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This is a methodical treatise on narration in different media types. It is not 
focused specifically on what is today thought to be modern media—forms 
of media that will soon probably be considered rather old-fashioned. 
Neither is it mainly focused on old media. Rather, it is about media char-
acteristics that are never new and will not ever become old. Similarly, it is 
not a treatise on old or new forms of narration; it is a theoretical rather 
than a historical study that should nevertheless be relevant for the under-
standing of narration in all times, including our own.
The title of this study reveals that it will be about narratives and stories. 
These notions should not be understood as separate things; later in the 
study, the story will be defined as the center of the narrative. It is here that 
one finds those essential transmedial media characteristics that make it 
possible for dissimilar media types to narrate in the same way, at least 
partly.
The treatise is divided into three parts. Part I, “Drawing the Frame”, 
presents established concepts and newly developed general concepts that I 
find indispensable for formulating a nuanced theoretical model of trans-
medial narration. In Part II, “Scrutinizing the Essentials”, I investigate 
those specific transmedial media characteristics that are most vital for real-
izing narratives in a plenitude of different media types. Part III, 
“Demonstrating the Principles”, contains some studies in which the nar-
rative potentials of a number of vastly diverse media types are illuminated 
with the aid of the theoretical framework.
PART I
Drawing the Frame
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Abstract This chapter provides a general introduction to the treatise. 
After a brief background sketch, some basic terminology concerning the 
field of transmedial narration is covered. This is followed by an overview 
of existing research in the area and declarations of the central research 
questions, aims, and goals of the investigation. Finally, an overview of the 
treatise is presented.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Transmediality • Transmediation • 
Transmedia storytelling
Everyday communication is full of simple and sometimes also complex 
narratives that make our lives and our surroundings comprehensible. 
These narratives are realized in a large variety of media types. On a typical 
day, I may meet one of my neighbors on my way to the mailbox and she 
will tell me, using shifting tones and intonations and sometimes vivid ges-
tures, about a weekend trip to her relatives in Gothenburg. At the break-
fast table, I read in the newspaper about all sorts of events: accidents and 
happenings in my region and political developments around the world. 
The written texts are visually formed in different ways and often combined 
or integrated with still images that contribute to or tell their own stories. 
Listening to the radio while brushing my teeth and feeding my cats, I first 
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hear a song about a problematic love affair and then an instrumental piece 
that depicts tensions among several emotional states. When I finally reach 
my worktable and start my computer, I receive an email from my daughter 
with a link to a short movie that I decide to watch before starting to work 
properly. The email tells a short story about the movie, which represents 
the adventures of a computer mouse.
Therefore, long before I have even had my first cup of coffee I have 
perceived an abundance of narratives. It is clear that many of these narra-
tives are, or may be, connected to each other. They do not exist in isola-
tion, and there are clearly no definite borders between narratives formed 
by dissimilar media types. Considering that there are no definitive borders 
between media types as such—they all overlap each other, in complex pat-
terns of similarities and differences—this is hardly surprising. Media obvi-
ously have their communicative capacities because of our cognitive 
faculties, and it is almost absurd to suggest the notion of a cognitive sys-
tem working in such a way that representations of events through one 
kind of medium could not in any way be matched by representations of 
events through other media forms. A brain that harbors a cognitive system 
composed of secluded, media-specific strata of information would be 
dysfunctional.
However, we do have the capacity to communicate about things 
through different forms of media in such a way that narratives in various 
media types connect to each other in highly meaningful ways. These con-
nections may be immediate, such as when my neighbor’s speech and ges-
tures together narrate about a trip, or when the written texts and still 
images in the newspaper narrate about a political crisis. However, the con-
nections may also cover temporal gaps: my daughter’s email may include a 
description of the movie that makes it possible for me to anticipate what 
goes on in it, and it is also possible for me to later tell my wife about what 
happened in the piece of music that I listened to in the morning.
Basic Terminology
Several complex capacities and phenomena are involved in these commu-
nicative occurrences. At the heart of the matter is how narratives may be 
created beyond specific media types or be moved across media borders; 
therefore, it is convenient to use terms starting with the Latin prefix 
‘trans-’—which means ‘beyond’, ‘across’, or ‘through’—to denote what is 
going on. As there are several expressions containing ‘trans-’ and ‘media’, 
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I will briefly comment on some central terms here and tie them to succinct 
conceptual definitions.
From the most wide-ranging perspective, the term ‘transmediality’ 
should be understood as referring to the general concept that different 
media types share many basic traits that can be described in terms of mate-
rial properties and abilities for activating mental capacities. All media 
products, in partly similar ways, are physical existences that trigger semi-
otic activity and can be properly understood only in relation to each other. 
Thus, physical media properties and semiosis are transmedial phenomena. 
More specifically, different media types may, to a large extent—although 
certainly not completely—communicate similar things, such as events 
forming narratives. Using more technical language, several media types 
may more or less fully represent “compound media characteristics” of vari-
ous sorts (Elleström 2014a: 39–45). In other words, represented media 
characteristics may be transmedial to different degrees. Transmediality is 
evidently a central part of intermediality, which is an even broader concept 
based on the proposition that different media types are interrelated in all 
kinds of ways.
It is only a short step from the idea that represented media characteris-
tics may be transmedial to different degrees to recognizing that media 
characteristics, because of their transmedial nature, can be understood as 
being transferred among different kinds of media. Inserting a temporal 
perspective, it very often makes sense to acknowledge not only that similar 
media characteristics are or may be represented by dissimilar media but 
also that media characteristics that can in some respect be understood as 
the same, recur after having appeared in another medium. The examples of 
a written email describing the events in a movie and spoken words retell-
ing a musical story both include a temporal gap between what might be 
called source and target media, but also the implicit notion of sameness. 
We find the relations between email and movie and between speech and 
music meaningful because the events that they represent are not only simi-
lar but in some respects the same (here, sameness should be understood as 
a pragmatic rather than a metaphysical quality). I refer to such a transfer of 
media characteristics as transmediation. In our minds, some perceived 
media characteristics of the target medium are, in important ways, the 
same as those of the source medium, which is to say that the media char-
acteristics of an initial medium are perceived to be represented again by 
another kind of medium (Elleström 2014a: 20–27).
 OPENING 
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Building on these brief stipulations, the term ‘transmedial narration’ 
should be understood to refer to all varieties of transmediality and trans-
mediation where narration is a media characteristic that is significant 
enough to be observed. In the most general terms, then, the concept of 
transmedial narration includes the notion that an abundance of different 
media types share traits that give them narrative capacities. In more spe-
cific terms, transmedial narration also includes the idea that the world is 
actually full of various sorts of more or less developed and complex narra-
tives communicated by different media types. In its most particular sense, 
transmedial narration can be understood as transmediation of narratives; 
the characteristics of narratives can be represented again by dissimilar 
media types and yet be perceived to be the same despite the transfer.
Transmedial narration, in its most general sense, must be accepted as a 
reality that has a bearing on a lot of communication. Furthermore, trans-
mediation of narratives is extremely common, not only in everyday com-
munication but also in more complex and official systems of communication 
such as education, research, and legal processes. It also flourishes in reli-
gion, art, and entertainment.
For some years now, Henry Jenkins’s concept of transmedia storytelling 
has been popular. This concept refers to the modern phenomenon of 
building large narratives as a sum of partial narratives distributed by differ-
ent kinds of media such as motion pictures, comics, video games, novels, 
and various forms of Internet-based media: “A transmedia story unfolds 
across multiple media platforms with each new text making a distinctive 
and valuable contribution to the whole” (Jenkins 2008: 97–98). In fact, 
this is an old and widespread phenomenon that can be observed in, for 
instance, Hindu, Greek, and Christian mythologies, although historical 
and cultural differences can obviously be noted (see for instance Ryan 
2013; Mittell 2014). Transmedia storytelling—narratives in different 
media types working together to form a larger whole—requires that nar-
ratives can be largely transmediated. It would not be possible to combine 
narratives from different media types to a larger whole if these narratives 
did not overlap. In effect, this means that one recognizes represented 
media characteristics in the different media as the same; thus, represented 
persons, environments, ideas, events, and their interrelations can inter-
lock. However, current research in transmedia storytelling does not 
engage what I consider to be the central questions of transmedial narra-





Although views differ considerably regarding most aspects of transmedial 
narration, the majority of researchers within the area seem to agree that 
narration is indeed a transmedial concept: media types that are not 
language- based may also narrate to a certain extent. Narration in various 
non-verbal media types has been noted, discussed, and to a certain degree 
theorized for centuries, although it has not been thoroughly conceptual-
ized until recently. Explicit recognition of narration as a transmedial phe-
nomenon can be found from the 1960s onward (Bremond 1964; Barthes 
1977 [1966]).
As media characteristics are clearly not either fully transmedial or not 
transmedial at all, the extent to which and ways in which narration is trans-
medial has been a principal question since the advent of thorough explora-
tions of the concept. Seymour Chatman, often quoted in the research on 
transmedial narration, maintained that the “transposability of the story is 
the strongest reason for arguing that narratives are indeed structures inde-
pendent of any medium” (Chatman 1978: 20; cf. Altman 2008: 1). Several 
commentators consider this to be an overstatement; because dissimilar 
media types have different means for communicating narratives, narrative 
structures cannot be understood as ‘independent’ of medium in a strong 
sense: “Narratives are not so much structures independent of any medium, 
as structures common to several media” (Walsh 2007: 63). Thus, narra-
tives always depend on some kind of medium to be realized; however, as 
different media types may generate narratives that are nevertheless recog-
nizable as the same, narrative structures can be understood to be ‘inde-
pendent’ of the medium, in a weak sense. Although media differences 
certainly do make a difference, the “transposability of the story” (Chatman 
1978: 20) remains.
To explain the relative dependency on media types, it is imperative to 
realize that the partly dissimilar and partly shared properties of various 
media types “both open up possibilities and impose constraints [that] 
shape the narration” (Rimmon-Kenan 1989: 160)—even though narra-
tion is “a process which is not in its basic aims specific to any medium [it] 
deploys the materials and procedures of each medium for its ends” 
(Bordwell 1985: 49). Marie-Laure Ryan, who has played an important 
role in the development of what she calls transmedial narratology, has 
articulated a nuanced view on the relation between media types and nar-
ration: “A core of meaning may travel across media, but its narrative 
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potential will be filled out, actualized differently when it reaches a new 
medium” (Ryan 2005: 1). Although I share the general views of Rimmon- 
Kenan, Bordwell, and Ryan on this matter, my way of conceptualizing 
transmedial narration in this treatise will differ substantially from all of the 
scholars quoted above (as will be demonstrated in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4).
The questions of how and to what extent narration is transmedial have 
also been debated in a more implicit way, through a steady flow of articles 
and books on narration in ever-new media types. Previous investigation in 
the area of transmedial narration raises some hope that research will be able 
to map and integrate knowledge about a very large range of different nar-
rative media types. The following list of examples of media that have been 
investigated from a narratological perspective since the 1970s (especially 
highlighting early studies of the respective media types) demonstrates 
impressive breadth. Apart from numerous studies of narration in various 
forms of written literature, there have been studies on narration in spoken, 
everyday language (Labov 1972); comics (Hünig 1974; Abbott 1986); 
painting (Alpers 1976; Steiner 1988: 7–42; Wolf 2003, 2004); literature 
and film (Chatman 1978); comics and image sequences (Schnackertz 
1980); written language, painting, and film (Goodman 1981); history 
writing (White 1981); painting and reliefs on ancient urns, walls, columns, 
and sarcophagi (Brilliant 1984); film music (Gorbman 1987); instrumental 
music (Newcomb 1987; Kramer 1991); drama (Richardson 1988); televi-
sion news (Campbell and Reeves 1989); written and oral language in the 
legal system (Brooks and Gewirtz 1998); literature and history writing 
(Canary and Kozicki 1978; Cohn 1990); mural decoration in churches 
(Lavin 1990); written language in economics and the natural sciences 
(Nash 1990); music in general and opera (Abbate 1991; McClatchie 
1997); advertisements (Stern 1994); spoken, everyday language and litera-
ture (Fludernik 1996); dance (Foster 1996); painting and photography 
(Kafalenos 1996); maps, diagrams, and advertisements (Kress and van 
Leeuwen 1996: 45–78); family photographs (Hirsch 1997); hypertext 
(Hayles 2001); still images and moving images (Ribière and Baetens 2001); 
film and television programs (Thompson 2003); all kinds of artistic media 
(Gaudreault and Marion 2004); computer games (Neitzel 2005); radio 
broadcasts of sports events (Ryan 2006); literature, comics, film, radio play, 
and hypertext (Mahne 2007); visual diagrams (Ryan 2007); music, litera-
ture, and drama (Almén 2008); written and oral language about the self 
(Eakin 2008); architecture and literature (Psarra 2009); sculpture (Wolf 
2011); mathematical proofs (Doxiadis 2012); mathematical diagrams 
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(de Freitas 2012); novels including photographs (Schwanecke 2012); jour-
nalism (Berning 2014); music and dance (Kutschke 2015); program music 
(Liu 2015); musical concept albums and their sleeves (Arvidson 2016); 
music combined with moving images (Giannoukakis 2016); and board 
games (Thibault 2016).
This breadth is emphasized even more if one considers the many collec-
tions of articles with really wide-ranging scopes of narrative media types. 
However, as Jan-Noël Thon accurately noted, “a genuinely transmedial 
narratology is not (or should not be) the same as a collection of media- 
specific narratological terms and concepts” (Thon 2016: 15). With some 
exceptions, this succinct observation can be used to criticize the setup of 
edited collections on narration in visual art, music, poetry, film, and com-
ics (Nünning and Nünning 2002); face-to-face communication, gestures, 
painting, comics, moving pictures, music, and digital media (Ryan 2004b); 
literature, comics, television serials, motion pictures, photonovels, photo 
collections, interactive writing on the Internet, computer games, and 
advertisements in television and radio (Grishakova and Ryan 2010); 
computer- mediated communication, video games, political speeches, and 
film (Hoffmann 2010); television programs, motion pictures, web texts, 
opera, comics, speech, gesture, and multimodal novels (Page 2010); 
drama, feature films, graphic novels, video games, literature, visual art, and 
television series (Ryan and Thon 2014); literature, drama, film, journal-
ism, television news, law courts, and oral communication (Nünning 
2015); and film music, songs, rock music, radio drama, video games, 
audio books, and audio guides (Mildorf and Kinzel 2016b).
Despite this remarkable range, most research on narration is concen-
trated on verbal media types, with robust narratological traditions in both 
linguistics and the study of literature. Furthermore, artistic media types, 
whether they include verbal components or not, dominate the research 
field. More importantly, one must conclude that the various perspectives 
on a wealth of media types are anything but broadly integrated. As Thon 
noted (2015: 441), monographs and articles on transmedial narration, as 
intermedial research at large—with only a few exceptions (such as Ryan 
2006)—consider just one or two media types at a time and are thus trans-
medial only in a weak sense.
While transmedial narratology is widespread to the extent that there are 
many studies of narration outside the verbal domain, the field is largely 
unexplored considering the few studies that seek to discover the common 
ground of narration in a broad range of media types. Although there has 
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been a lot of research for several decades on transmedial narration, there is 
presently only a piecemeal understanding of how the fundamentals of a 
genuinely transmedial theory of narration might look. This is remarkable 
considering the ubiquity of narratives in various media types in general, 
and more specifically transmediated narratives in all forms of communica-
tion. Notwithstanding several decades of research on the fundamental 
importance of narratives for humans, a truly transmedial conceptualiza-
tion of the central features of narration is still lacking. There are still no 
large-scale studies on transmedial narration in a strong sense, in which 
truly transmedial concepts useful for analyzing narration in a really broad 
scope of media types are methodically developed. Considering the diverg-
ing conceptualizations in the many studies on narration in various media, 
I conclude that such a fundamental conceptual framework is much needed.
This is not to say that narration is necessarily a completely transmedial 
phenomenon. Liviu Lutas’s contention that “narration in general can 
[not] be considered to be a trait that can be found in all media” (Lutas 
2016: 33) should be taken seriously. Clearly, not all kinds of media can 
narrate to the same degree; consequently, there are probably media types 
whose narrative capacities are so rudimentary that they might just as well 
be considered non-narrative. For the moment, however, I leave the pos-
sible borders of transmediality in narration open so that I can explore the 
whole media territory without restrictions.
aims and goals
It became clear in the previous section that the questions of how and to 
what extent narration is transmedial have been central in earlier research. 
They will remain so in this study. I have also already mentioned a couple 
of related questions that I find imperative: How are transmediations of 
narratives possible at all, and what are their limitations? The treatise will 
also be guided by some more specific research questions: How can narra-
tion be conceptualized within a broad communicative context, including 
psychological and cognitive aspects? How can narration be conceptualized 
so that both its wide-ranging transmedial potential and its media-specific 
limitations can be accounted for? What are the main constituents of narra-
tion understood in a truly transmedial way and how are they related to 
other central features of communication?
An eloquent quotation from Liv Hausken, expressing views that over-
lap closely with my own, shows the direction of my aim with this treatise:
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I believe that we should aspire to narrative theories that are independent of 
medium, while recognizing that the development of such theories demands 
a certain level of abstraction. Furthermore, I believe that we need medium- 
specific theories of narrative, theories with a conceptual apparatus suffi-
ciently specialized to define the actual differences between narratives in the 
various media. In addition to this, we need to be aware of the differences 
between the two types of narrative theories. The comparative study of nar-
rative in different media, either at the same time or one after the other, is 
one of the most efficient ways to expose both the common narrative features 
and the medium-specific aspects of the objects of study. (Hausken 2004: 
397)
While I recognize the great value of “medium-specific theories of narra-
tive”, my aim is to form a narrative theory that is “independent of medium” 
and to systematically chart its components to facilitate detection of also 
“medium-specific aspects”. I believe that the most efficient way of doing 
this is to anchor the conceptualization in a semiotic framework. While 
much classical narratology has been influenced by linguistic semiotics, 
especially the work by Ferdinand de Saussure, this is a blind alley for trans-
medial narratology. Language is only one, albeit very important, means of 
communication, and in my view all attempts to understand communica-
tion at large through essentially linguistic theories are doomed to fail. This 
is partly why semiotics has gained a bad reputation among some scholars. 
On the other hand, while the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce certainly 
has its pitfalls, it offers a foundational conceptualization that makes pos-
sible a truly transmedial understanding of communicative phenomena. 
Thus, I will use Peircean semiotics combined with some established theo-
ries of cognition and psychology. I will also apply some of my own previ-
ously developed concepts on communication, intermediality, and semiosis 
to structure the treatise.
Naturally, I will also profit from achievements in literary theory where 
narratology has vital roots. Whereas some of its concepts are very useful 
also for a transmedial approach, many are media-specific rather than trans-
medial and are therefore not suitable to deal with in a treatise like this. 
There is also much terminological and conceptual incongruity in the col-
lected body of narratological research, which leads me to avoid some 
terms that are used also for denoting potentially transmedial concepts, 
even though they emanate from language studies. For instance, I will not 
use the central term ‘discourse’, which has been employed in many ways 
that are rather confusingly interrelated. Instead, the central concepts and 
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distinctions that are associated with the term will be described in other 
ways.
Thus, I will disregard many ideas and concepts that have been discussed 
for decades in narratology, sometimes because I find them pointless and 
often because they are overly media-specific, meaning that they may be 
highly useful within a more limited frame. It is far beyond the purpose of 
this study to interrogate these many concepts that I choose to exclude. 
Instead, I will try to create an account of transmedial narration that is 
clearly focused on what is most distinctively transmedial, largely but not 
completely avoiding detours that might make my position within the 
whole narratological field clearer, but would at the same time distract the 
attention from my commitments.
I am aware of the risks of such an enterprise. In his insightful discus-
sions of the possibility of forming a truly transmedial narratology, Thon 
noted that the question remains “if decreasing the granularity of just about 
any narratological concept until it can somehow be applied to a sufficiently 
large number of narrative media is, in fact, a good idea” (Thon 2016: 23). 
Although I will certainly not try to adjust “just about any narratological 
concept” to fit in the transmedial costume, I expect that some readers of 
this study will find that my aim of forming a radically transmedial concept 
of narration is not a very good idea. Of course, I believe that it is; trans-
medial research sometimes demands not only “a certain level of abstrac-
tion” (Hausken 2004: 397) but a very high level of abstraction indeed. 
Although much traditional flesh will have to be carved off the bones (not 
necessarily to be discarded, but rather to be remolded), I believe that it is 
only by starting with the naked transmedial skeleton of narration that one 
can really detect the similarities and differences among more media- 
specific narratologies.
Therefore, my ambition is to make this treatise more broadly transme-
dial than the already existing works on transmedial narration, such as 
Thon’s (2016) in many ways exemplary and thorough investigation of 
some central narratological concepts applied to feature films, graphic nov-
els, and video games. Although Thon’s approach is certainly broadly 
transmedial, it would be quite difficult to include, say, narration in instru-
mental music or mathematical equations in his framework. A concept such 
as storyworld, which is central for Thon, presupposes that narratives are 
understood as representations of concrete, anthropomorphic characters 
moving around and acting in three-dimensional surroundings. This is not 
at all a suitable way of conceptualizing narration in media types such as 
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instrumental music—and this is not a far-fetched example, since there is 
quite extensive research on musical narration from which concepts such as 
storyworld are largely absent. Regardless of how useful concepts such as 
storyworld may be for understanding narration in several media types, 
they are not transmedial enough to find their way into this study.
However, my intention is not only to put aside concepts that are too 
media-specific but also to embed the investigation of transmedial narration 
in some central issues of communication at large. Therefore, I will include 
elaborations on concepts of communication that actually go beyond the 
defining traits of narration but are essential for making sense of them. 
Hence, another purpose of this work is to put the issue of transmedial nar-
ration in a wide-ranging setting of transmedial communication.
Although I will strive for logical coherence and systematic rigor, and 
certainly apply many distinctions, I will also resist the tendency to form 
too rigid conceptual structures. Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1981) criti-
cized the tendency in early narratology to form dualistic concepts (such as 
story vs. discourse). My own conceptual distinctions should be under-
stood as ways of modeling the complexities of transmedial narration and 
developing suggestions for methodical thinking about media interrela-
tions. Thus, I wish to avoid trying to define or postulate criteria for what 
narratives are as such or how narratives in different media types are actu-
ally, by themselves, related to each other. If pushed too far, these questions 
become rather pointless. Narration is a perceived quality that is always 
somehow grounded in certain media products, and sometimes very 
strongly so, but is ultimately evoked by the perceivers. Consequently, nar-
rative transmedial interrelations are also, to a large extent, phenomena 
that emerge in the mind of the perceivers. Therefore, I will interrogate 
how narratives may be construed by perceivers on the basis of various sorts 
of media products. A crucial goal is to improve our understanding of how 
such perceived narrative qualities depend on both basic, material media 
traits and mental operations that may be either very subjective or strongly 
intersubjective.
But why bother about transmedial narration at all? On the most general 
level, it is important to be able to understand and analyze ubiquitous com-
municative phenomena such as narration simply because communication 
is so vital for the existence of human beings—and a proper understanding 
of the place of narration in communication at large requires a transmedial 
approach. More specifically, a transmedial perspective on communication 
and narration is necessary for creating links among more-or-less isolated 
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research areas that would profit from cross-fertilization. A transmedial 
methodology makes it possible to compare, in some detail, how narration 
works in areas of communication that are, by routine, considered to be 
unrelated.
Furthermore, developed transmedial concepts enable careful investiga-
tions of how narratives are transmediated in all forms of communication in 
the whole society—from casual everyday communication to advanced 
political, artistic, or scientific communication—and what the consequences 
of such transmediations might be in terms of both added and corrupted 
significance. One vital media characteristic that may be distorted by trans-
mediation, sometimes with immense implications, is truthfulness; coming 
closer to an understanding of these processes appears to be urgent.
Although it is certainly meaningful and necessary to also investigate 
media-specific narration, such endeavors will remain incapable of contrib-
uting to a broader understanding of narration and human communication 
at large as long as transmedial narration is not a point of reference.
disposiTion
In the remainder of Part I “Drawing the Frame”, narration is first put into 
the area of communication at large. In Chap. 2, I propose several general 
concepts for modeling communication and relate these to some influential 
psychological and cognitive concepts. After that, the stage is set for a 
transmedial definition of narration followed by semiotic and cognitive 
elaborations in Chap. 3. Chapter 4 explores the fundamental similarities 
and differences among media types to explain why different media types 
may narrate to different degrees.
Part II, “Scrutinizing the Essentials”, systematically investigates the 
core characteristics of narration and some general forms of transmedial 
media characteristics that I find essential to framing narration. Chapter 5 
suggests a methodical and profoundly transmedial way of analyzing narra-
tors that are external and internal to narratives. Chapter 6 circumscribes 
the concept of event, central to narration, and Chap. 7 scrutinizes the 
equally fundamental concept of temporal relationships among events, pro-
posing some distinctions that are vital for grasping media differences. In 
Chap. 8, the formation of internal coherence in narratives is illuminated 
from several theoretical perspectives. Chapter 9 proposes some analytical 
tools for understanding how communication in general and narration in 
particular can be truthful to what we perceive to be the actual world.
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Finally, the brief Part III of the treatise, “Demonstrating the Principles”, 
illuminates and roughly summarizes some vital concepts and ideas. Its 
single chapter (Chap. 10) includes four sections investigating narration in 
dissimilar media types: painting, instrumental music, mathematical equa-
tions, and guided tours. These studies elucidate the usefulness of the theo-
retical framework developed in the treatise and highlight the media 
similarities and differences that make narration a profoundly transmedial 
but nevertheless media-dependent phenomenon.
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Abstract This chapter puts narration into the area of communication at 
large. Narration does not exist independently of minds but is a result of 
people communicating with each other. Therefore, some general concepts 
for modeling communication and the work of communicating minds are 
provided, partly influenced by Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotics. The 
importance of background knowledge for the realization of narration is 
emphasized and the issue of transmedial narration is related to some influ-
ential psychological and cognitive concepts.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Communication • Mediation • 
Representation • Gestalt • Image scheme
Having presented the map and calibrated the compass, I will now sketch 
the contours of a conceptual framework for communication. Narration 
does not exist by itself; it happens when we communicate with each other. 
Consequently, narratives and stories are not something that we find float-
ing around independently but something that is communicated by minds. 
Before I define narration in Chap. 3 and then scrutinize transmedial nar-
ration, this chapter will present certain general concepts that I find helpful 
for modeling communication and the work of communicating minds. 
Without such a background, it is difficult to model narration and the work 
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of narrating minds; the part cannot be properly understood without access 
to the whole.
CommuniCation, mediation, RepResentation
I start by postulating that communication should be understood here not 
only as communication among minds in general, but more specifically 
among human minds. This is simply because the capacities of human 
minds partly differ from the capacities of the minds of other animals. While 
recent research has revealed amazing cognitive abilities among several 
mammals and birds, there are still large differences. Although these differ-
ences can be bridged, making communication among different species 
possible and even widespread, a discussion of that subject is beyond the 
limits of this study.
To communicate is to share ideas, thoughts, notions, and understand-
ings. I call these shared entities cognitive import. At least two minds must 
be involved in communication and, somehow, a transfer of cognitive 
import occurs between them. My suggestion is to speak and write about 
the producer’s mind and the perceiver’s mind to refer to the mental places 
in which cognitive import appears. First, there are certain mental configu-
rations in the producer’s mind; then, following the communicative trans-
fer, there are mental configurations in the perceiver’s mind that are at least 
remotely similar to those in the producer’s mind. Clearly, an intermediate 
entity is required to make such a transfer possible. I suggest calling this 
intermediate entity a media product. A media product enables the complex 
transfer of cognitive import from one (or several) producer’s mind(s) to 
one (or several) perceiver’s mind(s). I have elaborated on all these notions 
elsewhere (Elleström 2018a, b). It may be noted, for instance, that in 
certain media types, such as those called interactive, one and the same 
mind may have the separate functions of being both co-producer and per-
ceiver of the evolving media product.
The media product must be somehow material, although not necessar-
ily solid or even palpable. It needs to be a physical entity or process that 
has the capacity to trigger mental reactions through semiosis, meaning 
that it prompts the creation of cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind; it 
acquires the function of a sign or a collection of signs. As the transfer of 
cognitive import among minds involves both material and mental aspects, 
I find it helpful to distinguish between two profoundly interrelated but 
discernible basic facets of the communicative process: mediation and rep-
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resentation (Elleström 2014a: 11–20). Mediation is the display of sensory 
configurations that are perceived by human sense receptors within a com-
municative situation. It is a presemiotic phenomenon and should be 
understood as the physical realization of entities (with material, sensorial, 
and spatiotemporal qualities, and semiotic potential). Consider the exam-
ple of a person hearing certain sounds. Representation is a semiotic phe-
nomenon and should be understood as the heart of signification (which is 
delimited here to how humans create cognitive import in communica-
tion). When a human agent makes sense of the mediated sensory configu-
rations, sign functions are activated and representation is at work. Using 
the example, the listener may interpret the sounds she has heard as a voice 
uttering meaningful words.
My current emphasis is on the idea that both a presemiotic and a semi-
otic side exist to basic encounters with media. Whereas the concept of 
mediation highlights the material realization of the medium, the concept 
of representation highlights the semiotic conception of the medium. 
Although mediation and representation are clearly entangled in complex 
ways, upholding a theoretical distinction between them is helpful in ana-
lyzing complex relations and processes. In practice, however, mediation 
and representation are deeply interrelated. Every representation is based 
on the distinctiveness of a specific mediation. Furthermore, some types of 
mediation facilitate certain types of representation and render other types 
of representation impossible. As a case in point, vibrating air emerging 
from the vocal chords and lips that is perceived as sound, but not as words, 
is well suited for the iconic representation of bird song, whereas such 
sounds cannot possibly form a detailed, three-dimensional iconic repre-
sentation of a cathedral. However, distinctive differences among media-
tions are frequently subtler and less easily spotted without close and 
systematic examination.
Thus, representation in communication is the creation of cognitive 
import through perception and cognition. To say that a media product 
represents something is to say that it triggers a certain type of interpreta-
tion. This interpretation may be more or less hardwired in the media 
 product and the manner in which one perceives it with one’s senses, but it 
never exists independently of the cognitive activity of the recipient—there 
are no signs unless there is a mind to activate sign functions. When some-
thing represents, it calls forth something else; the representing entity 
makes something else—the represented—present to the mind. This is to 
say, in terms of Charles Sanders Peirce’s foundational semiotic concepts, 
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that a sign or representamen stands for an object; Peirce’s third sign con-
stituent, the interpretant, may be understood as the mental result of the 
representamen–object relation (see for instance, 1932: CP 2.228–229 [c. 
1897]). My concept of cognitive import created in the perceiver’s mind in 
communication is an example of Peirce’s concept of interpretant. However, 
the entire triad of sign constituents is actually part of a mental process, 
although both representamens and objects may be connected to external 
material elements or phenomena (see Elleström 2014b).
Whereas representation—the very essence of the semiotic—constantly 
occurs in our minds when we think without having to be prompted by 
sensory perceptions, it is also triggered by external stimuli. In this context, 
it is appropriate to focus on external stimuli resulting from mediation. In 
other words, representation also occurs in pure thinking and in the per-
ception of things and phenomena that are not part of mediation, but the 
account of representation in this research is mainly limited to the creation 
of cognitive import on the basis of mediated sensory configurations—
stimuli picked up by our sense receptors in communicative situations. The 
contention is that all media products represent in various ways as soon as 
sense is attributed to them. Hence, the media product can be understood 
as an assemblage of representamens that, due to their physical qualities, 
represent certain objects (that are available to the perceiver), thus creating 
interpretants (cognitive import) in the perceiver’s mind.
I find these concepts indispensable for a methodical modeling of 
meaning- making processes in communication, and they will serve as a firm 
spine for delineating the concept of narration and, in particular, the trans-
medial aspects of narration. As the following chapters will demonstrate, 
these concepts make it possible to discern the fundamental similarities 
among media and still pinpoint where the essential dissimilarities are to be 
found. However, they should be complemented with some concepts that 
highlight the importance of background knowledge for meaning-making.
BaCkgRound knowledge, ViRtual spheRes
As no mind is a static and isolated entity that is dependent only on its 
inherited characters, the concept of communicated cognitive import in the 
producer’s and the perceiver’s mind must be examined also with an 
emphasis on how minds are molded by surrounding factors. In addition to 
its innate basic capacity to perceive and interpret mediated qualities (dis-
cussed in more detail later), the mind is inclined to form cognitive import 
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on the basis of acquired knowledge, experiences, beliefs, expectations, 
preferences, and values—preconceptions that are largely shaped by indi-
vidual experiences of culture, society, geography, and history. It is clear 
that all this is immensely important for the outcome of communication. 
The perceiver’s mind acts upon the perceived media product on the basis 
of both its hardwired cognitive capacities and its attained predispositions; 
evidently, the cognitive import that is stored in the mind before the media 
product is perceived has a significant effect—to various degrees—on the 
new cognitive import formed by communication.
This is a recognized phenomenon that has been extensively theorized 
in various ways and minutely scrutinized within theory of interpretation 
and other research areas. What I offer here is a complementary semiotic 
way of modeling how cognitive import in communication is formed by 
private and public environments. Although I focus on the perceiver’s 
mind, the basic suggested principles are also relevant to the formation of 
cognitive import in the producer’s mind.
I have already established that the representamens that initiate semiosis 
in communication come from sensory perception of media products. One 
perceives configurations of sound, vision, touch, and so forth that are cre-
ated or brought out by someone and understood to signify something. 
They make objects (in the Peircean sense) present to one’s mind—and 
eventually result in interpretants based on the representamen–object rela-
tion: it is these interpretants that constitute the cognitive import being 
communicated. But where do the objects come from? They clearly do not 
emerge out of nothing; they are drawn forth from earlier percepts, sensa-
tions, and notions that are stored in the perceiver’s mind, either in long- 
term or short-term memory that may also cover ongoing communication. 
‘Earlier’ could be a century ago or a fraction of a second ago.
In semiotic terms, the stored mental entities may be direct percepts 
from outside of communication, interpretants from semiosis outside of 
communication, interpretants from semiosis in earlier communication, or 
interpretants from semiosis in ongoing communication. This is to say that 
objects of semiosis always require “collateral experience” (Peirce 1958: 
CP 8.177–185 [1909]; cf. Bergman 2009) that may derive both from 
within and without ongoing communication. In other words, collateral 
experience may both be formed by semiosis inside the spatiotemporal 
frame of the communicative act and stem from other, earlier involvements 
with the world, including former communication as well as direct experi-
ence of the surrounding existence.
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In line with this twofold origin of collateral experience, I distinguish 
between two intertwined but distinct areas in the mind of the perceiver of 
media products: the intracommunicational and the extracommunicational 
domains. In doing so, I emphasize a difference between the forming of 
cognitive import in ongoing communication and what precedes and sur-
rounds it (Elleström 2018a, Forthcoming; related but divergent distinc-
tions in cognitive psychology have been proposed by Brewer 1987: 187). 
I also find it appropriate to make a corresponding distinction between 
intracommunicational and extracommunicational objects, both of which 
are formed by collateral experience from their respective domains.
From a broad temporal perspective, the extracommunicational domain 
is clearly prior to each new intracommunicational domain created and 
should therefore be understood as the background area in the mind of the 
perceiver of media products. This comprises everything one is already 
familiar with. As it is a mental domain, it does not consist of the world as 
such, but rather of what one believes and knows through perception and 
semiosis. In other words, one’s stored experiences not only consist of per-
cepts as such but also of percepts that have been contemplated and pro-
cessed by the mind through semiosis. This involves estimations and 
evaluations of encounters with people, societies, and cultures that are con-
sciously or unconsciously accepted, put in doubt, or rejected. The extra-
communicational domain includes experiences of both what one presumes 
to be more objective state of affairs (e.g., dogs, universities, music, and 
statistical relations), what one presumes to be more subjective state of 
affairs (states of mind related to individual experiences), and everything in 
between. Thus, it is actually formed in one’s mind not only through semi-
osis and immediate external perception but also through interoception, 
proprioception, and mental introspection. Hence, the extracommunica-
tional/intracommunicational domain distinction is very different from 
exterior/interior to the mind, world/individual, material/mental, and 
objective/subjective.
It is imperative to note that vital parts of the extracommunicational 
domain are constituted by perception and interpretation of media prod-
ucts. Thus, former communication is very much part of what precedes and 
surrounds ongoing communication. Together, non-communicative and 
communicative prior experiences form “a horizon of possibilities”, to bor-
row an expression from Marie-Laure Ryan (1984: 127); the extracom-
municational domain is the reservoir from which entities are collected to 
form new constellations of objects in the intracommunicational domain.
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In contrast to the extracommunicational domain, the intracommunica-
tional domain is at the foreground of the mind of the perceiver of media 
products. It is formed by one’s perception and interpretation of the media 
products that are present in the ongoing act of communication. It is based 
on both extracommunicational objects (emanating from the extracom-
municational domain) and intracommunicational objects (arising in the 
intracommunicational domain) that together result in interpretants mak-
ing up a salient cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind. However, the 
intracommunicational domain is largely mapped upon the extracommuni-
cational domain. Rehashing Ryan’s “principle of minimal departure” 
(1980: 406), I argue that one construes the intracommunicational domain 
as being the closest possible to the extracommunicational domain and 
allows for deviations only when they cannot be avoided. In other words, 
one does not question familiar ideas and experiences until such question-
ing is called for.
As the intracommunicational domain is formed by communicative 
semiosis, it may be called a virtual sphere. The virtual should not be under-
stood in opposition to the actual but as something that has potential. 
Hence, I define the virtual as a mental sphere, created by communicative 
semiosis, that has the potential to have real connections to the extracom-
municational. In other words, a virtual sphere may possibly represent 
extracommunicational objects indexically (indices being signs based on 
real connections); it may be truthful to the extracommunicational domain 
(this notion of truthfulness is further elaborated in Elleström (Forthcoming) 
and will be conferred in some detail in Chap. 9 in this treatise).
A virtual sphere can consist of many kinds of cognitive import. This 
could be anything from a brief thought triggered by a few spoken words, 
a gesture, or a quick glance at an advertisement, to a complex narrative or 
a scientific theory formed by hours of watching television or reading 
books. Depending on the degree of attention to the media products, the 
borders of a virtual sphere need not be clearly defined. As communication 
is generally anything but flawless, a virtual sphere may be very incomplete 
or even fragmentary. It may also include clashing ideas or inconsistent 
notions. As virtual spheres consist of cognitive import resulting from com-
munication, they are, by definition, shareable among minds to some 
extent.
The coexistence of intracommunicational and extracommunicational 
objects results in a possible double view on virtual spheres. From one 
point of view, they form self-ruled spheres with a certain degree of experi-
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enced autonomy; from another point of view, they are always heavily 
dependent on the extracommunicational domain. The crucial point is that 
intracommunicational objects cannot be created ex nihilo; in effect, they 
are completely derived from extracommunicational objects. This is because 
nothing can actually be grasped in communication without the resource of 
extracommunicational objects. Even the most fanciful narratives require 
recognizable objects in order to make sense (cf. Bergman 2009: 261). To 
be more precise: intracommunicational objects are always, in some way, 
parts, combinations, or blends of extracommunicational objects. Even 
more precisely, intracommunicational objects are parts, combinations, or 
blends of interpretants resulting from representation of extracommunica-
tional objects. For example, it is possible to represent a griffin (which, to 
the best of our knowledge, exists only in virtual spheres) because we are 
acquainted with extracommunicational material objects such as lions and 
eagles that can easily be combined. A virtual sphere may even include 
notions such as a round square, consisting of two mutually exclusive extra-
communicational objects that together form an odd intracommunica-
tional object. Literary characters such as Lily Briscoe in Virginia Woolf’s 
novel To the Lighthouse are composite intracommunicational objects con-
sisting of extracommunicational material and mental objects that stem 
from the world as one knows it. One cannot imagine Lily Briscoe unless 
one is fairly familiar with notions such as walking, talking, and eating; what 
it means to refer to persons with certain names; what women and men, 
adults and children are; what it means to love and to be bored; and what 
artistic creation is. Also, more purely mental extracommunicational objects 
may be modified or united into new mental intracommunicational objects. 
Objects such as familiar emotions may be combined into novel intracom-
municational objects consisting of conflicts between or blends of emotions 
that are perceived as unique, although one is already acquainted with the 
components. For instance, one may already be familiar with the separate 
emotions of feeling affection and disgust and then, through  communication, 
have these clashing sensations merged into what one perceives as a new 
intracommunicational object.
The question that then arises is, if all intracommunicational objects are 
ultimately derived from extracommunicational objects, how come virtual 
spheres, narratives and others, are often experienced as having a certain 
degree of autonomy? This is because they, either in part or in whole, may 
be perceived as new gestalts that disrupt the connection to the extracom-
municational domain. This happens when one does not immediately rec-
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ognize the new composites of extracommunicational objects. The reason 
why they are not re-cognized is that they have not earlier been cognized 
in the particular constellation or merger in which they appear in the virtual 
sphere. Several such disruptions lead to greater perceived intracommuni-
cational domain autonomy. Even though intracommunicational objects 
are entirely dependent on extracommunicational objects, one could say 
that they emerge within the intracommunicational domain.
The relation between extracommunicational and intracommunicational 
objects may be even more complex than hitherto indicated. 
Intracommunicational objects that are perceived as new gestalts might, in 
turn, be part of more embracing gestalts that are recognized from the 
extracommunicational domain. A virtual sphere can contain representa-
tions of intracommunicational objects such as living trains formed by 
familiar extracommunicational objects such as ‘man-made machines for 
transportation’ and ‘the quality of being animate and conscious’ that 
together form a new gestalt. However, when living trains quarrel or fall in 
love with each other, they interact in a way that is directly recognized from 
the extracommunicational domain. The conclusion is that intracommuni-
cational objects may be interspersed among extracommunicational objects 
in numerous, complicated ways.
In brief, then, virtual spheres are made of clusters of objects repre-
sented by media products; these clusters form cognitive import with a 
certain degree of internal coherence. This may be described as intracom-
municational indexicality, indices being signs based on real connections; 
in this case, connections within a virtual sphere (the notion of internal 
coherence is developed in Elleström (Forthcoming) and will be dealt 
with in Chap. 8 in this study). I submit that narratives should be under-
stood as virtual spheres with certain features, to be defined in the next 
chapter. As virtual spheres, by definition, may be communicated, it fol-
lows that they are intersubjective to a certain extent; they may be shared 
among several minds.
The advantage of such a conceptualization is that narratives can be 
neatly compared with other forms of communicated cognitive import; 
they are given a theoretical as well as pragmatic framework that enables 
methodical investigations of both the peculiarities and the commonalities 
of narratives. While narration is a communicative form that is specific and 
important enough to deserve special attention, it is, at the same time, only 
a variation of, and sometimes not at all clearly delimited from, producing 
virtual spheres in general. Furthermore, the concept of virtual sphere 
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offers an instrument to relate narratives and other clusters of objects rep-
resented by media products to what we perceive to be the actual world and 
to the background knowledge of the perceivers in a nuanced way (see also 
Chap. 9).
It should also be noted that the concept of virtual sphere is compatible 
with the common narratological concept of storyworld. However, although 
the latter concept is defined in a variety of ways by different authors, it is 
clear that the idea of a storyworld is narrower than the idea of a virtual 
sphere: it mainly refers to the kinds of virtual spheres that may be evoked 
by certain kinds of artistic media types such as literature, motion pictures, 
and comics, characterized by the prevalence of represented humans that 
act and interact in clearly perceptible spatiotemporal settings (see, for 
instance, Ryan and Thon 2014).
peRCeption, gestalts, image sChemes
I have suggested that virtual spheres are utterly dependent on background 
knowledge, which in more technical semiotic terms may be called extra-
communicational objects. I have also suggested that, even though virtual 
spheres are composed of already known objects, narratives and other vir-
tual spheres are generally experienced as having a certain degree of auton-
omy and coherence. Both of these interconnected conceptualizations are 
compatible with influential psychological and cognitive theories. Gestalt 
psychology has long taught us that, whether we want to or not, we con-
stantly structure sensory perceptions to make them coherent and intelli-
gible. Early on, the leading gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler 
established that “stimulation, as such, is completely unorganized”. The 
result of the operation of the rules of “sensory organization”, which aim 
to put related things together in gestalts, is very often “a kind of recon-
struction of those aspects of the objective physical situation which are 
temporarily lost on the way between the objects and the sense organ”; 
therefore, this process is in no way absolutely reliable (Köhler 1929: 177).
Modern cognitive and neurological research also confirms what many 
philosophers have suspected: that our perception is always an interpreta-
tion of the external world. The stimuli that reach our senses are not in 
themselves systematically arranged patterns that mirror actual reality but 
are instead a collection of more-or-less separate stimuli that the brain, on 
the basis of inherited skills and acquired experience, puts together into a 
comprehensible unity; they become meaningful by receiving form. Some 
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information is selected and some is neglected. In fact, perception “may 
have evolved exclusively for extracting statistical regularities from the nat-
ural world” (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1997: 453). Although it 
increases our chances of survival to believe that our sensations are immedi-
ate effects of perceived external matters, and it is indeed the external world 
that causes our sensations, it is not the perceived external world, the world 
we see and feel, that causes our sensations. The perceived item (not the 
item in itself, of course) is actually caused by our perception of that item. 
Thus, as Norman N.  Holland concluded in his enlightening article on 
neurological research from the point of view of literary reader-response 
criticism, the item is a projection of our sensations (Holland 2002: 29).
Neurological research has also established the idea that separate pieces 
of information are given meaning when perceived as coherent form, as 
forcefully demonstrated by gestalt psychology. This idea can actually be 
related to the notion that background knowledge shapes all semiosis, 
including the formation of virtual spheres. Perhaps the most foundational 
sort of background knowledge consists of our experiences of being living 
bodies moving within and interacting with the surrounding world, includ-
ing other living bodies. Mark Johnson famously demonstrated that, as a 
result of these profound experiences, our minds are embodied. His con-
cept of image schemas, understood as “preconceptual gestalt structures” 
that are formed by bodily experiences and various sorts of perception, 
gives an account of how this particular kind of background experience 
actually permeates the ways we think and communicate (Johnson 1987: 
74). The influential psychologist Jean Mandler, who more generally 
emphasized the importance of perception of the outside world, stated that 
“children become able to think, that is, to go beyond perceptual categori-
zation to form concepts” because “the attributes of adult concepts can be 
derived from the primitives of infants”. Perceptual categorization involves 
elements of “conceptual activity”, which means that all of our earliest 
 concepts are based on sensory experience. Mandler proposed that “per-
ceptual analysis results in redescriptions of spatial structure in the form of 
image- schemas” (1992: 587). Thus, both Johnson and Mandler stressed 
the close connection between bodily experiences and thinking, and both 
used the term ‘image scheme’ to denote the idea that bodily experiences 
and perception deeply affect thinking and conceptualization.
My conclusion is that the concept of image scheme also involves an idea 
of coherence: our thinking strives toward coherence partly because it is, to 
a large extent, derived from bodily perception, which our minds strive to 
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give meaningful coherent form because it is beneficial for our survival. 
Importantly, sensory perceptions are not the only phenomena structured 
by our brains. Cognitive formations, such as those in virtual spheres, are 
also structured to make sense—to fit schemes. Therefore, gestalt psycho-
logical principles should also be valid for stimuli that have already been 
cognitively processed into conceptions. Whether we want them to or not, 
our minds also form thoughts, ideas, and notions into meaningful, some-
how coherent gestalts. We crave structure and sense and virtual spheres are 
offspring of such organizing mental activities. Thus, narration is an impor-
tant example of our need and inclination to represent and understand the 
world around us as meaningful gestalts.
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Abstract This chapter concisely demarcates narration within the broad 
field of communication. The story, which should be understood as the 
scaffolding core of a narrative, is circumscribed as represented events that 
are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way. This definition is precise 
enough to be operable, yet general enough to work transmedially. After 
specifying a number of vital implications of the definition, these implica-
tions are elaborated in the context of some concepts in semiotics and cog-
nitive science.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Narrative: Story • Represented 
events • Cognitive schemata • Collateral experience
Having outlined a general conceptual framework in the previous chapter, 
we are now in a position to drill down to the issue of demarcating narra-
tion within the broad field of communication. In this chapter I will sug-
gest how narration can be circumscribed more precisely. Building on 
earlier research, I will first seek to formulate as precise definitions as pos-
sible of the concepts that are required to shape a transmedial understand-
ing of narration. I will then elaborate on these defined concepts through 
an interrogation of some vital semiotic and cognitive ideas. Thus, the 
chapter will first narrow down the perspective, only to broaden it again.
36
Transmedial delineaTions
Almost all definitions of narration and narratives in the literature are clearly 
related to each other. On the whole, then, there is little serious disagree-
ment about how the central concept denoted by terms such as ‘narration’ 
and ‘narrative’ should be understood. The disagreements are to be found 
in those important details that make it possible to operationalize the con-
cept in various ways. Those particulars are often more or less media- specific 
and hence, from a transmedial perspective, too peripheral to fit into a 
precise definition. Here, I will illustrate with a handful of succinct defini-
tions from research on various media areas.
Writing about spoken language, William Labov specified a narrative as 
“a verbal sequence of clauses” that represents events: “we can define a 
minimal narrative as a sequence of two clauses which are temporally 
ordered”, meaning that the represented events must contain at least one 
“temporal juncture” (Labov 1972: 359–361). The most media-specific 
elements here are clearly “verbal” and “clauses”. Discarding them, the 
idea of at least two represented events that are temporally ordered remains. 
Working mainly with literature, Gerald Prince’s most schematic descrip-
tion of a narrative says that it “may be defined as the representation of real 
or fictive events and situations in a time sequence” (Prince 1982: 1). This 
is already a functioning transmedial definition, although the notion of 
situation is perhaps not transmedially ideal. As will be demonstrated in 
Chap. 9, I also find the distinction between “real or fictive events” to be 
much too crude to be useful. Vincent Meelberg, who mainly works with 
music but with a pronounced transmedial approach, defined a narrative as 
“the representation of a succession of events that succeed each other in 
time” (Meelberg 2006: 39). This is also a fully functioning transmedial 
definition, although, on closer inspection, Meelberg’s idea of representa-
tion turns out to be much too narrow as it excludes several media types 
from the realm of representation. Finally, Murray Smith, who also 
approached the matter transmedially, first suggested that “A narrative is 
constituted by a set of agents and events linked in a cause-effect fashion” 
(Smith 2009: 2). After some discussion about uncertainties, he excluded 
the concept of agents and stated that “Perhaps the most minimal defini-
tion would stipulate only that, in a narrative, events must be represented 
in time” (Smith 2009: 3).
I have no objections to such a conclusion, although naturally every-
thing depends on exactly how one understands the concepts of representa-
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tion, events, and temporal relations—and on how one frames these 
entities. My way of explicating narration is to conceptualize it in terms of 
communication and media products—the intermediate entities of com-
munication among minds—and how one construes cognitive import on 
the basis of media products. I have already stated that narratives are virtual 
spheres with certain features, and this statement can now be qualified by 
adding exactly the indispensable features that we have recently approached: 
narratives are virtual spheres containing events that are represented in 
time. This means that the events are represented in such a way that they 
are understood to occur at different points of time within the virtual 
sphere, whether these moments are situated in the past, in the present, or 
in the future in relation to the creation of the representing media product. 
In line with much narratological research, I also argue that the events 
must be perceived to be meaningfully related—a notion that I prefer to 
keep rather open, given the multitude of cognitive operations available for 
us to make valid connections among things and phenomena.
I believe that these conditions are both specific enough to be practically 
useful and general enough to be broadly transmedial. Therefore, I pro-
pose defining a narrative as a virtual sphere, emerging in communication, 
containing events that are temporally related to each other in a meaningful 
way. Thus, the core of a narrative is exactly this: represented events that are 
temporally interrelated in a meaningful way. As the core consists of several 
elements, it might also be described as a scaffold. I also suggest that a 
whole virtual sphere containing such a core and normally also other media 
characteristics should be called a narrative and that the scaffolding core 
should be called a story. Narration should simply be understood as the 
communication of narratives.
From this, it follows that what we perceive to be the same story may be 
realized in dissimilar settings in different narratives. What we recognize as 
basically the same story can be narrated in different ways. For those 
acquainted with literature and film narratology, this conclusion does not 
come as a surprise. However, the nature of the sameness of stories has 
been debated, and here I prefer to take a pragmatic stance. I simply do not 
believe that there is a method of exactly delimiting the story of an actual 
narrative; virtual spheres are rather fragile mental constructs that cannot 
always be intersubjectively dissected. The philosophical difficulty of estab-
lishing whether stories in different narratives are “the same” or only 
belong to the same “story type” (Smuts 2009), for instance, is interesting 
but of little significance for understanding transmediality. I do not think 
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that definitively establishing such issues is necessary or even possible out-
side the realm of copyright trials. While the complexity of actual cases of 
narration may be illuminated and partly disentangled with the aid of the 
theoretical distinction between narrative and story, there is not necessarily 
always a point in trying to establish exact borders. I would argue that 
boundaries between complete narratives and their scaffolding story cores 
might well be differently conceived depending on the perceiver’s back-
ground knowledge and perspectives. What is crucial for transmedial 
research is that it is possible, common, and often useful to perceive that 
vital core constituents of some narratives—certain events being temporally 
related in certain ways—are more or less similar to vital core constituents 
of other narratives, possibly represented by other media types.
Given these conditions, it must also be emphasized that stories may 
either be construed for the first time by the perceivers of media products 
(on the basis of salient structures emerging as the narratives develop in the 
mind) or be recognized (from earlier encounters with narratives or events 
in the world). In other words, the story may be based either mainly on 
intracommunicational objects arising in the virtual sphere, or on extra-
communicational objects in the form of already known stories or perceived 
events. In any case, stories have no autonomous existence, as one might be 
led to believe by certain narratological discussions. They are always results 
of some sort of interpretation performed by certain persons in particular 
communicative circumstances; never objective existences, but possibly 
intersubjectively construed (cf. Thon 2016).
The theoretical distinction between a complete narrative and its scaf-
folding core story is essential for understanding transmedial narration: sto-
ries are embedded in narratives and they may also, to a certain extent, be 
realized by dissimilar media. However, the surrounding narratives and the 
representing media products are often conflated in narrative theory and 
sometimes termed discourse (they are not conflated by Chatman, though; 
see 1978: 23–24). However, there are not only two levels here—called, 
for instance, story and discourse—but rather three (cf. Genette 1980 
[1972] and Bal 2009 who also suggested three-layer distinctions, although 
quite different from mine; cf. also discussions of “three levels” in Meelberg 
2006: 43–44; Thon 2016: 36). A full discussion of all suggested concep-
tualizations of the matter would lead me far off track, so here I will simply 
make clear some consequences of my conceptualization of narration so far, 
which leads us to recognizing these three levels.
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• A media product with particular basic media traits and other forma-
tive qualities provides certain sensory configurations that are per-
ceived by someone; these sensory configurations come to represent 
…
• … media characteristics forming a complete narrative with all its 
many specific details and features; furthermore, the perceiver com-
prehends that this narrative surrounds …
• … a scaffolding core, the story, consisting of represented events that 
are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way.
It should also be reemphasized that stories and parts of their surroundings 
in the whole narrative may often be realized fairly completely by several 
kinds of media. This is because many media types have the capacity, to 
some extent, to represent events, temporal relationships, meaningful rela-
tionships, and an abundance of other media characteristics. The story is 
normally only one of many transmedial media characteristics in narratives. 
The complete narrative of a certain media product may include a multi-
tude of different media characteristics that may be more or less transme-
dial. However, as a rule, a story, consisting of the essential temporal 
structure of a narrative, is more transmedial than the complete narrative, 
although probably never wholly transmedial (cf. rewarding discussions of 
this issue in Gaudreault and Marion 2004).
semioTic and cogniTive elaboraTions
Brief definitions such as those in the previous section cannot stand alone; 
they must be entrenched in more comprehensive frameworks. I have 
already introduced and developed the frame of communication and the 
idea that narratives consist of represented events. In Peircean semiotic 
terms, this means, more specifically, as we have noted, that they are made 
up of represented objects that are construed such that they result in inter-
pretants making meaningfully interrelated events present to the mind of 
the perceiver. To push the exploration of transmedial narration forward at 
this point, I must reemphasize that objects do not arise out of nothing; 
they depend on what Peirce calls collateral experience.
In this context, collateral experience is understood as collateral experi-
ence in the extracommunicational domain: what the perceiver of media 
products already somehow knows of or is familiar with. It may be experi-
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ence of anything from simple entities such as water to complex processes 
such as how to build a house, or indeed knowledge of specific narratives. 
Collateral experience may also be understood as even more profound and 
omnipresent experiences, such as those emphasized by Mandler and 
Johnson: experience of common structures of perception and body activ-
ity. Their theories may be understood as suggesting explanations of perva-
sive cognitive processes that are also reflected in communication. Thus, 
the notion that virtual spheres are formed by extracommunicational 
objects, background knowledge, covers both inescapable, prevalent expe-
riences, such as those emphasized by Mandler and Johnson, and more 
specific and individual experiences, such as memories of certain items and 
events in one’s life.
Earlier narratological research has accurately highlighted the relevance 
of collateral experience in general and, more specifically, collateral experi-
ence of more or less essential parts of narratives. Emma Kafalenos has 
emphasized that the perceiver’s background knowledge largely determines 
the construction of narratives (Kafalenos 1996). Marie-Laure Ryan has 
stressed the difference between narratives that, at one extreme are entirely 
“new to the receiver” and, at the other extreme, are utterly dependent 
upon “the receiver’s previous knowledge” (Ryan 2004a: 14; cf. Groensteen 
2013 [2011]: 25). In the same vein, Michael Ranta has argued that previ-
ous knowledge is indeed very important and, furthermore, that, in gen-
eral, “pictorial media, when compared to verbal language, require 
recipients who are more active in the reconstruction of narratives” (Ranta 
2013: 7).
As Peircean semiotics is preoccupied with fundamental cognitive capac-
ities and functions that render meaning-making possible, I think it is well 
in agreement with modern cognitive science. The central concept of cog-
nitive schemata can be understood as fundamental forms of collateral 
experience. To the best of my knowledge, film scholar David Bordwell was 
the first to apply cognitive research to narrative theory. He highlighted the 
fundamental role of the perceiver of narratives and emphasized that narra-
tives are constructs that are dependent not only on the perceived qualities 
of the media products but also on expectations and hypotheses. In brief, 
the realization of narratives relies on cognitive schemata in the goal- 
directed perceiver’s mind (Bordwell 1985: 29–47; these ideas were devel-
oped in Branigan 1992: 13–32; and, with the main focus on literature, in 
Fludernik 1996 and Herman 2002: 85–113; narratives are also seen as 
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cognitive constructs in the transmedial narratology developed in Ryan 
2006).
Cognitive schemata can be understood as cognitive blueprints that are 
used to efficiently deal with and make sense of new input from the external 
world, including input from communication. One could say that they are 
based on condensed forms of collateral experience; large amounts of expe-
rience of the world, again including communication, that are abstracted 
and generalized into schemata. For instance, after having cooked food 
many times, or having observed someone who has, a person is likely to 
develop some sort of cognitive schema based on the expected main events: 
first, one collects the primary products, then they are prepared, then again 
they are possibly heated or combined in some way, after which the meal is 
served and eaten. As with all schemata, this one is not absolutely accurate 
for all cooking, but it captures much of the essence of much cooking—and 
may therefore create expectations about how to proceed when preparing 
a meal. It is also clear to see that cognitive schemata like this may serve as 
material for narratives.
As one might expect, there is no consensus among researchers concern-
ing the exact nature and function of cognitive schemata. In this context, I 
find it vital to emphasize the great diversity of cognitive schemata. As 
already noted, we have a plenitude of forms of collateral experience. By 
the same token, cognitive schemata, being based on collateral experience, 
must be understood as existing in a great deal of different forms. Our 
minds develop small and large schemata. Whereas some of them are more 
temporary and fade away, others stay with us for years or our entire life. 
We have schemata that concern trivial things and schemata that are related 
to matters of life and death. Some schemata evolve out of experience of 
nature, others build on culture, and yet others on both. There are cogni-
tive schemata that are based on experience of mental entities and processes 
(such as intentional action; see Bundgaard 2007) and there are schemata 
that have developed out of collateral experience of material entities and 
processes. Schemata may be highly subjective or more or less intersubjec-
tive. Intersubjective cognitive schemata clearly facilitate communication.
Thus, perceiving represented events that are temporally interrelated in a 
meaningful way in a narrative is a cognitive process that depends on col-
lateral experience and, more specifically, on cognitive schemata. Sensing 
interrelations to be meaningful is at least partially a question of being able 
to relate them to things that one is already familiar with.
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CHAPTER 4
Narrating Through Media Modalities
Abstract This chapter explores the fundamental similarities and differ-
ences among media types to explain why different media types may narrate 
to different degrees. Based on a general conceptual framework for analyz-
ing communication and a specific definition of narration, certain basic 
traits of media products that are significant for both communication at 
large and narration in particular are pinpointed. These basic traits are 
described in terms of the material, spatiotemporal, sensorial, and semiotic 
modalities of media. This conceptual framework makes it possible to dis-
tinguish between different ways of categorizing media; the differentiation 
between basic and qualified media types makes it possible to explain the 
differing narrative capacities of media types in a more refined way.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Media modalities • Basic media • 
Qualified media • Sign types
Based on a general conceptual framework for analyzing communication 
and a specific definition of narration, it is now possible to pinpoint certain 
basic traits of media products that are significant for both communication 
at large and narration in particular. However important the surrounding 
factors of communication may be—discussed above in terms of collateral 
experience, gestalts, and schemata—it is ultimately the more inherent fac-
tors of media products that trigger the mind-work of communication and, 
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to some extent, determine how and to what degree narration may be real-
ized in various media forms. It is clear that one and the same perceiving 
mind, harboring a certain set of knowledge, experiences, values, memo-
ries, and schemata, will interpret different media products in very different 
ways even if they are perceived in comparable circumstances. This is obvi-
ously because the media products are unlike in various ways and because 
the divergences are highly relevant. In order to understand how narratives 
can be communicated by dissimilar media types, one must first understand 
the fundamental similarities and differences among media types and the 
extent to which these differences matter. Those are the issues to be 
explored in this chapter.
Degrees of Narrativity
We have already noted that media characteristics may be transmedial to 
lower or higher degrees. Transmedial capacities are molded by certain 
basic media traits, which means that different media characteristics may 
depend on different basic media traits. Narration is one of many transme-
dial media characteristics, and the question is to what extent narratives 
depend on certain basic media traits. This question cannot be answered in 
a straightforward and definite way for the simple reason that narratives, 
notwithstanding elaborate definitions, do not constitute a clear-cut group 
of virtual spheres. Furthermore, narratives that are realized by media 
products belonging to the same media type may differ greatly. The notions 
of event and meaningful temporal interrelations allow for varieties that are 
large enough to create a span of narratives, even within one and the same 
media type. It is therefore not self-evident that different narratives within 
one and the same media type depend on exactly the same basic media 
traits. Additionally, media types overlap extensively regarding their basic 
media traits, and it is not even certain that a certain media product can be 
classified successfully. In the end, one must realize that there is, on the one 
hand, a broad spectrum of individual virtual spheres that can be perceived 
as more or less narrative in partly dissimilar ways, and, on the other hand, 
a wide range of partly overlapping media types that have more or less nar-
rative potential depending on their basic media traits.
Therefore, I, along with Seymour Chatman (1978), Marie-Laure Ryan 
(2006), Werner Wolf (2017), and many others (although these researchers 
are supported by different kinds of theoretical arguments) emphasize that 
narration is present in various degrees in different media products. This 
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has become a broadly accepted concept within narratology. I also agree 
with the majority of researchers of transmedial narration that even if many 
media types can narrate, they cannot do it to the same degree; as Ranta 
put it: “narratives may be manifested in various genres or media, and 
meaning bearers of various kinds may be more or less narrative. Narrativity 
can thus be seen as a matter of degree rather than kind” (Ranta 2013: 3; 
cf. Herman 2004). Although the degree of perceived narration can some-
times, in the case of specific encounters with particular media products, be 
explained by surrounding factors of communication such as general back-
ground knowledge and cognitive schemata, it cannot in the case of overall 
narrative differences among media types (although media-specific back-
ground knowledge may self-evidently sometimes be crucial for perceiving 
narration in a certain media type). Whereas general background knowl-
edge and cognitive schemata are relevant for the perception of all media 
types, they cannot explain why narration is realized differently in dissimilar 
media types. The differences in the kind and degree of narration in various 
media forms have their primary origin in more specific, basic media traits.
However, in order to track down basic media traits that allow for inter-
pretations in terms of degrees of narrativity, it is not sufficient to consider 
only the traditional range of loosely demarcated media conceptions: litera-
ture, text, image, music, visual art, comics, television news, film, speech, 
and so forth. For instance, I would argue that it is not sufficiently precise 
to discuss literature as a narrative medium: there is a large difference 
between visual and auditory literature, and even if one sticks to visual, 
written literature, there are considerable differences among, say, a classical 
nineteenth-century novel, a postmodern novel, and a short poem. On the 
other hand, written, artistic literature has many basic features in common 
with other forms of visual, verbal media types such as pieces of journalism, 
personal letters, scientific articles, and even simple manuals. Furthermore, 
dichotomies such as text versus image and verbal versus visual are too 
vague to be operational. Even if they are specified, the notions of, say, a 
written, verbal text and a visual, two-dimensional image are very inclusive 
and incorporate several basic media traits that partly overlap (such as visu-
ality). Thus, the dichotomy obstructs the clarification of relevant media 
similarities and differences. The equally widespread opposition between 
verbal and visual media types is simply a false and hence utterly misleading 
dichotomy. Whereas the verbal is related to semiosis—namely, the use of 
language and a specific way of making meaning through a specific form of 
signs (symbols)—visuality is a form of perception. The dichotomy of 
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 verbal and visual media types is equally warped as a dichotomy consisting 
of green cars on one hand and fast cars on the other.
To avoid such confusions, I advocate a more fine-grained and system-
atic way of describing and analyzing media similarities and differences. My 
contention is that media share basic traits that must be theoretically iso-
lated in order to be clearly visible. To find out how narration can be under-
stood as a transmedial concept, yet realized in partly different ways and 
degrees by different forms of media, one must get back to basics. Werner 
Wolf (2011: 170–173) took a step in that direction, but I will follow a 
model for intermedial relations that I have already developed (Elleström 
2010). I propose that what I call modalities of media can be used as a 
framework for comparing narrative capacities. A modality shall be under-
stood as a category of related basic and universal media features.
Thus, I suggest that all media products, without exception, can be ana-
lyzed in terms of four kinds of basic traits—four media modalities. As 
postulated earlier, media products are the entities through which cognitive 
import is shared in communication. The perception of media products is 
deeply entangled with cognitive operations that may broadly be called 
semiosis. I have already discussed this process of transferring cognitive 
import among minds in terms of mediation and representation; the prese-
miotic and semiotic. The concept of mediation highlights the material 
realization of the medium and the concept of representation highlights 
the semiotic conception of the medium.
the Presemiotic moDalities
Accordingly, three of the four media modalities should be understood as 
presemiotic, which means that they cover media traits that are involved in 
signification—the creation of cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind—
although they are not semiotic qualities in themselves. Thus, the three 
modalities are not asemiotic; they are presemiotic, meaning that the traits 
that they cover are bound to become part of semiosis as soon as commu-
nication is established. The presemiotic traits concern the fundamentals of 
mediation, which means that they are necessary conditions for any media 
product to be realized in the outer world, and so for any communication 
to be brought about.
The three presemiotic media modalities are the material modality, the 
spatiotemporal modality, and the sensorial modality. Media products are 
all material in the plain sense that they may be, for instance, solid or non- 
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solid, or organic or inorganic, and comparable traits like these—compa-
rable modes of the modalities—belong to the material modality. It is also 
the case that all media products have spatiotemporal traits, which means 
that such products that do not have at least either spatial or temporal 
extension are inconceivable; hence, the spatiotemporal modality consists 
of comparable modes such as temporality, stasis, two-dimensional spatial-
ity, and three-dimensional spatiality. Furthermore, media products must 
reach the mind through at least one sense; hence, sensory perception is the 
common denominator of the media traits belonging to the sensorial 
modality—media products may be visual, auditory, tactile, and so forth.
A thorough understanding of the conditions for mediation requires 
systematic attention to all three presemiotic modalities. It is clear that 
cognitive import of any sort cannot be freely mediated by any kind of 
material, spatiotemporal, and sensorial modes. To provide some rather 
obvious examples, complex assertions cannot easily be transmitted through 
the sense of smell, and it is more difficult to effectively transmit a detailed 
series of visual events through a static media product than through a tem-
poral media product.
the semiotic moDality
The fourth media modality is the semiotic modality that covers media 
modes concerning representation rather than mediation. Whereas the 
semiotic modes of a media product are less palpable than the presemiotic 
ones, and are in fact entirely derived from them (because different kinds of 
mediation have different kinds of semiotic potential), they are equally 
essential to realizing communication. The mediated sensory configura-
tions of a media product do not transfer any cognitive import until the 
perceiver’s mind comprehends them as signs. In other words, the sensa-
tions are meaningless until they are understood as representing something 
through unconscious or conscious interpretation. In other words, all 
physical objects and phenomena that act as media products have semiotic 
traits by definition.
By far the most successful effort to define the basic ways to create sense 
in terms of signs is Peirce’s foundational trichotomy: icon, index, and sym-
bol. These three sign types are defined on the basis of the representamen–
object relationship and can be understood as fundamental cognitive 
abilities. Icons represent objects on the ground of similarity; they stand for 
something, they make some object present to the mind because of a per-
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ceived similarity between representamen and object. Indices stand for 
objects on the ground of contiguity or, more precisely, real connections. 
Symbols represent objects on the ground of conventions or, more gener-
ally, habits (1932, CP2.247–249 [c.1903]; Elleström 2014b: 98–113). 
The same object, such as a steam engine, can often be partly or fully rep-
resented by different kinds of signs: one may imitate the sounds and move-
ments of a steam engine and hence form icons of it; one may point to a 
present steam engine or in other ways direct the attention to the smoke 
hovering over a railway track and thus create indices of it; or one may sim-
ply say ‘steam engine’ in order to produce a symbol of it. Importantly, not 
every perceived similarity, real connection, or habit necessarily leads to 
representation. For instance, one may note the visual similarity between 
two newspaper columns without construing one of them to be an iconic 
sign of the other. Again, signs must be understood as dynamic sign func-
tions, not as static entities or automatic mental responses.
I take iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity to be the main media 
modes within the semiotic modality, which is to say that no communica-
tion occurs unless cognitive import is created through at least one of the 
three sign types (icons, indices, and symbols). They are normally mixed in 
various ways. As with presemiotic modes, the semiotic modes of a media 
product offer certain possibilities and set some restrictions. Obviously, 
cognitive import of any sort cannot be freely created on the basis of just 
any sign type. For instance, auditory iconic signs (such as in music) can 
represent complex feelings and motional structures that are probably 
largely inaccessible to the symbolic signs of written text; conversely, writ-
ten symbolic signs can represent arguments and the appearance of visual 
items with much greater accuracy than auditory icons. Obvious examples 
like these are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the various (in)capaci-
ties of signs based on similarity, real connections, and habits. Therefore, 
communicative transfer of cognitive import through media products is 
made possible—but also profoundly limited—by the semiotic traits of the 
medium. Whereas these semiotic traits are not as definite as the presemi-
otic ones, they are always somehow anchored in the physical appearance of 
media products.
Therefore, I argue that a semiotic perspective must be combined with a 
presemiotic perspective. Communication at large, as well as the specific 
case of narration, is equally dependent on the presemiotic media modali-
ties and the semiotic modality. What we take to be represented objects 
called forth by representamens or signs (separate objects such as persons, 
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things, events, actions, feelings, ideas, desires, and conditions, and com-
posite objects such as interrelated events in narratives) are results of both 
the basic features of the physical media product as such (the mediated 
material, spatiotemporal, and sensorial modes) and of cognitive activity 
(resulting in representation). While signification is ultimately about mind- 
work, in the case of communication this mind-work is fundamentally 
dependent on the physical appearance of the media product. Having said 
that, some semiosis is clearly more closely tied to the appearance of the 
medium, whereas other semiosis is more a result of interpretation, and 
therefore the setting of the perceiving mind.
Thus, the most fundamental restraining and releasing factors of com-
munication are to be found in the basic presemiotic and semiotic modes 
of the media products. Many exceedingly complex factors are clearly 
involved when the perceiver’s mind forms cognitive import. My proposed 
model highlights one cluster of crucial factors in particular: media prod-
ucts have partly similar and partly dissimilar material, spatiotemporal, sen-
sorial, and even semiotic modes, and the combination of modes partly 
determines what kinds of cognitive import can be transferred from the 
producer’s mind to the perceiver’s mind. Songs, emails, photographs, ges-
tures, films, caresses, and advertisements differ in various ways concerning 
their presemiotic and semiotic modes and can therefore only transfer the 
same sort of cognitive import to a limited extent. Consequently, their nar-
rative capacities differ.
Basic aND QualifieD meDia tyPes
Up to this point, I have discussed the notion of media types in an unspe-
cific way. The analytical framework of four media modalities makes it pos-
sible to now conceptualize the categorization of media with some accuracy. 
Although each media product is unique, thinking species such as humans 
feel the need to categorize things so that we can navigate in the world and 
communicate efficiently. We also categorize media products and, as is 
often the case with classification in general, our media categories are usu-
ally quite fluid.
However, some categories are more solid and stable than others because 
they depend on less variable factors. Therefore, I find it helpful to work 
with the two complementary concepts of basic media types and qualified 
media types (Elleström 2010: 24–27). Sometimes one mainly pays atten-
tion to the most basic features of media products and classifies them 
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according to their most salient material, spatiotemporal, sensorial, and 
semiotic properties. For instance, we think in terms of still images (most 
often understood as tangible, flat, static, visual, and mainly iconic media 
products). This is what I call a basic medium (a basic type of media prod-
uct) and it is relatively stable. However, such a basic classification is some-
times not enough to capture more specific media properties of interest. 
Therefore, one qualifies the definition of the media type in question and 
adds criteria that lie beyond the basic media modalities. One also includes 
all kinds of aspects of how the media products are produced, used, and 
evaluated in the world, and how they are situated in geography, history, 
and culture. One may wish to delimit the focus to still images that are, say, 
handmade by very young people; that is, children’s drawings. This is what 
I call a qualified medium (a qualified type of media product) and it is more 
fluid than the basic medium of still image simply because the added crite-
ria are optional and more variable than those captured by the media 
modalities. For instance, it may be difficult to agree on what a handmade 
drawing actually is: should drawings made on computers or scribble on 
the wall be included? And when does a child become a young adult rather 
than a child? The notion of childhood varies significantly among cultures 
and also changes over time, not to mention the individual differences in 
maturity. Thus, the limits of qualified media types are bound to be ambiva-
lent, debated, and changed much more than the limits of basic media 
types.
Basic media include classes like still images (solid, flat, static, visual, and 
mainly iconic media products), written verbal texts (solid, flat, static, 
visual, and mainly symbolic media products), moving images (solid, flat, 
temporal, visual, and mainly iconic media products), and spoken verbal 
texts (non-solid, temporal, auditory, and mainly symbolic media prod-
ucts). There are many basic media types that we have no proper names for 
in everyday language. Qualified media include classes such as political 
speech, music, instruction manuals, sculpture, television programs, emails, 
and news articles. As qualified media types may be qualified in many dif-
ferent ways, and as they are often requalified as time passes, they not only 
overlap in intricate ways but may also emerge, change, and fade away.
The distinction between basic and qualified media helps us realize that 
the concept of transmedial narratology is not as straightforward as one 
might think. Early in this treatise, I described the concept of transmedial 
narration, in its most general sense, as the idea that a multitude of differ-
ent media types share traits that render them narrative capacities. Although 
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still valid, this notion turns out to be more complex than expected. 
Investigating narrative capacities of dissimilar media types must include at 
least two stages, for the simple reason that there are different kinds of 
media types. Consequently, the distinction between basic and qualified 
media allows for a more methodical approach to transmedial narration.
This is what I suggest: Instead of immediately comparing a broad vari-
ety of different kinds of media types, such as the narrative potential of 
comics, written texts, computer games, literature, music, images, speech 
and gestures, and so forth—comparisons that tend to become rather spe-
cific—one should begin by comparing the basic media traits: what is the 
role for narration, if any, of the material, spatiotemporal, sensorial, and 
semiotic modes of media modalities? Such comparisons can be expected to 
result in a more fundamental and wide-ranging understanding of similari-
ties and differences in narrative capacities among media types in general. 
This initial query, framed by the notion of basic media types, will be pur-
sued in Part II of the treatise, where the core characteristics of narration 
are scrutinized. After such an investigation of those basic media traits, 
which brings together all media types onto a common conceptual plat-
form, investigations and comparisons of qualified media types can be 
made. As qualified media types are much more restricted than basic media 
types, such comparisons are likely to result in a narrower, but also more 
detailed, understanding of similarities and differences in narrative capaci-
ties among media. This will be tried out in Part III of the treatise. Needless 
to say, only a very limited amount of exemplifying comparisons can be 
made there, although the instances are chosen to illustrate transmedial 
narration in a really broad spectrum of qualified media types.
the overall relevaNce of meDia moDalities 
for NarratioN
Before finishing this last chapter of Part I, I will provide an initial overview 
of the role of media modalities for narration, as preparation for the more 
specific investigations in Part II. Although differences in modality modes 
are largely responsible for differences in kind and degree of narration in 
various media forms, examining them does not offer a convenient short-
cut to full understanding. Consequently, this section will not provide any 
easy answers to the questions that are raised by transmedial narration. 
Thinking in terms of media modalities is not a quick fix. The basic prese-
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miotic and semiotic traits are always embedded in complex surroundings, 
so they generally need to be analyzed in their interactions with each other 
and with additional factors. Nevertheless, modeling narration in terms of 
media modalities facilitates a methodical approach to the issue of transme-
diality. Having different material, spatiotemporal, and sensorial modes 
implies having partly dissimilar capacities for narration and, by the same 
token, the use of different sign types has consequences for narration.
The material modality is perhaps the least crucial category of media 
traits for determining narrative capacities. Solid media products such as 
written verbal texts, as well as non-solid media products such as spoken 
verbal texts, clearly have very high narrative capacity, as decades of intense 
research has demonstrated. Furthermore, organic media products such as 
moving human bodies, as well as inorganic media products such as dolls in 
motion, may form complex narratives.
The spatiotemporal modality is much more critical for narration. This 
is because the scaffolding core of narratives consists of represented events 
that are temporally interrelated. The key question then becomes the extent 
to which the representation of a temporal object requires a representamen 
with certain spatiotemporal qualities. There is not much to indicate that 
media products should have specific spatial traits in order to be able to 
narrate successfully. Moving human bodies and dolls in motion are three- 
dimensional and, indeed, very suitable for narration. Written verbal texts 
are two-dimensional, but also potentially superbly narrative media prod-
ucts. Spoken verbal texts emanating from a singular source are spatial only 
in a limited way, but are still well suited for narration.
However, there are some relevant differences between temporal and 
static media products. Moving images that are inherently temporal may 
effortlessly represent sequences of events and hence also elaborate narra-
tives. This is not to say that the represented events are necessarily under-
stood to be interrelated in precise accordance with the temporal unfolding 
of the media product. In contrast, still images are, by definition, static and 
are thus incapable of representing events that are inescapably perceived in 
a certain temporal order. This is not the same as being incapable of repre-
senting temporally interrelated events; it only means that the scope of 
possibly represented events is reduced (assuming that the size of the still 
image is not huge) and that the perception of possibly interrelated repre-




Nevertheless, the difference in spatiotemporal modes reduces the nar-
rative potentiality of still images compared to moving images—at least if 
one considers media products constituted by single still images. However, 
it is possible to construe media products consisting of a whole set of still 
images. Whereas this does not in itself enhance the narrative capacity, it 
opens up for the use of a special kind of symbolic element, namely the 
convention of sequential decoding. Perceivers who have learnt to process 
parts of certain kinds of static media products in a regulated order may 
distinguish represented events in temporal sequences that are as stable as 
those produced by media products that are physically temporal.
This line of reasoning is also applicable to the difference between spo-
ken verbal texts and written verbal texts: the distinction between temporal 
and static media products cuts through both images and verbal texts. 
Spoken verbal texts are temporal because the sensory configurations of 
such media products constantly change as time passes; written verbal texts 
are static because the sensory configurations of such media products 
remain the same from one moment to the other (unless, of course, the text 
is perceived while it is being written or is a part of a temporal, visual media 
product such as a film). This means that spoken verbal texts, just like mov-
ing images—given that a certain volume of temporal extension is allowed 
for—readily represent sequences of events and may therefore produce 
intricate narratives. In contrast, written verbal texts are normally static and 
if we think of written verbal texts in rough analogy with solitary still 
images—namely as consisting of single entities such as one letter or one 
word—written verbal texts are equally handicapped when it comes to rep-
resenting events that are inevitably perceived in a certain temporal order. 
In the case of language, however, the convention of sequential decoding 
is so strong that written verbal texts are normally understood to consist of 
large sets of subordinate symbols that are bound to be decoded in a man-
ner that is highly regular. As in the case of sequential decoding of still 
images, this may lead to the discernment of represented events that are 
temporally interrelated in a manner that is as stable as those formed by 
physically temporal media products. This is why so many researchers—
misleadingly, I would argue—claim that written verbal texts are temporal. 
Such a conception obscures the difference between the physical appear-
ance of representamen (the traits of the media product), the process of 
perceiving the physical appearance of representamen, and the virtual 
appearance of object (the traits of the virtual sphere).
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Thus, the fact that all kinds of media are perceived in time has some 
bearing on the capacity of representing temporally interrelated events: 
conventionalized orders of decoding may strongly enhance the narrative 
capacity of static media types. However, this does not erase the substantial 
differences between inherently temporal and static media.
Sensorial modality also plays a role for the narrative capacity of media 
products. This is mostly because the senses (understood here as the exter-
nal senses) are not developed cognitively to the same degree. Sight and 
hearing are our two most advanced senses, in that they are strongly con-
nected to complex cognitive functions such as knowledge, attention, 
memory, and reasoning. This means that sight and hearing are both well 
suited for narration. It is no coincidence that virtually all examples of nar-
ration in this treatise have so far included either the visual or the auditory 
sensory mode.
However, this does not exclude the other senses. The faculty of touch 
may be used for reading braille, for instance, or sensing the forms of reliefs 
and three-dimensional figures forming narratives. It is also fully possible to 
consider series of interpersonal touches that form casual, narrative media 
products. Children playing and adults having sex may well communicate 
elementary narratives by way of sequences of touches that are performed 
and located differently.
I presume that it would also be possible, in principle, to construe lan-
guage systems mediated by taste or smell. In practice, however, they would 
probably be rather inefficient as a speedy decoding of symbols requires 
quickly performed sensory discriminations. However, taste and smell can 
no doubt be used to create at least rudimentary narratives. A well-planned 
meal with several courses served in a certain order may be construed as 
narrative to the extent that tastes and taste combinations may be devel-
oped, changed, and contrasted in such a manner that gives a sense of 
meaningfully interrelated events. A series of scents may be presented in 
such a way that represents, say, a journey from the city through the woods 
and to the sea, including encounters with people and animals with smells 
that reveal certain activities.
The three main modes of the semiotic modality are iconicity (based on 
similarity), indexicality (based on contiguity), and symbolicity (based on 
habits). All of these semiotic modes are immensely important for the real-
ization of narration. Among those more acknowledged basic media types 
that are commonly reasonably well defined and have accepted names in 
ordinary language, a majority are saliently dominated by iconicity or sym-
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bolicity. Most of the recent examples of potentially narrative media types 
can clearly be characterized by a semiotic hallmark. Verbal texts, whether 
they are visual, auditory, or tactile, rely heavily—although certainly not 
exclusively—on symbolicity: the conventional meaning of letters, sounds, 
words, and so forth. Moving and still images, whether they are visual, 
auditory, or tactile, are understood to signify primarily through iconicity, 
based on perceived similarities between representamens and objects. 
Although series of touches, tastes, and scents are hardly acknowledged as 
media types in common parlance, a case could be made for recognizing 
them as basic media types dominated by indexicality: real connections 
between the perceived sensory configurations and what they stand for.
Furthermore, indexicality is an especially important semiotic mode for 
narration because it creates both internal coherence and external truthful-
ness (see Chaps. 8 and 9). Early on, Roland Barthes used the notion of 
index to frame some features of narration, but within a conceptual frame-
work that differs fundamentally from mine (1977 [1966]).
For the sake of clarity, I have tried to isolate the possible contributions 
of various media modes to narration. By highlighting modal differences, it 
is possible to discern media traits that contribute to the gradability of nar-
ration. However, media products are normally more or less multimodal—
in very different ways—which makes the above generalizations fuzzier, the 
differences among media types more subtle, and the issue of transmedial 
narration more multifaceted. What the model of media modalities can 
offer is not so much a lexicon of transmedial narrative capacities as a 
methodical approach to examining narration in a wealth of dissimilar 
media products and media types. In each specific media product and media 
type, the present modes of the modalities add, in profound interaction, to 
the forming of virtual spheres and possibly narratives. In a certain media 
product, the various presemiotic modes all contribute to forming certain 
sensory configurations: a cluster of physical representamens that together 
come to represent—iconically, indexically, or symbolically—a certain clus-
ter of objects that possibly forms a narrative.
Therefore, I support Karin Kukkonen’s conclusion that “[i]f, with 
Ryan, we understand narrative as a cognitive construct, different modes in 
multimodal media work together to provide the reader with clues to fill 
gaps and formulate hypotheses” (Kukkonen 2011: 40). Importantly, how-
ever, I go beyond the rather coarse notion of mode used by Kukkonen and 
in so-called social semiotics in general: modes understood as text, image, 
gesture, and so forth. In the present treatise, multimodality is a more fine- 
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grained concept that can be more precisely circumscribed as four kinds of 
multimodality: multimateriality, multispatiotemporality, multisensoriality, 
and multisemioticity. As already stated, it is more the rule than the excep-
tion that actual media products and media types have many modes of one 
and the same modality. For instance, media products that consist of both 
organic and non-organic materiality are multimaterial. Media products 
that are both spatial and temporal are multispatiotemporal. Audiovisual 
media products are multisensorial. Furthermore, many media are multi-
modal in several ways simultaneously.
Finally, most media products are multisemiotic to the extent that sign 
types typically work in collaboration. In an early article advocating the 
value of applying Peircean semiotics to the study of narratives, Robert 
Scholes suggested that “we cannot understand verbal narrative unless we 
are aware of the iconic and indexical dimensions of language” (1981: 
205), and this is certainly true. Even though symbolic signs are clearly the 
most salient ones, verbal language does not work solely through symbolic-
ity. In visual language, for instance, lineation, letter size, letter form, and 
empty spaces may create iconic meaning; in auditory language iconicity is 
often produced by certain sound qualities, intonations, rhythms, and 
pauses. By the same token, most media types signify through iconicity, 
indexicality, and symbolicity in combination, although they are typically 
dominated by certain kinds of sign functions. However, one can find 
instances of communication and narration characterized by such extreme 
multimodality that virtually all kinds of modality modes, both presemiotic 
and semiotic, are included.
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The issue of media modalities will, more or less explicitly, permeate the 
remainder of this treatise. There will also be a certain emphasis on the idea 
of story. Although the story is only one of many varying media character-
istics in narratives, it is the common denominator and defining core: rep-
resented events that are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way. More 
precisely, then, the story consists of a set of connected media characteris-
tics. Complete narratives may include many different media characteristics 
that may be more or less transmedial, but to keep the investigation focused 
it is necessary to emphasize the essentials. Therefore, Part II will scrutinize 
the notions of represented events, temporal interrelations, and meaningful 
internal coherence.
However, the core characteristics of narration cannot be completely 
isolated from the broader features of communication in which narration is 
always embedded. For that reason, the discussions of the essentials of the 
story will be supplemented with elaborations of two general forms of 
transmedial media characteristics that I find essential to outlining narra-
tion satisfactorily. Thus, I will start Part II with a broad conceptualization 
of communicating minds and end it with an investigation of external 
truthfulness in communication. Both of these areas have, to some extent, 
long been part of narratology, discussed in terms of narrators and fictional-
ity. As I construe the notions of communicating minds and external truth-
fulness, however, they are essential issues for the whole area of 
communication, of which narration is only one, albeit an important part.
PART II
Scrutinizing the Essentials
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CHAPTER 5
Communicating, Narrating, and Focalizing 
Minds
Abstract This chapter affords a broad conceptualization of communicat-
ing minds, which is essential for framing transmedial narration. It also 
suggests a methodical way of analyzing narrators and narratees that are 
external and internal to narratives. Distinctions are made between actual 
narrators/narratees and overarching and embedded virtual (represented) 
narrators/narratees in order to be able to discern both transmedial and 
media-specific narrative features. Whereas all narratives by definition 
require actual narrators and narratees, it is sometimes helpful to construe 
overarching virtual narrators or narratees that are internal to narratives 
and help in making sense of them. Narratives can also hold embedded 
virtual narrators and narratees creating stories within stories. Narrators 
additionally act as focalizers, delimiting the scope of narration in various 
ways.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Actual communicator • Actual 
narrator • Virtual communicator • Virtual narrator • Focalization
There is an extensive literature on the issue of narrators, their nature, and 
their possible existence or nonexistence (a good recent overview with a 
transmedial perspective can be found in Thon 2016: 125–166). Although 
I have profited in general terms from this literature, which will not be 
extensively discussed here, I will in this chapter form a conceptual frame-
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work that is suitable for using in the setting of all forms of communication 
by all kinds of media—not only narration and not only media types where 
the use of language is salient. However, narration will be pinpointed as a 
special case in order to get us back on the main track.
Although my suggested typologies in this chapter naturally resemble 
earlier categorizations in several ways, they are more flexible, precisely in 
the sense that they work for all media types. Given that narratives are con-
ceptualized as virtual spheres formed in the perceiver’s mind, which means 
that they are not determined to have any certain characteristics except for 
those stipulated by the definition of a story, they also allow for a pragmatic 
approach to the issue of narrators. I suggest that fruitless quarrels regard-
ing whether certain kinds of narrators need to be present in various media 
types can be avoided by emphasizing the virtual nature of narratives and 
the modeling nature of the proposed typologies; the distinctions to be 
made in this chapter correspond to possible ways of construing narratives 
rather than to definite traits of narratives.
I will start by briefly presenting the contours and essential features of 
this conceptual framework and then discuss parts of it in some detail. This 
requires reemphasizing some general concepts that I have already intro-
duced in this treatise. In Chap. 2 I distinguished between the intra- and 
extracommunicational domains and emphasized that they are utterly 
entwined but nevertheless dissimilar areas in the mind of the perceiver of 
media products. The point is to mark out a difference between the form-
ing of cognitive import in ongoing communication and what precedes and 
surrounds it in the form of cognitive import stored in the mind. I call the 
intracommunicational domain, formed by communicative semiosis, a vir-
tual sphere. Narratives are virtual spheres.
Regarding the extracommunicational domain, I have noted that vital 
parts of it are constituted by perception and interpretation of media prod-
ucts; previous communication is very much part of the background of 
ongoing communication. Thus, it may be said that the extracommunica-
tional domain, the mental realm that precedes and surrounds the virtual 
sphere being formed in ongoing communication, consists of two comple-
mentary spheres: other virtual spheres (former interpretive results of com-
munication) and what I propose to call the perceived actual sphere. The 
perceived actual sphere consists of earlier percepts outside of communica-
tion and interpretants resulting from semiosis triggered by these percepts. 
Every instance of communication is dependent on the experience of earlier 
encounters with things and phenomena in the world that have not been 
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communicated by other minds. In summary, the perceived actual sphere is 
formed in one’s mind through semiosis, immediate external perception, 
and also interoception, proprioception, and mental introspection.
CommuniCating and narrating minds
In Chap. 2 I also initially described communication in terms of a transfer 
of cognitive import between at least two minds, the producer’s mind and 
the perceiver’s mind, with the aid of an intermediate entity: the media 
product. After such a communicative transfer, there are mental configura-
tions in the perceiver’s mind—a virtual sphere—that to some extent are 
similar to those in the producer’s mind. Acknowledging the presence of at 
least one producer’s and one perceiver’s mind in human communication 
is the starting point of the following distinctions among different kinds of 
communicating minds; distinctions that are vital for discerning some intri-
cate conceptual structures of communication at large.
Before getting into details, I will present an overview of my proposed 
typologies in the form of two embryonic lists. The first is an inventory of 
different forms of communicating minds:
• A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual producer 
of a media product = an actual communicator
• A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual perceiver 
of a media product = an actual communicatee
• An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the producer of 
overarching communication = an overarching virtual communicator
• An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of 
overarching communication = an overarching virtual communicatee
• An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the producer of 
embedded communication = an embedded virtual communicator
• An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of 
embedded communication = an embedded virtual communicatee
• And so on; multiple layers of communication embedded in embed-
ded communication.
The second list is a catalog of narrative minds. It is identical to the first list, 
except that communication in general is replaced with the special case of 
narration, meaning communication including stories:
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• A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual producer 
of a narrative media product = an actual narrator
• A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual perceiver 
of a narrative media product = an actual narratee
• An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the producer of 
overarching narration = an overarching virtual narrator
• An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of 
overarching narration = an overarching virtual narratee
• An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the producer of 
embedded narration = an embedded virtual narrator
• An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of 
embedded narration = an embedded virtual narratee
• And so on; multiple layers of narration embedded in embedded 
narration.
As narration is a transmedial form of communication, the terms ‘narrator’ 
and ‘narratee’, precisely as the terms ‘communicator’ and ‘communica-
tee’, shall be understood to refer to comprehensive communicative con-
cepts useful for disentangling a range of functions and levels in narration 
in effectively all (not only verbal) media types.
I will now comment on each of these forms of communicative and nar-
rative minds and explain their interrelations and why I think they are use-
ful for conceptualizing certain aspects of communication in general and 
narration in particular.
A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual producer of a 
media product = an actual communicator. If communication is at hand, a 
producer’s mind is, by definition, present, at least initially. The producer’s 
mind is responsible for the creation of a media product that may be 
perceived by some other mind either directly, as in face-to-face communi-
cation, or later, as when one watches an old movie. I suggest that a brief 
and simple term for this entity may be ‘actual communicator’. However, it 
is more specifically a communicating mind that must be understood to 
stem, more or less directly, from a perceived actual sphere. Hence, it is 
perceived to be actual, which means that there will always necessarily 
remain some epistemological doubts regarding its actuality. In face-to-face 
communication, the perceiver is close to the producer’s mind, in both 
time and space. Hence, the immediate perception of the activities of the 
body holding the producer’s mind becomes part of the perceived actual 
sphere. In the case of watching an old movie, the perceiver is normally at 
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a spatiotemporal distance from the producer’s mind. Consequently, the 
mind of the producer (the actual communicator) may well be known to 
the perceiver only indirectly, perhaps through earlier communication. In 
other words, the perceived actual communicating mind stems from other 
virtual spheres (that always rely, to some extent, on perceived actual 
spheres). In any case, actual communicators are by definition parts of the 
extracommunicational domain. A media product may be produced by 
either one actual communicator (like speech) or several actual communi-
cators (like most movies).
A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual producer of a 
narrative media product  =  an actual narrator. All that was said above 
regarding actual communicators can be specified in terms of ‘actual narra-
tors’. In brief: if narration is at hand, a mind producing the narrative media 
product must exist; there is, by definition, at least one actual narrator 
emanating from the extracommunicational domain.
A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual perceiver of a 
media product  =  an actual communicatee. Just as communication (as I 
define it) requires a producer’s mind, it also requires a perceiver’s mind. 
The perceiver’s mind perceives the media product produced by the pro-
ducer’s mind and forms a virtual sphere through the mediation and repre-
sentation of this media product. ‘Actual communicatee’ is a straightforward 
term for this entity. Although it may seem a bit strange, the actual com-
municatee is also, like the actual communicator, a perceived actual com-
municating mind: the mind that perceives a media product has an 
awareness and understanding of itself and this self-understanding stems 
from what precedes and surrounds ongoing communication: the extra-
communicational domain. Thus, a mind that perceives and makes sense of 
a media product does so on the background of having perceived and made 
sense of, among other things, itself—immediately or mediated through 
earlier communication. Therefore, an actual communicatee is more pre-
cisely a perceived actual communicating mind, again necessarily tinted by 
epistemological doubts regarding its nature and actuality. A media prod-
uct may be perceived by either one actual communicatee (like someone 
receiving a nudge indicating which direction she should go) or several 
actual communicatees (like many people listening to the same talk).
A perceived actual communicating mind that is the actual perceiver of a 
narrative media product = an actual narratee. Again there is no need to 
repeat what has already been stated about the actual communicatee. What 
might be termed ‘actual narratees’ are the same as actual communicatees, 
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except that they are more specifically involved in narration. If narration is 
at hand, at least one actual narratee perceiving the narrative media product 
must exist.
An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the producer of over-
arching communication  =  an overarching virtual communicator. 
Communicators are minds that make communication possible by produc-
ing media products. In virtual spheres, however, communicators are vir-
tual; they are representations of minds forming media products with 
semiotic qualities. A perceiver of a media product, an actual communica-
tee, who for various reasons has no knowledge of, access to, or interest in 
the actual communicator, is likely to form a virtual sphere that includes a 
construed overarching virtual communicating mind that is the producer 
of overarching communication—in brief, an ‘overarching virtual commu-
nicator’—that helps in making the virtual sphere comprehensible. 
Otherwise, it might be difficult to make sense of media products whose 
producers are anonymous. Hence, the craving for internal coherence, for 
gestalt, can be satisfied with the aid of a construed overarching virtual 
communicator: odd details, vague connections, and apparent inconsisten-
cies may be knitted together through the idea of a virtual communicating 
mind having certain ideas, peculiarities, purposes, unconscious drives, or 
ironic inclinations. Overarching virtual communicators may also be needed 
when perceiving media products formed collectively by several actual 
communicators and trying to understand the resulting virtual sphere as 
somehow consistent.
By definition, a virtual sphere can have only one overarching virtual 
communicator. As soon as one thinks in terms of several virtual communi-
cators, they are automatically subordinated to either an overarching virtual 
communicator or an actual communicator. Whereas at least one actual 
communicator is needed to bring about communication, the overarching 
virtual communicator is an optional entity that can be conjured up in the 
virtual sphere to make sense of it. Although it emerges within the intra-
communicational domains, it may well be very similar to communicating 
minds in the extracommunicational domain, such as the actual communi-
cator. This is because, as noted earlier, all intracommunicational objects, 
including overarching virtual communicators, are ultimately made up of 
parts, combinations, or blends of extracommunicational objects.
The idea of an overarching virtual communicator accords well with 
what has long been known in literary theory as “implied author” (Booth 
1961) and what in film studies is sometimes referred to as “voice” or 
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“hypothetical filmmaker” (Alber 2010), although different authors 
 construe these latter concepts in different ways. There have also been 
many philosophical discussions regarding the rather awkward question of 
the possibly factual existence of this kind of entity in various media (see 
Diehl 2009). In any case, the concept of overarching virtual communica-
tor is fundamentally transmedial. This is because overarching virtual com-
municators are only indirectly represented by the sensory configurations 
of the media products, so to speak; they are formed in a later stage of the 
chains of semiosis and therefore independent of the modality modes of the 
media products.
An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the producer of over-
arching narration = an overarching virtual narrator. Narration is com-
munication including narratives, and narrators are minds that make this 
possible by producing narrative media products. An ‘overarching virtual 
narrator’—a brief term for an overarching virtual communicating mind 
that is the producer of overarching narration—should be understood in 
analogy with the concept of an overarching virtual communicator, except 
that an overarching virtual narrator is obviously relevant in the case of nar-
ration. Nothing much needs to be added here, except a brief terminologi-
cal comment. As the term ‘narrator’ has been used mainly for media types 
including verbal language, the term ‘monstrator’ has been suggested for 
the realm of visual iconic media (Gaudreault 2009 [1988]). Although this 
term stands for a concept that corresponds quite well with the concept of 
overarching virtual narrator, it would be unfeasible to use different terms 
for all basic media types that harbor narratives. For that reason, I stick to 
the term (actual or virtual) ‘narrator’ and postulate that it should be 
understood to stand for a transmedial concept.
An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of over-
arching communication = an overarching virtual communicatee. While a 
perceiver of a media product (an actual communicatee) may have no 
knowledge of, access to, or interest in the actual communicator, an actual 
communicatee must be supposed to be aware of and have a certain amount 
of control of herself. Thus, there is no need to involve an overarching 
virtual communicating mind that perceives the overarching communica-
tion—an ‘overarching virtual communicatee’—because the actual com-
municatee is out of reach. However, an overarching virtual communicatee 
may, just like an overarching virtual communicator, be helpful for making 
the virtual sphere comprehensible. In cases where the actual communica-
tee has a sense of not being an adequate perceiver at all, or when she 
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believes that only parts of what is being communicated is graspable, it may 
be useful or even necessary to construe a virtual sphere including an over-
arching virtual communicatee. It is about construing an ideal perceiver’s 
mind that might be able to grasp the entirety in a better way than the 
actual communicatee and hence achieve fuller understanding and better 
coherence (the concept of overarching virtual communicatee is a transme-
dial variation of what is known in literary theory as “implied reader” 
[Booth 1961]). In other words: the overarching virtual communicatee is 
the type of actual communicatees that is best suited for perceiving the 
media product. This ideal type of communicatee is something that may 
emerge within the virtual sphere as a result of the thought activity of the 
actual communicatee. Sometimes it is superfluous. As the concept of over-
arching virtual communicator, the concept of overarching virtual com-
municatee is profoundly transmedial and does not rely on the modality 
modes of the media products.
An overarching virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of over-
arching narration  =  an overarching virtual narratee. The ‘overarching 
virtual narratee’ is a variation of the overarching virtual communicatee, of 
which nothing more must be said except that the exploration of narratees 
at different levels in literature was pioneered by Prince (1982: 16–26) in a 
way that has inspired this account.
An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the producer of embed-
ded communication = an embedded virtual communicator. It is common 
for communication to be about communication. When talking to each 
other, one may mention other people who have said things or communi-
cated them in other ways. Still images may depict acts of communication 
such as speaking, writing, drawing, or gesticulating. In all of these cases, 
one infers that communicating minds are involved in what is being repre-
sented. When seeing a still image of a writing person, for instance, one 
considers that the represented person must have a mind—a virtual mind, 
of course—that directs the writing performed by the directly represented 
body. In a case like this, the virtual sphere being formed by the perception 
of the static, visual, and iconic media product includes an embedded vir-
tual communicating mind that is the producer of embedded communica-
tion; or, more succinctly, an ‘embedded virtual communicator’. Virtual 
communicators like these are embedded, not overarching, because they 
only constitute smaller or larger parts of the virtual sphere, in contrast to 
overarching virtual communicators that have bearing on the totality of the 
virtual sphere. Although embedded virtual communicators, like overarch-
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ing virtual communicators, emerge within the intracommunicational 
domains, they may more or less resemble minds in the extracommunica-
tional domain. A virtual sphere may contain no, one, or several embedded 
virtual communicators.
An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the producer of embed-
ded narration  =  an embedded virtual narrator. The ‘embedded virtual 
narrator’ is a special case of the embedded virtual communicator. It must 
be noted that literary theory in particular has come up with a multitude of 
terms and concepts that connect to the discussions here, although they are 
too media-specific to be relevant for a treatise on transmedial narration.
An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of embed-
ded communication  =  an embedded virtual communicatee. As already 
stated, it is common for communication to be about communication, and 
of course it is not only communicators, but also communicatees, that can 
be represented in communication. To reformulate the previous examples: 
When talking to each other, people may mention other people having lis-
tened to, seen, or in other ways perceived media products. Still images 
may depict acts of communication such as speaking, writing, drawing, or 
gesticulating, but also people listening to, sensing, or watching various 
media products, and we must then infer that these represented people 
have virtual minds that process the perceived sensory configurations. In 
alignment with embedded virtual communicators, a virtual sphere may 
harbor none, one, or several ‘embedded virtual communicatees’.
An embedded virtual communicating mind that is the perceiver of embed-
ded narration = an embedded virtual narratee. ‘Embedded virtual narra-
tees’ are nothing more or less than specific forms of embedded virtual 
communicatees.
And so on; multiple layers of communication or narration embedded in 
embedded communication or narration. Continuing these lines of reason-
ing, embedded communication and narration may embed further layers of 
communication and narration. Communication or narration embedded in 
embedded communication or narration follow the same principles as com-
munication or narration that is simply embedded in communication or 
narration. However, in contrast to overarching virtual communicators, 
communicatees, narrators, and narratees, embedded virtual communica-
tors, communicatees, narrators, and narratees are to some extent sensitive 
to modality modes and therefore not fully transmedial.
Media types involving sophisticated systems of symbols, such as media 
including visual, auditory, or tactile verbal language, may easily represent 
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infinite layers of embedded communication: ‘Sarah said that she had read 
in a book that scientists claim that people who eat much sugar report that 
….’ Also, media types involving visual icons (whether fully spatiotemporal 
or three- or two-dimensionally spatial) have great potential for represent-
ing several layers of embedded communication. We have all seen images of 
people creating images of people creating images of people creating images 
ad infinitum. However, it is not as easy for these iconic media types to 
represent several layers of embedded narration if they are not temporal. 
Moving images may readily represent events in succession that include 
narrative events, such as when we see a story about someone going to the 
cinema, buying tickets, and then watching a movie about someone going 
to her desk, sharpening a pen, thinking a while, and then writing a letter 
about a friend who has traveled to Indonesia and fallen in love—and so 
forth. Still images, on the other hand, are less adequate for representing 
temporal interrelations being represented within other temporal interrela-
tions, although it is certainly not impossible, especially if the perceiver’s 
background knowledge is explored. In the case of media types that are 
recognized as potentially narrative only in a more elementary manner—
such as a meal where the interrelated events consist of tastes and taste 
combinations that are developed and contrasted—the idea of representing 
embedded narratives offers even more resistance due to the limited 
amount of complex cognitive functions connected to the gustatory sense. 
As a rule of thumb, I propose that embedded narration is even more 
media-sensitive than narration as such, and that the deeper down in 
embedded narrative layers one goes, the less transmedial it all becomes.
FoCalizing minds
For a long time, narratology has, for good reasons, scrutinized concepts 
such as perspective and point of view and in numerous ways related them 
to narration and narrators. The related concept of focalization was first 
investigated by Gérard Genette in written literature (1980 [1972]: 186) 
and was later explored by, among many others, François Jost in film 
(2004), Kai Mikkonen in comics (2011), and Jonathan Hensher in still 
images (2016). There is an extensive literature on the entangled issues of 
perspective, point of view, focalization, and their interrelations (for a 
recent overview with a transmedial perspective, see Thon 2016: 223–264).
Focalization is variously conceptualized in terms of agency or functions 
that somehow delimit narratives and parts of narratives: not everything is 
seen, heard, or conveyed in a certain narrative. The scope of narratives can 
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hence be understood to be restricted by one or several focalizers. Although 
originating from literary theory, focalization is actually a profoundly trans-
medial concept that, I believe, must be tightly connected to the concept 
of communicating and narrating minds.
It is often noted that the term ‘focalization’ has certain visual connota-
tions. It is “based on the visual metaphor of a lens through which one can 
take things, characters, actions in the storyworld into ‘focus’. It seems that 
a media-sensitive narratology has to revise this concept to accommodate 
all the other sense perceptions, too” (Mildorf and Kinzel 2016a: 14). 
While it is vital to revise the concept so that it clearly covers all forms of 
sense perceptions, this does not necessarily include revising the term. 
Several new terms have actually been coined for focalization of other sense 
perceptions than the visual, but I think it is untenable to use different 
terms for each different sense being involved, just as it is untenable to use 
different terms for narration and narrators in different media types. Such 
a practice would make transmedial terminology acutely overloaded and 
transmedial research unnecessarily cumbersome. As the term ‘focus’ is far 
from exclusive to the visual domain—it is broadly used for denoting points 
of convergence, attention, or action in a wide array of sensorial and cogni-
tive domains—I find the term ‘focalization’ useful for transmedial narra-
tology. Therefore, I prefer to continue talking about focus, focalizing, and 
focalization in all media types instead of introducing a broad range of new 
media-specific terms.
However, the concept of focalization is also highly useful outside the 
area of narration. For that reason, I define focalization as a main feature of 
communication at large. All virtual spheres are demarcated in various 
ways. The notion of actual and virtual communicators always communi-
cating everything they perceive and know is clearly absurd, so it must be 
concluded that communicators of all kinds are generally also focalizers to 
some extent (pace Genette and despite the broad range of knowledge of 
so-called omniscient narrators). In order to cover the complex field of pos-
sible restrictions of what is being communicated, it is also vital to empha-
size that focalization concerns not only restrictions on the communication 
of all kinds of sensory perceptions but also restrictions on all kinds of 
knowledge, thoughts, ideas, and values. As the awareness of sensory per-
ception and cognition takes place in minds, it is minds that have the ability 
to select what is to be communicated; therefore, focalization must be per-
formed by focalizing minds.
Focalization is an essential and unavoidable aspect of communication in 
general. As communication on all levels is entirely dependent on minds, 
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from the actual communicators and communicatees to embedded virtual 
communicators and communicatees, focalization is located in minds on 
the different levels that have been described in this chapter. The actual 
communicator determines—consciously or unconsciously—certain frames 
of what to be communicated. When construing the virtual sphere, the 
actual communicatee furthermore interprets the communicated in terms 
of virtual narrators focalizing their sense impressions and cognition in vari-
ous ways.
Therefore, focalization regulates the communicated, both in whole and 
in detail. From the broadest perspective, the limits of a mind’s perceptions 
and cognitions also constitute a form of focalization: one can never com-
municate what is outside one’s scope, so the presence of a certain virtual 
mind may result in the communicated being focalized in a way that would 
not be the case if another virtual mind, harboring other perceptions and 
cognitions, had been present. By the same token, actual minds can, natu-
rally, only (try to) communicate what they have perceived and what they 
know or believe. From a narrower perspective, focalization is rather about 
choosing—for practical or more calculated reasons—to delimit the scope. 
As communicating minds may choose to pay attention to what they know 
about other minds, one of many ways of focalizing is to delimit one’s 
scope to what one assumes to be the perceptions, knowledge, and ideas of 
other minds. Clearly, different minds within the same virtual sphere may 
focalize in ways that create tensions or even conflicts—clashes that may or 
may not be satisfactorily resolved by an overarching virtual narrator.
Overall, I believe that a clear notion of different levels of communicat-
ing, narrating, and focalizing minds is highly useful for understanding 
how communication at large and narration in particular is structured. It is 
essential that the conceptual framework is thoroughly transmedial, while 
at the same time pointing to the limits of transmediality. In the following 
chapter, where the attention will be on represented events, it should be 
borne in mind that events may appear both in narratives that actual or 
overarching virtual narrators are responsible for, and in narratives pro-
duced by embedded virtual narrators.
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Abstract This chapter scrutinizes the essential notion of represented 
events as a transmedial cornerstone of narration. Events should be under-
stood as sudden or slow changes of conditions. Because events can be 
both concrete and abstract and generally very diverse, they can be repre-
sented by a broad range of media types far beyond the borders of verbal 
media. The distinction between actions and occurrences further helps to 
discern among different kinds of narratives: actions are events that result 
from acts of volition and occurrences are events that do not result from 
acts of volition. Finally, it is emphasized that some represented events are 
normally perceived to be more salient than others, which leads to 
hierarchization.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Existent • State • Event • Action • 
Occurrence
While the concepts of actual and virtual narrators and narratees are essen-
tial for understanding how narration is realized, narrating minds are not, 
as such, part of the narrative core—the investigation of which will start 
here. In this and the two subsequent chapters, I will examine the various 
constituents of this scaffolding core, the story, according to the definition 
of it as represented events that are temporally interrelated in a meaningful 
way. This chapter focuses on represented events.
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The concept of event is potentially very complex. It has been investi-
gated in great detail by David Herman (2002: 27–51), but for my pur-
poses a comprehension that includes only the most essential features of the 
concept is needed. A general guiding principle to be observed is that it is 
not always possible to delimit the exact extension of events. Sometimes it 
may not be absolutely clear whether some represented happenings are best 
understood as one or several closely linked events (cf. Nanay 2009). 
Whereas this may be a philosophical difficulty, it does not constitute a 
problem for understanding how narration works.
StateS and eventS
Nevertheless, the concept of event must be inspected and delineated suf-
ficiently to operate transmedially. Chatman (1978) suggested that narra-
tives include existents and events. Existents appear in represented space and 
events appear in represented time. Although this is a neat dichotomy that, 
at least partly, works well for its purpose of investigating narration in film 
and literature, it is too narrow for a more radical transmedial narratology. 
Confining existents to three-dimensional space means, in effect, that only 
materially existing objects and phenomena are captured. This largely 
excludes communication that is not primarily about what goes on in a 
physical place inhabited by concrete entities but is rather about more 
abstract notions. Although abstract thinking is also deeply colored by our 
experiences of existing in a three-dimensional, physical world, resulting in 
image schemas that bridge the mental and the material, there is a differ-
ence between thoughts and ideas that have a spatial character and physical 
objects and processes that are three-dimensional as such. Therefore, a 
truly transmedial narratology cannot delimit its scope to the representa-
tion of concrete existents but must include a comprehension of virtual 
spheres that contain representation of partly, mainly, or only abstract exis-
tents. This also means that the existents versus events dichotomy no lon-
ger builds on the clear-cut space-versus-time division.
Substantially modifying Chatman’s dichotomy, I instead propose 
another initial distinction, namely between representing what exists (exis-
tents) and how that evolves in time. Existing entities may be material as well 
as mental and may be perceived as anything from concretely spatial to 
abstractly spatial or not spatial at all. Examples of existents would then 
include a cat represented by a still image, a balloon represented by moving 
images, the emotion of happiness represented by speech, the notion of 
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high speed represented by a piece of writing, a toddler represented by 
gestures, and the idea of conflict represented by a meal. Represented exis-
tents like these are media characteristics that may be more or less transme-
dial: whereas the most abstract existents, such as conflicts, are likely to be 
most transmedial, the most concrete existents, such as balloons, are likely 
to be somewhat less transmedial. Media types based on developed systems 
of symbols, such as visual verbal language, have large representative scopes. 
As demonstrated in the previous sentences of this very text, several forms 
of both abstract and concrete existents can readily be represented by writ-
ten words.
Media types based on visual or auditory iconicity may also represent a 
broad scope of existents. Not least, visual iconicity is a versatile representa-
tive tool: cats, balloons, and toddlers can be represented through straight-
forward similarity between representamen and object (meaning that, 
because of the resemblance, one directly conjures up inner images of cats, 
balloons, or toddlers). Adding an index makes it possible to also effort-
lessly represent existents such as happiness, speed, and conflict: visual icons 
of faces, airplanes, or cats can be formed in such ways that one does not 
only perceive a resemblance to these objects but also interpret them as 
really connected to more abstract existents. Represented faces that look 
happy also represent happiness, airplanes represented as flying also repre-
sent speed, and cats represented as fighting also represent conflict. 
Auditory icons, on the other hand, freely represent auditory objects that 
visual icons may represent only more indirectly: the mewing of a cat, for 
instance, can directly be represented by a sound resembling mewing, but 
only indirectly by a visual image of a cat with a certain facial expression. 
Thus, the transmediality of existents is not a question of either-or but 
rather of degrees between efficient and highly intersubjectively perceived 
transmediality and cumbersome and less intersubjectively perceived 
transmediality.
There is a wealth of represented existents. Investigating them all would 
amount to investigating the totality of communication, and investigating 
all their various transmedial potentials would be equal to investigating the 
entirety of transmediation.
How do existents evolve over time? Answering this question requires 
another distinction, namely between states and events. States are relatively 
stable conditions flanked by events, while events are sudden or slow 
changes of conditions. Thus, states tend toward lack of evolvement, 
whereas events comprise evolvement. Although there is clearly no definite 
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way of saying when a slight modification of a state turns into a slow event, 
the distinction is operable and highlights important facets of what goes on 
both in the actual world and in virtual spheres.
Representing various kinds of existents is fundamental for all forms of 
communication and both states and events obviously presuppose exis-
tents; if there is no representation of anything that exists, there is clearly 
nothing that can evolve over time. One could say that representing states 
is the default position of communication. In a minimal act of communica-
tion, such as an actual communicator writing the word ‘cat’, the actual 
communicatee, if she understands English, will most probably form an 
interpretant based on the notion of an unchanging existent: a kind of ani-
mal with certain properties that does not evolve in time in any particular 
way. It is simply there; an existent in a certain state. Thus, representing 
events is optional in communication: ‘the cat disappeared’ involves an 
existent being connected to first a state and then an event: first the cat was 
simply there and then something happened—a sudden change of condi-
tions leading to it no longer being there. Introducing such an event is the 
first step toward narration.
Just like existents, states and events can be material as well as mental; 
they may be directly perceived by the external senses as well as internally 
experienced. Whereas events such as balloons bursting or toddlers starting 
to cry are primarily perceived, events such as happiness being transformed 
to irritation or a conflict being resolved are often experienced.
Yet another distinction is needed to clarify the concept of event. As 
human beings, equipped with consciousness and advanced cognitive and 
emotive resources, most of us believe that there is a substantial difference 
between things that happen by themselves, because of physical forces 
freely operating in the universe, and things that happen because of cere-
bral processes. Again, we are faced with one of those difficult dichotomies 
that must certainly be thoroughly questioned and scrutinized but are nev-
ertheless difficult to do away with. While it is easy to put theoretical pres-
sure on the general material–mental dichotomy, and more specifically on 
the opposition between physical forces and cerebral processes—because 
cerebral processes actually adhere to physical forces—human interactions 
would be very difficult to handle if we did not recognize the vital differ-
ence between someone hitting someone else in the head and someone 
being hit in the head by a dead branch falling from a tree.
Consequently, in the context of human communication and transme-
dial narration it is useful to distinguish between two main forms of events: 
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actions and occurrences. Actions are events resulting from acts of volition, 
while occurrences are events not resulting from acts of volition (for a 
detailed discussion of the concept of action, see for instance Meister 
2003). While this is not the forum to try to define the definite border 
between volition and non-volition, I leave the possibility open for under-
standing, for instance, certain acts performed by mentally severely ill living 
creatures as occurrences rather than actions. As other distinctions in this 
treatise, the distinction between actions and occurrences is not intended 
to cut reality into two pieces but rather to highlight important but debat-
able differences in order to get closer to a more complex understanding of 
the phenomena in question.
Examples of actions, either in our lived world or represented in various 
forms of communication, include a resting cat that decides to try to catch 
a mouse, a father who finds an empty balloon and blows it up, a lonely 
pensioner who buys a dog and becomes happy, a burglar who steels a car 
and drives away at high speed, a toddler jumping into a puddle, and a 
monkey who mocks another monkey and gets into conflict with it. Within 
literature and film narratology, represented concrete existents with con-
scious agency are often called characters (human beings, animals, or 
anthropomorphized objects).
Examples of occurrences, within or without communication, include a 
cat that falls ill because of eating an infected mouse, a balloon that gets lost 
because of strong wind, a happy pensioner who becomes sad because of 
the death of a friend, a speeding car that stops because there is no gas left, 
a toddler who gets soaked because of a sudden rain, and two monkeys who 
happen to find a delicious fruit simultaneously and start to quarrel. Like 
existents, events in the form of simple actions or occurrences are media 
characteristics that may be more or less transmedial. The most abstract 
events, such as conflicts that arise, are likely to be more transmedial, and 
the most concrete events, such as balloons blowing away, are likely to be 
less transmedial.
As narration is about representing events, all of these observations are 
relevant for analyzing how narratives can be formed; they are simply indis-
pensable for studying the peculiarities of narration. Narratives must nec-
essarily and self-evidently include represented existents. Whereas 
representing states—stable conditions of existents—is common and often 
sufficient in communication, narratives also comprise representations of 
changes in the conditions of existents: events. Narratives can also be con-
stituted by represented events that are perceived as actions caused by voli-
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tion, as  occurrences not caused by volition, or as a mixture of the two. A 
miniature narrative such as ‘Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese air 
force, which brought the United States into World War II’ is action-
based. In contrast, the elementary narrative ‘the Earth was hit by a giant 
meteor, which led to the extinction of dinosaurs’ is occurrence-based. 
Confronted with a slightly more complex narrative such as ‘because most 
people ignored the warnings of scientists, the accumulated emissions led 
to global climate changes; the consequences were massive involuntary 
migration and escalating worldwide famine and ethnic conflicts’, one 
must conclude that it is based on a mixture of actions and occurrences. 
Naturally, occurrences can be represented so that they look like actions 
(‘the eruption of the volcano was a warning to the people on the island 
who lived in sin but decided to repent’) and actions may be brought for-
ward as occurrences (‘after having suffered such humiliation for many 
years, he was forced to kill her’). Media types based on symbol systems or 
visual iconicity are probably normally superior at expressing this kind of 
narrative subtlety.
HierarcHieS of eventS
The more events a narrative contains, the more interrelations will appear 
among events. Increased narrative complexity is likely to lead to stratifica-
tion because, often, not all events are perceived to be equally important. 
Therefore, it is probably unavoidable to construe hierarchies of events; 
most perceivers of media products resulting in narrative virtual spheres of 
some complexity will find that events have partly different weight and 
function.
This was realized already in the infancy of narratology. Writing about 
‘motifs’, which can approximately be understood as the smallest of events, 
Boris Tomashevsky suggested that “The motifs which cannot be omitted 
are bound motifs; those which may be omitted without disturbing the 
whole causal-chronological course of events are free motifs” (Tomashevsky 
2012 [1925]: 68). In a similar vein, he proposed that “Motifs which 
change the situation are dynamic motifs; those which do not are static” 
(Tomashevsky 2012 [1925]: 70). Although there are only subtle differ-
ences between dynamic and bound motifs (if motifs change the situation, 
they cannot be omitted without altering the course of events) and 
between static and free motifs (if motives do not change the situation, 
 L. ELLESTRÖM
83
they can be omitted without altering the course of events), the distinc-
tions point to a substantial hierarchy of events in narratives. The differ-
ence between those represented events that are vital for the core of a 
narrative (what Tomashevsky called “the whole causal-chronological 
course of events”) and those that are not highlights the fact that although 
the story, the scaffolding core of a narrative, consists of represented events 
that are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way, the whole narrative 
may contain less vital represented events that are not perceived to be part 
of the story.
Several decades later, Roland Barthes launched a similar distinction 
between more or less vital events. He stated that there are events that have 
“cardinal functions” and events that are merely “catalysers”. For a func-
tion to be cardinal, he continued, “it is enough that the action to which it 
refers open (or continue, or close) an alternative that is of direct conse-
quence for the subsequent development of the story. […] Catalysers are 
only consecutive units, cardinal functions are both consecutive and conse-
quential” (1977 [1966]: 93–94). Although Barthes was only writing 
about actions, the distinction may well be extended to also include 
occurrences.
Thus, represented events can to some extent, although hardly very 
exactly, be hierarchically ordered in concordance with Tomashevsky’s and 
Barthes’s ideas. Depending on the qualities of specific narratives, more or 
less clear-cut stratifications may be made in order to more clearly perceive 
meaningful relations among events. Although those two authors wrote 
mainly about literature, especially Tomashevsky’s distinctions are formu-
lated on a very general level and are truly transmedial. This means that 
they are important tools for analyzing transmediation of narratives: being 
able to identify events that are more vital than others means being able to 
more accurately find similarities among central structures shared by narra-
tives realized by dissimilar media types.
However, the issue becomes more intricate when considering that nar-
ratives may embed narratives, which means that represented events are 
embedded in represented events (investigated by Genette 1980 [1972] 
and many others). As such, an embedded narrative may be considered to 
be an event in the overarching narrative that is or is not vital. Furthermore, 
events that are vital in an embedded narrative may or may not be consid-
ered vital in the overarching narrative. It is probably safe to say that it is 
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Abstract This chapter investigates temporal interrelations of represented 
events with an emphasis on dissimilarities among temporal interrelations. 
Two distinctions that are vital for grasping media differences are high-
lighted: possible temporal differences between (static or temporal) repre-
senting media products and (temporal) narratives, and potential temporal 
differences within narratives, more precisely between overall narratives 
and core stories. Particular attention is given to the convention of sequen-
tial decoding, which is important for inducing temporality in some forms 
of static media products. These explorations make it possible to under-
stand both the transmedial possibilities and the media-specific restraints 
for narration.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Narrative time • Media product • 
Narrative: Story • Sequential decoding
Although the previous chapter was mainly attentive to the nature of rep-
resented events and their conceptual relations to existents and states, the 
last section also started investigating interrelations of events. This chapter 
will take the step toward examining temporal interrelations of events. In so 
doing, we move to the central part of the definition of story as represented 
events that are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way. As the notion 
of represented events being temporally interrelated is, as such, rather 
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unproblematic—it simply means that events can be understood to precede 
and follow each other in various ways—the discussions will be concen-
trated on differences among temporal interrelations.
To be able to disentangle the crucial phenomenon of temporal differ-
ences in narration in a lucid way, I will repeat the three levels of narration 
that were first presented in Chap. 3:
• A media product with particular basic media traits and other forma-
tive qualities provides certain sensory configurations that are per-
ceived by someone; these sensory configurations come to represent 
…
• … media characteristics forming a complete narrative with all its 
many specific details and features; furthermore, the perceiver com-
prehends that this narrative surrounds …
• … a scaffolding core, the story, consisting of represented events that 
are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way.
Inspecting this three-level distinction, one can discern two main ways in 
which narration can hold vital temporal differences: (1) There may be a 
difference between the basic temporal features of the media product and 
the narrative; (2) There may also be a difference situated within the narra-
tive, namely between the complete narrative and the core of the narrative, 
the story.
These two kinds of temporal differences in narration—on one hand 
between the media product as representamen and the narrative as object 
and, on the other hand, within the object; that is, between the complete 
narrative and the scaffolding core story—are both central to understand-
ing the possibilities, limitations, and particularities of transmedial 
narration.
Temporal Differences BeTween meDia proDucTs 
anD narraTives
Investigating the first kind of temporal difference in narration, between 
the media product and the narrative, requires a methodical approach 
grounded especially in the spatiotemporal and semiotic modalities; 
although the material and sensorial media modes are not irrelevant, of 
course, there is no call to elaborate on them here beyond what was already 
done in Chap. 4.
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In communication in general, there are four principal possibilities 
regarding temporal similarities and differences between a media product 
and a virtual sphere. There may be temporal media products representing 
temporal virtual spheres; temporal media products representing static vir-
tual spheres; static media products representing temporal virtual spheres; 
and static media products representing static virtual spheres. As narratives 
are temporal virtual spheres, only two main options need to be consid-
ered: temporal media products representing temporal virtual spheres (nar-
ratives); and static media products representing temporal virtual spheres 
(narratives). Therefore, the simple initial observation to be made here is 
that, in principle, both temporal and static media products might repre-
sent temporal virtual spheres such as narratives. Moreover, it is fairly gen-
erally accepted that this is also the case in practice, as will be illuminated 
here in some detail.
A methodical overview of the abundance of intricate ways to narrate 
can begin with some comments on temporal media products forming nar-
ratives. In the simplest of cases, sensory configurations that are each 
understood to represent some event evolve one after another in the tem-
porally unfolding media product. The default result of such an actual tem-
poral sequence of representations, conditioned by the temporal progression 
of the media product, is that the temporal sequence of the media product 
corresponds to a temporal sequence in the virtual sphere. In these elemen-
tary cases, there is a strong parallelism between the temporal qualities of 
the media product and the narrative.
If one listened to the radio, for instance, and heard first a scream, then 
a bang, and finally the sound of something heavy falling to the ground, 
one would normally (unless other things speak against it) take those 
sounds to iconically represent a virtual sphere where something like this 
happens: first, someone sees a person with a gun and screams, then the 
gun is fired, and finally a body falls to the ground because it has been hit. 
The order of and the intervals between the sounds and the represented 
events would be understood to match each other (again as long as more 
complicated interpretations are not motivated). In instances like this, the 
narration is so straightforward that the distinctions between temporalities 
in media product, narrative, and story cannot be practically effectuated.
However, adding further details to the representation of these three 
events could lead to the construction of a more complex narrative. For 
instance, the actual narratee may perceive that in the virtual sphere there 
is a long temporal gap between the scream and the bang, or that the 
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scream was in fact heard after the bang and the heavy fall. Temporal media 
types may indeed accomplish intricate narratives. The point is that tempo-
ral media products ultimately require very little, except their very tempo-
rality, to be capable of simple narration. The matching temporalities of 
temporal media products and temporal virtual spheres plainly facilitate 
narration.
The temporal difference between static media products and temporal 
virtual spheres requires more sophisticated conditions to make narration 
possible. I discern three main ways to bridge such a temporal difference 
and compensate for the lack of temporality in static media products. In 
practice, these conditions may be present separately or simultaneously.
The first prerequisite is a convention of sequential decoding. Such con-
ventions, or strong habits, form the ground of a symbolic element also in 
those media types that are rather dominated by icons or indices. They can 
make static media products appear almost as if they were temporal, which 
means that their sequentiality may, by default, be understood to corre-
spond to a temporal sequence in the virtual sphere. Some basic examples 
are regulated sequential decoding of iconic media types (such as series of 
still images), sequential decoding of iconic and indexical media types (like 
a succession of photographic still images), and sequential decoding of 
symbolic media types (with written verbal texts as the principal but not 
exclusive example). It is precisely the strong convention of sequential 
decoding that makes writing appear so similar to speech despite the funda-
mental difference between a static and a temporal media type.
The second prerequisite is the representation of temporal positions or 
relations. Icons may represent objects working as indices for temporal 
positions: clocks, the positions of the sun in the sky, objects connected to 
specific seasons of the year (snow, blossoming cherry trees, falling leaves, 
etc.), certain holidays, and so on. One example is visual two-dimensional 
still images that represent numerous hour-glasses indicating different time 
positions for several depicted events. Another example is tactile three- 
dimensional reliefs that iconically represent the growth of an infant 
through the development of bodily age characteristics connected to a 
number of crucial life events. Words or other symbols may represent tem-
poral positions (‘in the afternoon’, ‘Tuesday’, ‘1984’) or temporal rela-
tions (‘earlier’, ‘first’, ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘later’). A visual, verbal, and 
two-dimensional text may represent a series of events temporally anchored 
to specific months of the year, or a tactile, verbal three-dimensional braille 
text may represent events that are bound together through different 
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phases of the moon. All these devices may certainly occur also in temporal 
media types.
The third prerequisite is representation of objects that make it possible 
to create a temporal virtual sphere through inferences about past and 
future time. This is achievable because of collateral experience. As there 
are several forms of collateral experience, there are several means of achiev-
ing represented temporality through inferences about past and future 
time. Collateral experience in the form of general knowledge of both the 
natural and the cultural world often incites one to draw inferences of what 
has probably happened before and what will probably happen after a single 
event represented by a static media product. Any form of representation 
of, say, someone jumping from a bridge will normally lead to the perceiver 
inferring a temporal continuation: the person will fall down until some-
thing or someone rescues her or until she hits the ground or water under-
neath. This is what one’s knowledge of the physical laws contributes. By 
the same token, the perceiver is likely to infer that something vital has 
anticipated the act of jumping: the single represented event cannot stand 
entirely alone, one presumes, for the simple reason that this is not how 
things work in the world that we are familiar with. So, the virtual sphere 
represented by the static media product may grow to include preceding 
events, such as the person having been forced by someone else to jump, 
having experienced a serious trauma that makes life unbearable, or having 
taken some heavy mind-altering drug. This is what one infers because of 
one’s knowledge of human nature and culture.
As discussed above, general knowledge of the world may be developed 
to cognitive schemata, which means that inferences like these can be rather 
extensive. Any static media type representing an average person debarking 
a commercial airplane will open up for inclusion of a whole cognitive 
schema in the virtual sphere: the person has bought a ticket, then gone to 
the airport, passed security control, embarked, and spent some time sitting 
down in the aircraft before debarking, which will be followed—our cogni-
tive schema tells us—by other standard procedures for airport arrival. In 
some cases, then, extensive cognitive schemata may provide static media 
products with the complete material for forming narratives.
Furthermore, collateral experience in the form of specific knowledge of 
already narrated stories may deliver additional events to the virtual spheres 
of static media products. If we are confronted with the representation of a 
little girl wearing a red hood and meeting a wolf in the woods, it may be 
almost unavoidable to see this event as part of a well-known story—given 
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that the actual communicatee is familiar with the story, of course. The suc-
cession of events unfolds in the mind of the perceiver, creating a virtual 
sphere that is similar to those virtual spheres that have been formed in 
earlier perceptions of the story. Naturally, all forms of collateral experience 
are also relevant for temporal media types, although they are not always as 
urgent for achieving narration.
All these distinctions and elaborations not only contribute to our 
understanding of how static media types may narrate at all but also help us 
appreciate the balance between similarities and differences amid narration 
in temporal and static media types, respectively. They are, in brief, central 
for understanding the possibilities and limitations of transmedial 
narration.
Temporal Differences BeTween narraTives 
anD sTories
We have seen that the temporality of the overarching narrative may be 
represented by either a temporal or a static media product. In the latter 
case, there is a temporal difference between the media product and the 
narrative; this is the first kind of temporal difference in narration. The 
second kind of possible temporal difference in narration is a difference 
situated within the narrative, namely between the temporality of the com-
plete narrative and the temporality of the scaffolding core of the narrative, 
the story. It should be remembered, though, that it is not always possible 
to firmly establish the distinction between narrative and story in actual 
narratives, and that it only sometimes involves a temporal difference.
Why is it, then, that stories are sometimes construed in such a way that 
a temporal difference between the complete narrative, being more com-
plex and elaborated, and the core story, consisting of the essence of tem-
poral events in the narrative, is established? It is probably mainly because 
of an urge to think in terms of how the temporally interrelated events in 
the narrative would unfold if they would appear in directly perceived real 
life instead of being represented. Having a drive to understand what really 
happens around us is essential for our survival, and this includes a will to 
comprehend the ways in which events are interrelated.
In the case of temporal media types and static media types that are 
sequentially decoded because of conventions, the temporal qualities of the 
represented events in the overall narrative are, if not determined, at least 
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strongly directed by the temporality or sequentiality of the media product. 
This is why the interrelations among events in the narrative may be 
deranged, so to speak, compared to how they would unfold if they were 
directly perceived in real life. Depending on what the actual narrator wants 
to emphasize, a story about someone who sees a person with a gun and 
screams, after which the gun is fired and a body falls to the ground, can be 
enwrapped in various forms of narratives emphasizing certain events rather 
than others, certain states rather than events, or certain interrelations 
among states and events. An efficient means of achieving such emphasis 
may be to manipulate the temporal interrelations of the story, thus form-
ing narratives about, say, the state of the screaming person after the shot 
compared to the state before the shot, the dramatic event of the shooting, 
or the relation between the preceding state of the shooting person and the 
act of shooting. In general, an actual narrator may attract attention by 
starting with the most sensational event or create suspense by way of with-
holding it. She may also want to narrate a chain of events in the order she 
learnt about the separate events rather than in the order they possibly 
actually happened, thus emphasizing her own experience of putting the 
events together, which naturally creates a temporal difference between 
narrative and story.
In the case of media types not being temporal or sequentially decoded 
because of conventions, the order in which the represented events are 
encountered cannot, for obvious reasons, be determined by the (lack of) 
temporality and conventional sequentiality of the media product. This is 
not to say that the perceiver randomly explores the spatially represented 
events in the narrative. Some sensory configurations may be presented 
(through size or position, for instance) so that they are distinguished as 
more salient than others, which can lead to a rudimentary order of percep-
tion and partly decide the relative duration of certain perceptions. In 
museums, for instance, the visitor can even be directed by walls and other 
physical obstacles to follow a certain path and hence encounter repre-
sented events in an arranged order. Anyhow, the absent or relatively weak 
determination of how static but spatial media products are sensorially per-
ceived in time weakens the possibility of construing a difference between 
the temporality of a narrative and the temporality of a core story. Perceivers 
of static media products that are not conventionally decoded sequentially 
presumably have little incentive to first construe an order of events in the 
narrative, with all its many specific details and features, and then discern 
another order of events in the core story; such a differentiation would be 
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a detour for a perceiving mind striving to get a grip of what happens in the 
virtual sphere.
Thus, the exploration of temporal differences between narratives and 
stories is most, but certainly not exclusively, relevant for narration involv-
ing temporal media products and media products that are conventionally 
decoded sequentially. However, temporal differences between narratives 
and stories include more than differences of order and those other differ-
ences can be applied more broadly transmedially. Here I follow Gérard 
Genette, who has suggested three different sorts of temporal divergences 
in narratives regarding order, duration, and frequency (Genette 1980 
[1972]: 33–160; the possible difference between the order of events in 
the ‘plot’ and the ‘story’ was already established in Tomashevsky 2012 
[1925]: 67). Adopting and adapting this to a transmedial perspective, I 
suggest that there may be differences in the temporal order, duration, and 
frequency of represented events between the complete narrative and the 
core story. In other words, a difference may be perceived between how the 
order, duration, and frequency of events and states are represented in the 
narrative and how we assume that the order, duration, and frequency of 
events and states would appear in real life, not being represented. 
Therefore, construing a story may involve both a concentration and a 
rearrangement of represented events.
Let me briefly illustrate the idea of temporal differences with the aid of 
the example of listening to the radio and hearing first a scream, then a 
bang, and finally the sound of something heavy falling to the ground. As 
we have already noted, these sounds can be taken to represent the events 
of a narrative of someone seeing a person with a gun and screaming, after 
which the gun is fired and a body falls to the ground because it has been 
hit. Given the sparse sensory configurations transmitted by the radio, this 
is not the only possible narrative that may be construed. The point here is 
that if one reduces this narrative to a story, taking away a few marginal 
details, virtually the same order, duration, and frequency of events will 
remain.
However, such a correspondence is not necessarily the case in narra-
tion. Presume that one instead hears a bang, followed by a long pause. 
After that, an exceedingly, unnaturally long scream followed by a bang is 
heard and this sequence is repeated three times. Finally, after yet another 
long pause, the sound of something heavy falling to the ground is heard. 
Such an auditory, temporal, and iconic media product may well be under-
stood as an artistic realization of the same simple story consisting of three 
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interrelated events: a scream followed by a bang followed by a fall. In this 
case, however, there are substantial temporal differences between narrative 
(the temporal qualities of which are no doubt strongly directed by the 
temporal qualities of the media product) and story. The order differs 
because the narrative starts with the shot instead of the scream. The dura-
tion differs because the scream and the pause between bang and fall are 
longer in the narrative than in the story. The frequency differs because 
both the single scream and the single bang in the story are repeatedly rep-
resented in the narrative.
Narratology has long explored these forms of temporal differences, so 
it should suffice here to add that there may be temporal differences 
between overarching and embedded narratives and among separate 
embedded narratives that seem to have a common core and are possibly 
based on the same story. These narrative interrelations can no doubt be 
infinitely complicated.
The distinction between temporal qualities of the media product and 
the narrative, as well as the distinction between temporal qualities of the 
narrative and the story, are both central to understanding the possibilities 
and limitations of transmedial narration. Furthermore, the division 
between the two distinctions, which has a tendency to be blurred, allows 
for a more fine-grained understanding of temporal similarities and differ-
ences in narration. The distinction between temporal qualities of the 
media product and temporal qualities of the narrative is fundamental for 
exploring the basic narrative capacities of dissimilar media types. The dis-
tinction between temporal qualities of the narrative and temporal qualities 
of the story is widely recognized for highlighting vital narrative devices. 
However, this distinction has a limited transmedial reach: it is mainly 
applicable to temporal media types and media types that are convention-
ally decoded sequentially.
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Abstract This chapter offers a semiotically colored model for interrogat-
ing meaningfully interrelated events in narratives. Based on our minds’ 
inclination to perceive gestalts (i.e., intraconnected wholes), it is suggested 
that meaningful temporal interrelations among represented events be 
understood in terms of internal coherence. It is also put forward that the 
internal connections in narratives can be analyzed in terms of various sorts 
of contiguity, forming the basis for indices that bind together the numer-
ous parts of narratives. Several theoretical perspectives and concepts, such 
as narrativization, are discussed. Finally, the results are demonstrated to be 
valid for the phenomenon of multimodal narration, which is central for 
understanding transmedial narration.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Coherence • Contiguity • Index • 
Narrativization • Multimodal narration
Whereas Chap. 7 scrutinized temporally interrelated events in general and 
differences among temporal interrelations in particular, this chapter will 
move on to the last part of the definition of story as represented events 
that are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way. Based on the inclina-
tion of our minds to perceive gestalts, intraconnected wholes, I suggest 
that meaningful temporal interrelations are understood in terms of coher-
ence. Thus, narratives are virtual spheres that, to some extent, must be 
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perceived as meaningful wholes; virtual spheres that, despite possible con-
trasts, tensions, ambiguities, uncertainties, and even incomprehensibili-
ties, are ultimately internally coherent enough not to fall into separate 
pieces.
What does it mean to say that a virtual sphere is coherent? It may be, 
for instance, that represented persons and actions appear to be generally 
interrelated; events and moods seem to somehow follow from each other 
rather than occur randomly; details are apprehended as parts of discernible 
mental or material wholes; psychological states, ideas, and concepts are 
developed intelligibly; physical properties are associated to material items 
in a consistent way; physical and psychological actions lead to reactions 
that are linked to the actions; emotions can be understood in the context 
of other emotions and activities; concepts make sense considering the set-
ting; or that entities and developments are felt to be proportional given 
the overall frame.
There are no clearly discernible borders between more and less coher-
ent virtual spheres. Coherence is partly a quality of perception involving 
mental parameters that cannot be measured straightforwardly. By the 
same token, the difference between less coherent narratives and virtual 
spheres representing events that are unclearly interrelated is not always 
clear. There may be many cracks in a virtual sphere that is still kept 
together, but at some point it may be felt to break.
Kinds of Contiguity
Here, I will conceptualize coherence, or more precisely internal coherence 
of virtual spheres, in terms of indexicality. We have already established that 
indices stand for objects on the ground of contiguity, to be understood as 
real connections, and a main function of indices in communication is to 
form meaningful internal interrelations. Intracommunicational indexical-
ity is semiosis creating bonds within a virtual sphere, connecting repre-
sentamens on the ground of contiguity to objects that are drawn into or 
formed inside the virtual sphere as it evolves.
Apart from being able to hold represented space and time, a virtual 
sphere is spatiotemporal in the sense that it is formed by more or less con-
tinuous perception and interpretation of physically more or less demar-
cated media products. Even if the perception is interrupted (as when one 
stops reading a book and resumes the following day), or if parts of the 
media products are scattered (as when communication is spread to a com-
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bination of various media types that are accessible at different points of 
time and places), one has the mental capacity to (re)connect the pieces so 
that they form a consistent virtual sphere. Hence, the sensation of the 
constituents of the media product, as well as what they represent, is that 
they are minimally co-present. As perception and interpretation evolve they 
are often also understood to interact.
Narrative theory often emphasizes that events in narratives are related 
in terms of cause–effect, which can be understood as a strong form of 
interaction. While it may be mechanical causality or intentional causality, 
the latter kind is often privileged: narration is generally restricted to the 
representation of actions rather than occurrences.
However, some narratological research also comprises objections to an 
overly strict comprehension of interaction involving one event clearly caus-
ing another, suggesting more nuanced ways of understanding cause–effect 
as not necessarily very direct or absolute (see for instance Branigan 1992: 
26–32). It can also be noted that the notion of cause–effect is not really 
used in physics, where one rather reasons in terms of connected conditions: 
given certain circumstances, certain things will happen because of the prop-
erties of involved objects and the physical laws. If one adds a mental side to 
this material conceptualization, one gets a tool for investigating interrela-
tions among narrative events that is more subtle and multifaceted than the 
concept of cause and effect: given certain mental and material circumstances, 
certain things will happen because of the properties of involved material 
objects and the physical laws, and because of the individual features of 
involved minds and the psychological commonalities. In the context of nar-
ration, naturally, all these aspects are represented and part of virtual spheres.
Co-presence and interaction are two general forms of contiguity on a 
scale from weaker to stronger real connections among the constituents of 
virtual spheres. However, one may also think in terms of more specific 
subclasses of contiguity, understood as particular kinds of real connections 
that form the ground of indices. The following list of various kinds of 
relational channels between entities is in no way complete and there are no 
clear borders between the categories; the classification is merely intended 
to provide a broad overview of real connections by illuminating examples 
ranging from material to mental contiguity.
Contiguity that does not include mental activities in the relational 
channel between entities includes mechanical contiguity (e.g., between 
finger and fingerprint, or between a bow being drawn across strings and 
violin sounding); electromagnetic contiguity (such as between photons 
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emitted from matter and digital photographs [see Godoy 2007], or 
between input in a computer and what is seen on the computer screen); 
chemical contiguity (between photons emitted from matter and classical 
photographs, or between added heat and boiling water); and organic con-
tiguity (between disease and observable symptoms, or between a dead 
animal and a fossil).
Contiguity that includes corporeal and conscious or unconscious men-
tal activities in the relational channel between entities includes, for instance, 
the combination of mental and mechanical contiguity (e.g., between the 
decision to use a pencil and written text, or between sudden rage and the 
smashing of a window) and the combination of mental and organic conti-
guity (such as between emotional state and voice quality, facial expression, 
and body posture; between refusal to eat and sensation of hunger).
Finally, there is contiguity that merely consists of conscious or uncon-
scious mental activities in the relational channel between entities (between 
sensations and assumptions; between premises and conclusions). Thus, 
contiguity covers everything from concrete physical connections to 
abstract reasoning that often ultimately derives from experiences of corpo-
real relations.
These differentiations of forms of contiguity offer a refined way of 
understanding the many possible variations of meaningfully interrelated 
represented objects in virtual spheres in general and more specifically mean-
ingfully interrelated events in narratives. The general and specific subclasses 
of contiguity illuminate the possible grounds of both intracommunica-
tional indexicality (internal coherence of the virtual sphere) and extracom-
municational indexicality (external truthfulness; to be discussed in Chap. 
9). In the case of internal coherence, the contiguities are virtual. In the case 
of external truthfulness, even indices that build on stronger real connec-
tions (i.e., interaction) and reach out to the perceived actual sphere, repre-
sent only the world as one knows it. Not only mental, but also mechanical, 
electromagnetic, chemical, and organic contiguity are presumed contigui-
ties formed by collateral experience. In the end, the extracommunicational 
and the intracommunicational domains are both mental.
narrativization
The concept of perceiving virtual spheres as consisting of meaningful rela-
tions among represented events—what I subsume here under the heading 
of intracommunicational coherence—has already been theorized in vari-
ous ways. In the discussions of gestalt psychology in Chap. 2, I noted that 
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our minds crave structure and sense. This might be reformulated in terms 
of contiguity: we crave real connections. As contiguities can be known to 
us only through mental operations, they must, I repeat, be conceptualized 
as presumed contiguities formed by collateral experience. This comports 
with ideas formulated within narratological research. Seymour Chatman 
noticed “our powerful tendency to connect the most divergent events” 
(1978: 47). By acknowledging this tendency, one is not far from embrac-
ing Monika Fludernik’s concept of narrativization: “making something a 
narrative by the sheer act of imposing narrativity on it” (Fludernik 1996: 
34). A relevant factor for such acts is framing (Wolf 2014, 2017), under-
stood as all kinds of communicative elements that set the mind of the 
actual communicatee toward expecting narrativity and so increase the 
inclination to narrativize: to construe meaningful interrelations among 
represented events. Thus, narrativizing is not understood here as treating 
series of life events as narratives but as imposing narrativity on media 
products.
These ideas can fruitfully be compared with a classical psychological 
experiment by Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel (1944) in which a large 
group of people were shown a short animated movie in which two trian-
gles and a circle move around in relation to a rectangle with an opening. 
The figures and their movements were not randomly chosen. Nevertheless, 
the moving geometrical figures were automatically seen as representations 
of interacting animated beings and the rectangle as a house. A majority of 
the participants in the experiment interpreted the interactions as a con-
nected story. A large but far from absolute consistency in these perceived 
stories was also reported. The researchers emphasized “the great impor-
tance which causal interpretation plays in the organization of the events 
into a story” (1944: 251).
Long before the heyday of narratology, this experiment demonstrated 
the power of narrativization and the transmedial nature of narration. 
Although not discussed or even mentioned, it also demonstrated that 
among the cognitive schemata used by the perceivers of the animated 
movie, one could not only find ideas about how animated beings such as 
humans interact in general, by nature, but also more specific cultural con-
ceptions regarding gender behavior; in other words, stereotypes of how 
men and women are and how they act. Different narrativizations used 
partly different schemata originating in collateral experience of both 
nature and culture, resulting in partly different narratives.
A follow-up experiment by Bassili (1976) established that interaction 
among moving geometrical figures is perceived much more strongly dur-
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ing certain spatiotemporal conditions. Therefore, it is not the case that any 
kinds of stimuli are capable of triggering our inclination to perceive mean-
ingful interrelations. Narrativization requires certain properties in the 
media products and we do not freely narrativize just anything to the same 
extent. Although human minds are inventive, crave meaningful coher-
ence, and have the power to narrativize meager material, our minds addi-
tionally have constraints—there are limits to what one perceives to be 
meaningfully interrelated events (Bundgaard 2007). This leads to a cer-
tain degree of intersubjectivity among actual narratees. Consequently, 
whereas framing may sometimes be important for construing narratives, I 
would argue that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for nar-
ration. On one hand, media products may have qualities that make it prac-
tically unavoidable for most perceivers to interpret in terms of narration, 
independently of how they are framed. On the other hand, framing cannot 
incline us to narrativize any random sensory configurations.
Once again, one must conclude that understanding the emergence of 
narratives is a question of understanding both all kinds of surrounding 
factors of communication and the more inherent factors of different media 
products.
MultiModal narration
Presumably, the results of the experiments by Heider and Simmel (1944) 
and Bassili (1976) can, in principle, be applied to all kinds of media. 
Narrativization does not occur only in the perception of solid, two- 
dimensional, temporal, visual, and iconic media products (cf. Neubauer 
1997). It must also be expected that every change of mode of any of the 
media modalities may affect the way media products communicate. 
Another experiment, based on Heider and Simmel’s animated movie, 
found that combining the movie with different kinds of music altered the 
total perceptions of narratives, to some extent (Marshall and Cohen 
1988). This shows that, as most of us would probably expect, there is 
interaction among the various modes of media products in narration. 
During the last few decades, much empirical research has been dedicated 
to especially the interaction of sensory modes, such as vision and hearing, 
in communication in general.
Given that a majority of basic media types are multimodal—meaning 
that they have several material modes (like being partly organic, partly 
inorganic), several spatiotemporal modes (such as being both two- 
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dimensionally spatial and temporal), several sensorial modes (being both 
visual and auditory, for instance), several semiotic modes (like being domi-
nated by both iconic and symbolic signs), or several modes of more than 
one media modality—it is obvious that our minds have the capacity to 
bind these various modes together into one system of semiosis. For exam-
ple, scientists know that sensory modes are connected and integrated in 
the brain, but know little about how this happens. Semiotic modeling, 
however, is more dependent on pragmatic observation than on detailed 
scientific evidence. Therefore, I claim that an important role of indices is 
to knit together the different modes of a media product so that an inte-
grated virtual sphere, rather than a set of unrelated, mode-specific virtual 
spheres, can be created. Indices—representamens that call forth objects on 
the ground of contiguity—work effortlessly across modal borders simply 
because perceiving real connections among various modes is what our 
brains have been trained to do since the dawn of evolution. We know that 
solid, liquid, and gas-formed materiality interact; that our actual experi-
ence of space and time cannot be separated; and that our senses constantly 
cooperate to make sense of our surroundings.
On a deeper semiotic level, indices continue to connect all kinds of 
represented objects in a virtual sphere in order to achieve coherence. This 
is what I call intracommunicational indexicality: semiosis creating bonds 
within a virtual sphere. First, then, indices interconnect the actual percep-
tions of a possibly multimodal media product to prepare the formation of 
an integrated virtual sphere. At a later stage, indices interconnect the vir-
tual constituents of the virtual sphere so that they can, if possible, form a 
coherent whole; the represented existents and events are perceived to 
interact. In the case of narration, indices form meaningful interrelation 
among virtual events in virtual time. This is the case whether the involved 
media products consist of a limited amount of material, spatiotemporal, 
sensorial, and semiotic modes (such as still images or written text) or are 
markedly multimodal (such as movies that are both spatial and temporal, 
visual and auditory, and iconic and symbolic).
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Abstract This chapter proposes some analytical tools for understanding 
how communication in general and narration in particular can be truthful 
to what one perceives to be the actual world; how it can achieve external 
truthfulness. These external connections are scrutinized in terms of vari-
ous sorts of contiguity, forming the basis for indices that connect narra-
tives to the perceived actual world. The proposed analytical tools are 
intended to make it possible to understand the many ways in which the 
represented events in narratives can be connected to phenomena outside 
the narratives. The standard concept for theorizing this issue within nar-
ratology—fictionality—is critiqued and replaced with a multifaceted con-
cept of (lacking) external truthfulness.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Truthfulness • Contiguity • Index 
• Fiction • Fictionality
In Chap. 8, I circumscribed narration in terms of intracommunicational 
indexicality creating internal coherence. To conclude this second part of 
the treatise, I will also investigate narration in the light of extracommuni-
cational indexicality forming external truthfulness. As internal coherence, 
external truthfulness is a concept that is potentially valid for all kinds of 
virtual spheres created in communication. Traditionally, however, and for 
good reasons, issues of truthfulness have often been connected to research 
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on narration. When perceiving a narrative, nothing is more natural than to 
ask whether the story is ‘true’ or not; do the core events of the narrative 
correspond to events outside the narrative? The standard way of theoriz-
ing this issue within narratology is through the concept of fictionality. In 
this chapter, for reasons that will become clear, I will instead elaborate on 
the concept of extracommunicational indexicality.
Extracommunicational indexicality is semiosis that creates bonds 
between a virtual sphere and its surroundings, connecting representamens 
on the ground of contiguity to objects from outside the virtual sphere. I 
suggest this is external truthfulness in communication. Thus, the concept 
of truthfulness that I propose is to be understood as a conceived commu-
nicative trait; this is not to be confused with truth, which is understood as 
a feature of the actual, never fully accessible world. However, truth may 
possibly be approached through accumulated truthful communication 
and the observation of effects of further action on the basis of conceived 
truthfulness—if the effects of the actions correspond to what is predicted 
by the communication, there is a chance that truthfulness will come close 
to truth.
CommuniCators and narrators
Approaching the issue of external truthfulness, one factor deserves special 
attention: communicating minds, understood as communicators (and 
more specifically narrators), not communicatees (narratees). As defined in 
this treatise, communication is about transferring cognitive import among 
minds. Therefore, the concept of communicator is germane. In related 
but clearly different ways, communicators are central to conceiving both 
the intracommunicational and the extracommunicational domain. To a 
certain extent, they are responsible for both internal (in)coherence and 
external (un)truthfulness. This comes about through representation. 
Communicators are made present to the mind of the perceiver, the actual 
communicatee, via representamens of the media products, and they may 
be objects in the virtual sphere itself, in other virtual spheres, or in the 
perceived actual sphere.
The starting point for this inquiry is the plain but fundamental observa-
tion that actual communicators, producing some cognitive import to be 
perceived by actual communicatees via media products, do not simply dis-
appear behind the virtual spheres created in the perceivers’ minds. In 
many situations, the actual communicator is decidedly represented by the 
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media product and so becomes part of the virtual sphere. In an ordinary 
conversation, for instance, the word ‘I’ is often understood as an index, 
based on strong contiguity in tangible space and time, for the actual com-
municator using her body and its extensions as media products when 
uttering the word. To the extent that anything can be established at all, 
this is a determinable communicating mind that can even be engaged in 
two-way communication. In other situations, the actual communicator 
may be much more distant in both space and time and sometimes, such as 
when one looks at ancient rock-paintings, the actual communicator is not 
at all accessible and can only be construed as an idea of something that 
must have existed at some point. The painting becomes an index based on 
a weak contiguity that depends on the assumption that someone must 
have produced the visual configurations through actions of mind and 
hand. In any case, actual communicators are always, if they are parts of the 
perceived actual sphere, perceived actual producers’ minds.
Represented actual communicators, originating in the perceived actual 
sphere, are objects that warrant external truthfulness, to varying degrees. 
Their existence in and collateral experiences of certain parts of the per-
ceived actual sphere make it plausible that certain aspects of the communi-
cated cognitive import are more or less truthful, even though, paradoxically, 
actual communicators in fact become virtual the moment they are repre-
sented. Of course, the representation of actual communicators is not in 
itself a guarantee of complete truthfulness (for instance, there are factors 
such as forgetfulness, misconceptions, and lies that disconnect parts of the 
intracommunicational domain from the extracommunicational domain), 
but the collateral experience of actual communicators makes it possible to 
partly decide upon the amount of contiguity that is present. This is a com-
plex issue that cannot be developed further for the moment; here, I only 
want to stress that actual communicators are central extracommunicational 
objects; although their roles may vary considerably, they are always, at a 
minimum, necessary links to the perceived actual sphere.
Apart from representing actual communicators, media products may 
also represent overarching and embedded virtual communicators. 
Although emerging within the virtual sphere, overarching virtual commu-
nicators, like all intracommunicational objects, are ultimately construed by 
extracommunicational objects, which means that they may well be similar 
to actual communicators. In addition, media products may represent all 
kinds of communicators that have already been represented in other vir-
tual spheres (one recognizes the communicators from earlier communica-
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tion); these are extracommunicational objects that can be incorporated in 
a virtual sphere in intricate ways.
Kinds of truthfulness
Although actual communicators are often central for the conception of 
external truthfulness through their presence in the perceived actual sphere, 
they do not, as such, determine the outcome of communication. 
Ultimately, it is the actual communicatees that perceive media products 
and form virtual spheres on the grounds of specific media traits and sur-
rounding factors. More precisely, it is those media traits that are perceived 
to have real connections to the extracommunicational domain, and fur-
thermore trigger indexical interpretation, that ultimately create external 
truthfulness.
One central question that has been largely missing in narratological 
research, and more broadly in communication research, is: To what exactly 
can communication, and therefore narration, be truthful? Only differenti-
ating different kinds of external truthfulness can help us out of the trap of 
such unproductive dualities as truthful versus untruthful and fiction versus 
nonfiction, which too often lead to either-or ways of reasoning.
Therefore, I suggest that extracommunicational indexical objects—
objects from the extracommunicational domain that are represented on 
the ground of real connections—can be classified variously, each category 
corresponding to a certain kind of truthfulness. Here, I will provide some 
prominent examples of such kinds of objects and truthfulness. It is not a 
rigid classification but rather an incomplete inventory of types that some-
times overlap, sometimes complement each other, and sometimes are in 
conflict. I do not propose that they should be treated as categories for 
compartmentalization; rather, they are flexible groupings for methodical 
investigations of truthfulness in communication.
Following the division of the extracommunicational domain into two 
parts, we may state that a virtual sphere can be truthful to objects in the 
perceived actual sphere or to objects in other virtual spheres; to our 
notions of the surrounding world or to our acquaintance with earlier com-
munication. In turn, earlier communication may be truthful to objects in 
the perceived actual sphere or to objects in other virtual spheres. The 
notion that there may be truthful representations of other virtual spheres 
that do not represent the perceived actual sphere has previously been 
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 discussed in terms of making truthful performances and statements about 
so-called fictional characters (Colapietro 2009: 117; Searle 1975: 329).
Another division that follows from our earlier discussions in this treatise 
is that a virtual sphere can be truthful to objects that are material or men-
tal. This is a crucial and, in a way, self-evident, but often neglected obser-
vation. According to my view, a concept of truthfulness that includes only 
real connections to materially observable states is perhaps easier to man-
age, but of little use.
Connecting to an age-old distinction of Aristotle, we can also say that a 
virtual sphere can be truthful to objects that are (more or less) universal or 
those that are particular (Aristotle 1997 [c. 330 BCE]: 81; cf. Gale 1971: 
335; Gallagher 2006: 341–343; Walton 1983: 80). Some variations of this 
distinction would be to say that a virtual sphere can be truthful to objects 
that are typical or atypical; permanent or temporary; and global or local. 
This could perhaps be understood as a sort of statistical view on truthful-
ness, related to the probability of repeated contiguity in various environ-
ments and circumstances; truthfulness as a function of certain ways of 
framing the extracommunicational domain.
In a related manner, a virtual sphere can be truthful to objects that are 
wholes or to objects that are details (cf. Pavel 1986: 17). Truthfulness in 
detail does not guarantee a truthful whole and a truthful whole may har-
bor non-truthful details. This is truthfulness understood as perception of 
gestalts; truthfulness emanating from (in)attention to (absence of) singu-
lar real connections when construing the overall pattern of contiguity.
An important but more complex way of sorting extracommunicational 
indexical objects, partly coinciding with some of the earlier categories, is 
that a virtual sphere can be truthful to objects that have previously been 
manifested, that are currently manifested, that are bound to be manifested, 
or that may be manifested (cf. the concept of “possible worlds” in Pavel 
1986: 46). One could perhaps even argue that a virtual sphere can be 
truthful to objects that should be manifested. These latter kinds of truth-
fulness rely heavily on mental contiguity.
In this context, it must also be noted that any material item can be 
drawn into the communicative act and become a media product working 
together with other media products or creating highly multimodal joint 
media products. In criminal trials, for instance, fingerprints and other 
pieces of evidence are framed so that they interact with standard basic 
media types such as speech, written text, still images, movies, and sound 
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recordings that incorporate them to create a virtual sphere based on strong 
contiguity to the perceived actual sphere.
Summarizing these recent observations, and some earlier ones from 
Chap. 8, I suggest that all general varieties of contiguity (from weak co- 
presence to strong interaction), all kinds of indexical junctions (based on 
mechanical, electromagnetic, chemical, organic, and mental contiguity), 
and all types of indexical objects (in the perceived actual sphere or in other 
virtual spheres, material or mental, universal or particular, wholes or 
details, manifested previously, currently, or subsequently) are involved in 
claims to external truthfulness in communication. Consequently, they are 
all vital to external truthfulness in narration.
truthfulness in so-Called fiCtion
To close this chapter, and also Part II of the treatise, I will place external 
truthfulness in relation to the contrasting concepts of fiction and fictional-
ity. Fictionality is normally understood as a supposed (at least partial) qual-
ity of certain qualified media types labeled fiction—“novel, short story, 
graphic novel, fiction film, television serial fiction, and so on” (Skov 
Nielsen et al. 2015: 62; cf. Searle 1975: 332)—and pertaining to repre-
sentation of invented, unreal, and purely imaginary objects. Also, when 
fictionality is sometimes assumed to be a possible quality in nonfiction, it 
is circumscribed in terms of invention and unreality.
In other words, fictionality is supposedly not the representation of 
objects from the perceived actual sphere but solely of objects from the 
virtual sphere or other virtual spheres that do not involve the perceived 
actual sphere. This concept runs into trouble when one considers that all 
intracommunicational objects ultimately rely on extracommunicational 
objects, even though they emerge within the intracommunicational 
domain and may gain a sort of autonomy by being perceived as new 
gestalts. A minimal conclusion of this observation is that fictionality is very 
difficult to circumscribe because of the floating borders between extra-
communicational objects and new intracommunicational gestalts. A more 
drastic conclusion is that there is no specific quality of fictionality, only 
sorts and degrees of truthfulness according to the categorizations in the 
last sections: degrees of contiguity from weak co-presence to strong inter-
action in various indexical junctions (based on mechanical, electromag-
netic, chemical, organic, or mental contiguity) connecting to a variety of 
indexical objects (in the perceived actual sphere or in other virtual spheres, 
 L. ELLESTRÖM
109
material or mental, universal or particular, wholes or details, manifested 
previously, currently, or subsequently). In less provocative terms, this 
would mean that the idea of fictionality is not necessarily meaningless or 
redundant but in dire need of a refined conception of the myriad ways in 
which communication can harbor low degrees of truthfulness.
If the term ‘fictionality’ is to be retained at all, it should not be under-
stood as referring to distinct features but to a lack of certain sorts of truth-
fulness. In effect, this renders the term ‘fictionality’ superfluous. Hence, I 
argue that truthfulness and so-called fictionality are not two contrary qual-
ities; rather, they represent different grades on the same scale—and one 
does not need two terms, and even less two concepts, to capture the varia-
tions of one phenomenon. I think it is more efficient to work with one 
homogeneous but indeed very complex concept of sorts and degrees of 
(lack of) truthfulness.
If the concept of fictionality is deserted or remodeled to a notion of 
lacking truthfulness, what is then left of fiction, which is supposedly based 
on fictionality? Under all circumstances, it is clear that one cannot make “a 
categorical distinction” between fiction and nonfiction (Yadav 2010: 191; 
cf. Ryan 1991). If the concept of nonfiction is to be retained in academic 
discourse, it must be understood as a range of qualified media types that 
are expected to have certain kinds of truthfulness. Fiction, an equally 
problematic concept, would then be a range of qualified media types that 
are expected to lack certain kinds of truthfulness. However, this does not 
eliminate the condition that there is truthfulness in both fiction (including 
qualified media types such as novels, animated cartoons, and ballads) and 
nonfiction (such as documentary films, scientific articles, and oral testimo-
nies). This has been acknowledged in various ways by several scholars who 
otherwise differ in their conceptions and terminology (for instance, 
D’Alessandro 2016; Gale 1971; Grishakova 2008; Harshaw 1984; Ronen 
1988; Ryan 1980; Searle 1975).
Because I find this conception of fiction versus nonfiction very coarse 
and unnecessarily cumbersome, I think it gives a better understanding of 
the varieties of truthfulness in communication if each qualified media type 
is investigated on a more fine-grained scale regarding expected truthful-
ness in terms of different kinds of contiguity and different kinds of extra-
communicational indexical objects. I will illustrate this with some 
observations of a few qualified media types from the historical and cultural 
perspective in which the author of this treatise is situated.
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Television news programs are normally expected to be strongly truthful 
in a variety of ways. They should preferably include photographs or film 
footage produced by electromagnetic or chemical contiguity. They should 
certainly be truthful to objects in the perceived actual sphere, but also to 
objects in other virtual spheres, meaning that earlier communication must 
be correctly reported. News programs should also have real connections 
to both material and mental objects; not only to persons, places, and 
events but also to objects such as ideas and emotions. Both wholes and 
details are expected to appear correctly. Importantly, these programs are 
expected to truthfully represent objects that are particular, regardless of 
their degree of universality, which means that atypical and temporary 
rather than permanent objects are also part of their norm. Furthermore, 
the programs should definitely be equally truthful to objects that have 
been manifested and those that are currently manifested—and, if possible, 
to objects that may or are bound to be manifested.
In contrast, historical paintings are expected to be strongly truthful in 
some ways and less truthful in others. To be counted as part of this quali-
fied media type, a media product should be produced by mental and 
mechanical contiguity by a person possessing relevant collateral experi-
ence. A historical painting ought to be truthful to mainly material, visual 
objects. Although the quality of universality can certainly be included, it is 
primarily expected to have real connections to objects particular to a cer-
tain time and place. It is foreseen to be truthful to both wholes and details, 
although the very smallest details are often counted out. While the pri-
mary norm is to truthfully represent objects that have been manifested, 
this might well be combined with truthful representation of objects that 
may be manifested according to the idea that history can repeat itself.
A third example is science fiction novels that are expected to be more 
or less truthful in other ways compared to news reports and historical 
paintings. To a certain extent, they should be truthful to objects in other 
virtual spheres, meaning that their own objects should preferably corre-
spond to other science fiction in order to make sense. Most readers prob-
ably anticipate such novels to represent more or less universal objects, and 
to discuss things in general and globally. Of course, this does not exclude 
truthful representations of atypical and spectacular objects. Naturally, sci-
ence fiction novels are primarily expected to be truthful to objects that 




My claim here is not that the sketched expectations of a handful of 
qualified media types are accurate, but rather that there are various and 
shifting anticipations of these kinds that are important for construing 
qualified media types. Media types and submedia, or genres, are often 
qualified (Elleström 2010) exactly regarding expected presence or absence 
of various sorts of truthfulness; qualified media types are partially defined 
by the very kinds of truthfulness in the media products that constitute 
them (cf. Wildekamp et al. 1980: 556). Thus, media type attributions such 
as ‘this is a dinner conversation, but that is a legal testimony’ can be under-
stood as truth claims. Additionally, expected or even required varieties of 
external truthfulness and non-truthfulness are often envisaged to go hand- 
in- hand with certain styles and other media hallmarks that emphasize the 
media differences. In the end, however, qualified media types are certainly 
not stable entities but important pragmatic categories that vary through 
history, ideologies, and cultures. Mapping such manifold diversities is nec-
essary in order to transcend the all too coarse fiction–nonfiction 
distinction.
In this concluding section of the last chapter of the second part of the 
treatise, I have already moved the discussion from basic to qualified media 
types. In the third and final part, the qualifying aspects of media types will 
be studied in some detail and from a decidedly narrative point of view.
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It is now time to fully engage in the issue of narration in qualified media 
types: media types that are formed not only by basic modality modes but 
also by the origin, delimitation, and use of media in specific historical, 
cultural, and social circumstances, and furthermore by their communica-
tive and perhaps aesthetic traits; what they can do for certain people in 
certain environments (Elleström 2010: 24–27). Part III exemplifies narra-
tion in diverse qualified media types: painting, instrumental music, math-
ematical equations, and guided tours. These qualified media types are 
grounded on partly very dissimilar basic media types, which also makes it 
possible to highlight the fundamental importance of media modalities for 
narration. The four brief investigations will additionally illustrate how his-
torically and socially qualified media types establish, in different ways, con-
ventions that facilitate narration. Through habits and experiences we form 
expectations and learn how to interpret certain features of qualified media 
types as narrative supports. Each investigation will pay attention to the 
core elements of narratives, represented events that are temporally interre-
lated in a meaningful way, entrenched in the other general communica-
tive fundamentals that have been elaborated throughout the first two parts 
of the treatise.
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CHAPTER 10
Narration in Qualified Media Types
Abstract This chapter illuminates and roughly summarizes some vital 
concepts and ideas of the whole treatise. Narration in four diverse quali-
fied media types is explored: painting, instrumental music, mathematical 
equations, and guided tours. These qualified media types are grounded on 
partly very dissimilar basic media types, which also makes it possible to 
highlight the fundamental importance of media modalities for narration. 
The four investigations also illustrate how historically and socially qualified 
media types establish conventions that facilitate narration. Overall, the 
four investigations elucidate the usefulness of the theoretical framework 
developed in the treatise and highlight the media similarities and differ-
ences that make narration a profoundly transmedial but media-dependent 
phenomenon.
Keywords Transmedial narration • Qualified media • Painting • 
Instrumental music • Mathematical equations • Guided tours
In selecting qualified media types I have avoided those that have been 
most popular in narratological research, such as various forms of literature, 
film, and comics. To push the transmedial perspective, I chose to inspect 
media types that challenge overly narrow limits of narration. I begin with 
two already partly explored artistic qualified media types—painting and 
instrumental music—and end with two unexplored ‘non-artistic’ qualified 
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media types: mathematical equations and guided tours. As my goal is to 
highlight the broad transmedial applicability of essential narrative con-
cepts, the four investigations will be structured similarly, while also reveal-
ing in some detail the media-specific differences.
Painting
There is a long history of research on the issue of narration in painting. 
Because painting is normally understood as a qualified form of the basic 
media type of still image, the results of this research can, to some extent, 
be extended to narration in still images in general. Paintings are still images 
in that they are usually expected to be solid (and generally inorganic), 
two-dimensionally spatial and non-temporal, visual, and predominantly 
iconic. Being predominantly iconic means that the visual surface is at an 
initial stage primarily understood to resemble the objects that they repre-
sent, although the represented objects are not necessarily concrete and 
visual. Paintings, like other forms of media products, may be cross- modally 
iconic, meaning that the iconicity is based on similarities among, for 
instance, different sense perceptions, and between concrete and abstract 
entities (Elleström 2017). This means that so-called abstract or non- 
figurative art may also be iconic, representing objects such as rhythms and 
patterns of sound or tactile sensations, or more abstract notions such as 
clashes, speed, harmony, chaos, or rest.
Although the capacity to hold cross-modal iconicity facilitates transme-
diation among different media types in general, and also transmediation of 
narratives, narration in painting faces one obstacle: because the materiality 
of still images does not evolve in time, painting is a static media type. As 
already noted, this puts narration to the test because non-temporal media 
products do not readily represent temporal relationships among events. 
However, as I concluded earlier, this does not eliminate the narrative 
capacity of still images and hence paintings.
This is not the forum for extensive elaborations on how painting as a 
qualified media type can be delineated. One crucial point of the concept 
of qualified medium is that qualified media types are bound to vary and 
change, which means that I can only make approximations here. If one 
initially circumscribes paintings as still images that are handcrafted by peo-
ple using various techniques for applying color to a surface, one may note 
that there is a multitude of specific traditions and functions of paintings in 
various cultures. Of course, no one really knows precisely how ancient 
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people used and appreciated for instance rock-paintings, and still today 
paintings have rather different functions depending on culture and other 
contexts. Paintings may be expected to have, say, religious, aesthetic, edu-
cational, or practical uses, or a mixture of them all. For more thorough 
investigations, therefore, it is probably more useful to think in terms of 
several interrelated rather than one single qualified medium of painting.
As painting is such a broad media category, there are virtually no limits 
to the kinds of events that a painting may depict. Anything that can be 
represented by visual still images may be harbored within painting con-
ceived as an all-embracing qualified medium. Naturally, criteria for what 
kinds of events qualify for proper painting vary considerably depending on 
time and culture. For instance, at a certain moment in a certain place, only 
events from Christian history and mythology might be accepted. 
Additionally, there are genres of painting that further qualify what kinds of 
existents, states, and events should be included. Therefore, genres may 
appropriately be called submedia.
Some paintings, such as so-called still lifes, represent only states, such as 
food lying on a table. Although it is not impossible to narrativize such 
states, there is a huge difference between still lifes and paintings depicting 
myriad people eating, fighting, or playing. In the latter case, both concrete 
events such as jumping and falling and abstract events such as winning and 
losing may be directly represented. Given a sufficient amount of events, 
they may also be hierarchized by the actual communicatee on the basis of 
the appearance of the media product—the painting. On one hand, repre-
sented events may be given a dominant role because of, say, large size, 
foreground location, or central position on the two-dimensional surface of 
the painting. On the other hand, represented events may be perceived to 
be principal because of their existential weight; someone dying in the 
background may well be a more essential event than someone having a 
beer in the foreground.
Given the capacity of paintings to represent a multitude of concrete and 
abstract events, both actions and occurrences, it is fair to say that paint-
ings, photographs, and other still images have “narrative implications” 
(Kafalenos 1996). It is also clear that painting and other qualified media 
types based on visual still images have, for thousands of years, developed 
conventions that enhance narration. In semiotic terms, this adds a sym-
bolic element to the predominantly iconic medium of painting. Research 
in the historical development of ancient qualified media types such as epic 
literature, vase painting, and illustrated written religious texts have dis-
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cerned three methods of realizing already known literary narratives in 
visual art (Wickhoff 1895: 8–9; Weitzmann 1947: 12–33). These catego-
ries are echoed in later and more general research on transmedial narration 
(such as Kibédi Varga 1988; Wolf 2003: 189–191). Formulated in my 
own terminology and with the addition of some reflections, narration is 
achieved through the three following means:
• One single confined two-dimensional space in which one event is 
directly represented. This event calls other temporally interrelated 
events to mind so that they can together form a narrative. As stated 
in Chap. 7, there are at least two ways of achieving narration in this 
way. Either collateral experience in the form of general knowledge of 
the natural and cultural world is called forth to provide additional 
events, or collateral experience in the form of specific knowledge of 
an already existing narrative complements the directly represented 
event so that other temporally interrelated events can be added.
• One single confined two-dimensional space in which several events 
are directly represented. These events can be sorted temporally by 
the perceiver and form a narrative. As there are conventions for this 
kind of interpretation in painting, beholders are invited to construe 
such temporal interrelations.
• Several confined two-dimensional spaces in which one event per 
space is directly represented. These spaces are supposed to be per-
ceived sequentially. In other words, narration is enhanced through a 
convention of sequential decoding in analogy with the convention of 
reading written verbal texts.
In principle, one could add a fourth possibility (Kibédi Varga 1988); 
namely, several confined two-dimensional spaces in which several events 
per space are directly represented. These spaces should also be perceived 
sequentially.
There are clearly many ways of representing several temporally interre-
lated events in painting and these may include temporal differences 
between narratives and stories (Genette 1980 [1972]: 33–160). A con-
ventionally decoded sequence of events may form a narrative in which the 
order of events differs from the order in the story. Also, paintings that are 
not sequentially arranged can hold a temporal difference between narra-
tive and story in terms of frequency: a single confined two-dimensional 
space in which several events are represented may represent what is per-
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ceived to be the same event several times (meaning at different places), 
although it only happens once in the story.
Thus, narration in painting profits from habitually grounded ways of 
ordering represented events or even perceiving them in a certain order. In 
addition, painting often includes another symbolic element: visual verbal 
titles. These may clearly add to the overall narration by representing inter-
related events that, for instance, specify or augment the events represented 
by the visual icons. Werner Wolf emphasized the importance of captions 
pointing to “cultural scripts” and thus enhancing narration (Wolf 2003: 
191).
Given that there are several interrelated media types of painting, rather 
than one single type, the issue of expected truthfulness in painting is any-
thing but straightforward. However, it is important to emphasize that 
even though painting is generally categorized among other art forms as 
some sort of ‘fiction’, successful painting is certainly not believed to lack 
truthfulness. Although indexicality in painting can clearly be understood 
in terms of texture and patterns of color having real connections to how 
the artist’s tools mechanically formed the surface—which is relevant when 
establishing who actually created a painting—mental contiguity is of more 
immediate interest for most perceivers of painting. In terms of mental 
contiguity, the way in which things have actually been experienced by 
minds exposes other forms of truthfulness to the many kinds of mental 
and material objects in the perceived actual sphere. Obviously, different 
types of painting are expected to represent different forms of indexical 
objects understood in terms of, say, universals or particulars and wholes or 
details. Whereas paintings of the crucifixion of Christ should be truthful to 
how humans generally suffer or exult, paintings of specific historical events 
are supposed to be truthful to the appearance of individuals. Whereas 
impressionistic works are expected to be truthful to how the whole visual 
area is perceived, so-called trompe l’oeil paintings must be truthful to both 
the whole and all of its details. All these forms of truthfulness may be part 
of painted narratives.
instrumental music
Narratological research, including studies in transmedial narration, often 
ignores the rather extensive research in musical narration. Márta Grabócz 
(2008) provides an overview of the many ideas about narration in music 
and the subject is somewhat controversial. Malgorzata Pawlowska (2014) 
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offers a good summary of the shifting opinions on the existence of narra-
tion in music. The hesitation to embrace the idea of music being poten-
tially narrative does not so much concern music including song, or having 
words integrated in other ways, as music (almost) completely lacking ver-
bal components—which I refer to here as instrumental music. As the con-
cept of narration is still strongly associated with verbal media types, some 
scholars consider music that has perhaps at most an abstract title as the 
only verbal constituent to be non-narrative, almost by definition. I will 
refrain from explicitly arguing against these views, which are often vari-
ously formulated in nuanced ways, and instead pick up some rewarding 
suggestions of how to conceptualize narration in music. My contention is 
that it is both unproblematic and constructive to consider some instru-
mental music narrative.
The presemiotic basic media traits of music are fairly clear-cut. 
Materially, music simply consists of vibrating air. These vibrations are tem-
poral because they change as time passes; all music is perceived within a 
certain time frame. Music may also be three-dimensionally spatial to a 
certain extent. If the point of departure for the vibrations is one single 
location, like a guitar, the vibrations are spread in the room in a fairly sym-
metrical way, making us perceive the music as one sensation, albeit distrib-
uted in space. If the points of departure for the vibrations are several 
locations—such as a guitar, a flute, and a set of drums—the vibrations are 
spread throughout the room so that one may discern spatial differences. 
This three-dimensionality of music is more diffuse than the three- 
dimensionality of, say, a gesturing body, but concrete enough to contrib-
ute to the signification of music. Although music may be defined to 
include the visual perception of for instance performing musicians, I 
delimit it here to the auditory.
It is perhaps more controversial to state that the dominant semiotic 
mode of instrumental music is iconicity. It would require a large detour 
from the primary objective of this treatise to explain the many conflicting 
ideas about musical signification, or more generally musical meaning. 
Therefore, here I only suggest that musical signs are auditory signs largely 
referring to motions, emotions, bodily experiences, and cognitive struc-
tures on the ground of similarity. Melodies, pitches, intervals, rhythms, 
dynamics, sound qualities, and the way they together form ever- developing 
structures represent similar structures in the externally perceived common 
world around us, in the internally perceived personal world within us, and 
in the emotionally and cognitively experienced mental domain within us. 
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Representing emotions, for instance, is not the same as evoking emotions: 
a listener can perceive that a piece of music represents happiness without 
becoming happy herself.
From a presemiotic point of view, instrumental music is no doubt suit-
able for representing temporality and therefore potentially for narrating 
because all musical media products evolve in time. The challenge of narra-
tion in instrumental music concerns the semiotic rather than the spatio-
temporal modality, mainly because of the absence of well-developed 
symbolicity in the form of verbal language.
Instrumental music, understood as a qualified medium and not just any 
form of communicative non-verbal sound, is generally expected to have 
some sort of aesthetic qualities, in a broad sense (including lighter as well 
as more highbrowed aesthetics). Because instrumental music, just like 
painting, is such a broad category, a more detailed study would have to 
make distinctions among an abundance of all forms of submedia, genres, 
in order to give a representative picture. Like all qualified media types, 
instrumental music is qualified differently in different periods, cultures, 
and subcultures. Since virtually all research on narration in music that I am 
aware of concerns Western classical (tonal) music, this will also be my 
point of departure—not because I think it is necessarily the best illustra-
tion of narration in instrumental music but because it makes it easier to 
incorporate existing research in my argumentation.
Having swiftly established that the representation of temporality poses 
no problem for instrumental music, the remaining core question for nar-
ration concerns the representation of events. It is evident that instrumen-
tal music does not freely represent events that are as clearly and 
intersubjectively definable as many events represented by language-based 
media types using advanced symbol systems, media types using visual icons 
(photography, dance), or both (television news, comics). In those media 
types, events can often also be connected to concrete existents, which 
make them more palpable. In instrumental music, events must primarily 
be understood in terms of changes in tempo, dynamics, sound qualities, 
keys, and so forth. Events such as these, and also the existents that they are 
grounded on, are abstract rather than concrete. Nevertheless, existents 
and events represented by auditory icons can certainly be perceived as hav-
ing meaningful interrelationships.
Anthony Newcomb discussed this in terms of temporally ordered musi-
cal events where the listener experiences directedness, continuation, and 
potential (Newcomb 1987). Also, Eero Tarasti treated narration in music 
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in terms of temporally emerging tensions and forces among events; he 
additionally reasoned more specifically, in terms of musical entities such as 
“actants” or “actors” that fulfill different functions in the musical narrative 
(Tarasti 1994). Susan McClary emphasized relations among themes and 
keys and the possibility of thinking about tunes as “protagonists”, together 
forming tensions in the temporal development and possibly disruptions of 
expectations (McClary 1994, 1997; cf. Seaton 2005). Broadening the 
scope, Vera Micznik wrote about musical narration in a more far-reaching 
sense, beyond directions, forces, and tensions among abstract events rep-
resented iconically (Micznik 2001). She also considered connotations 
(which I would translate as indexicality) and sense created by musical con-
ventions (which I would call symbolicity). Although limited in their scope 
compared to those extensive systems of symbols that we call verbal lan-
guages, such musical symbols also connect more directly to the exterior 
and can hence represent more concrete existents and events such as hap-
penings in a pastoral scene. Thus, musical narration including symbols is 
closer to narration in verbal media types than to musical narration primar-
ily based on icons.
Convention-based semiosis in instrumental music can be grounded not 
only on habits of representing certain existents and events but also on 
more specifically narrative conventions: habits of composing music that 
facilitate narration. Newcomb (1987) developed a rather general analogy 
between narration in written literature and instrumental music in terms of 
rule-governed, temporal perception of sensations representing events sup-
ported by narrative conventions that lead to certain expectations of what 
will follow, although these may or may not be fulfilled.
The above-mentioned researchers variously thought of represented 
events as actions or occurrences. Including notions such as actants and 
protagonists means that music is understood to represent conscious enti-
ties, minds, which act and thus create events in the form of actions. 
Consequently, it is possible but not necessary to think about musical 
events in terms of actions; also without represented minds that act there 
may be events in the form of occurrences. It must also be added that 
although the prerequisite for narration consists of representation of tem-
porally interrelated events, the sometimes accented three-dimensionality 
of musical sounds also facilitate distinct spatial divisions of represented 
events: listening to musical sounds coming from different directions may 
trigger the creation of a virtual sphere containing spatially separated 
events. It is additionally clear that musically represented actions and occur-
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rences, distributed in time and possibly also in space, are generally more or 
less hierarchized by listeners: all changes of conditions are not considered 
to be equally important.
It goes without saying that collateral experience of the perceiver in the 
form of cognitive schemes and knowledge of earlier narratives may be vital 
for the realization of narration in instrumental music. This means that very 
simple verbal titles can also make event-structures of known narratives or 
cognitive schemes present to the mind of the perceiver; these event- 
structures may then be realized or reinforced by the unfolding musical 
structure. Noting this, we are already on our way to explain narration in 
so-called program music, which includes more comprehensive verbal ele-
ments and hence falls beyond the borders of instrumental music as defined 
here.
Anyhow, perceiving music with or without verbal components involves 
striving toward grasping some sort of internal coherence. If one is aware 
of a title pointing toward something more concrete, one normally tries to 
incorporate this in the virtual sphere. If the piece of music only has an 
abstract title referring to musical form (like ‘Piano Concerto No. 2’) or no 
title at all, it may nevertheless not be self-evident how the parts belong 
together; it might be necessary to construe an overarching virtual narrator 
being responsible for, say, the representation of harsh clashes between 
existents and events that are best understood as ironic. Robert Hatten 
argued that narration in music includes some extreme contrasts in instru-
mental music that may be understood as shifts in the “level of discourse”; 
a sudden change in mood may place “all of the previous musical discourse 
in a new perspective” (Hatten 1991: 88). Avoiding the notion of dis-
course, I understand this as musical pieces presenting embedded virtual 
narrators introducing new and contrasting events or focalizing already 
represented events in a completely different way. Such ruptures may or 
may not be successfully reconciled by an overarching virtual narrator.
Narration in instrumental music can also be complex in other ways. 
There may be temporal differences between the complete narrative and 
the scaffolding core story, more specifically differences between the order, 
duration, and frequency of states and events in the narrative and the story 
(Genette 1980 [1972]: 33–160). This was investigated by Fred Everett 
Maus (1991) in reference to musical analyses made by other musicolo-
gists. Exemplifying differences in duration, Maus noted that a “musical 
tragedy” may be understood to have a story that lasts for months or years, 
while its complete narrative only lasts for eight minutes (Maus 1991: 31). 
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Differences in order are illustrated with a ‘cadential gesture’, normally 
heard toward the end of a piece, instead being displayed early; one may 
then perceive a temporal disjunction between the temporal development 
of the story (which is concluded by the cadence) and the temporal devel-
opment of the narrative (which presents the cadence at the outset) (Maus 
1991: 28–30). Such a cadential gesture may actually be heard several times 
in the same piece, which may then be understood as appearing only once 
in the story but several times in the complete narrative; this would consti-
tute a difference in frequency (Maus 1991: 30).
Musical narration, like all other forms of narration, may be perceived to 
be more or less truthful, and instrumental music is also qualified as a type 
of medium on the basis of, among other things, expected truthfulness. 
Again, it is important to note that instrumental music must be understood 
in terms of a variety of submedia (such as Indian instrumental ragas, pro-
gressive rock without song, or string quartets), so it is impossible to deliver 
anything but very general remarks here. Anyhow, it makes little sense to 
me to understand instrumental music (just as other forms of communica-
tion) in terms of fictionality. Although it cannot have the same kind of 
contiguity and refer to the same kind of indexical objects as certain other 
media types, it is very much connected to the perceived actual sphere. I 
suggest thinking in terms of mental contiguity, how things have actually 
been experienced by minds. Instrumental music is often expected to be, 
and indeed frequently is, truthful to objects such as motions, bodily expe-
riences, emotions, and cognitive structures in general. Indexical objects 
like these are known to us not least through personal (external or internal) 
experiences and perceptions of both material and mental phenomena, so 
representations of them can be perceived to be more or less truthful. 
Because of our deeply shared resources of feeling and thinking, the indexi-
cal objects of music are often perceived to be highly universal.
mathematical equations
Compared to painting and instrumental music, mathematical equations 
constitute a quite different qualified media type that has hardly been 
researched in terms of narration. Nevertheless, it is a media type that illu-
minates the concept of narration in several ways. Although mathemati-
cians may find some equations elegant, to some degree, they are not 
considered an art form, and compared to most other forms of communi-
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cation it is rather abstract; nevertheless, I believe its narrative capacity is 
striking.
Apart from figures representing numbers, mathematics is full of sym-
bols that are rarely or never used outside this specific communicative 
domain. The basic feature of equations is that they state that two things 
are equal, which is symbolized by an equals sign (=). Moreover, equations 
include variables, also called unknowns, that are often represented by let-
ters such as x, y, and z. The point of equations is to communicate a math-
ematical problem that can be solved through calculation so that the two 
so-called expressions on each side of the equals sign can be demonstrated 
to be equivalent. This includes determining the values of the variables. 
The solution of the simple equation 2 + x = 5 is that the variable x stands 
for 3 because 2 + 3 equals 5.
Investigating the media modalities of mathematical equations makes it 
clear that the basic modes of equations are virtually identical to those of 
written verbal language. Hence, mathematical equations and written ver-
bal language overlap smoothly in various ways and they can both effi-
ciently be transmediated to spoken verbal language; that is, they can be 
read. Although both these qualified media types can, in principle, be real-
ized in rather varied material and spatiotemporal settings, they normally 
appear on solid, inorganic, static, and two-dimensional surfaces. They are 
visual and their most salient signs are symbols: letters in the case of most 
Western languages, and, in the case of mathematics, figures and a range of 
specifically mathematical symbols (although there are also figures in lan-
guage and letters in mathematics). Semiotically, however, written verbal 
language as well as mathematical equations may also be considerably iconic 
and hence semiotically multimodal. The equals sign in itself consists of 
two identical lines representing the absolute similarity of the two expres-
sions in equations. The other mathematical symbols are placed on the 
surface in such a way that one may perceive similarities in gaps, distances, 
internal relationships, proportions, and other spatial qualities. The equiva-
lence of the two expressions is represented iconically through their mir-
rored positions to the left and to the right, respectively, of the equals sign. 
Hence, the two expressions can be seen as signs for each other, so to 
speak.
We have noted that equations—like paintings, but unlike instrumental 
music—are non-temporal, which means that they do not absolutely effort-
lessly represent temporally ordered events. Unless one knows what an 
equation is and how to proceed in interpreting it, little significance will 
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come out of it—and certainly not a virtual sphere containing temporally 
interrelated events. Furthermore, mathematical equations have evolved as 
media products in different cultures for thousands of years; therefore, as 
with other qualified media types, there is a historical dimension to con-
sider. Like painting and instrumental music, equations do not constitute 
one single variation but rather a plenitude of submedia with intricate spe-
cific traits and widely different levels of complexity. Nevertheless, they are 
all expected to hold the specific communicative core quality of being tools 
for solving mathematical problems that may be more or less connected to 
understanding properties of the world.
Equations can represent existents that are not only numeral abstrac-
tions. Albert Einstein’s famous formula e = mc2 represents the interrela-
tions among energy, mass, and the speed of light. However, these 
interrelations involve certain calculable relationships. Thus, equations in 
physics, chemistry, and engineering freely mix representations of existents 
that are anchored in the physical qualities of the world and mathematical 
existents such as numbers and proportions. Therefore, represented events 
in mathematical equations may be changes of conditions involving both 
more concrete and more abstract states.
A simple equation such as 1 + 1 + 4 − 5 = x represents events under-
stood as changes of numeral and proportional states. It can be read ver-
bally as ‘one plus one plus four minus five equals ex’. Whether the equation 
is read verbally or not does not affect its potential status as a narrative; 
either way, it represents a series of numeral changes—a succession of inter-
related events. Nevertheless, a transmediation to a more elaborate verbal 
narrative might make the narrative core of the equation more visible: ‘I 
was alone in the kitchen when my wife came home. Soon after that, also 
our four children arrived, but after a while I saw five family members go 
out in the garden. As I was very tired it was all very confusing: how many 
were actually left in the kitchen?’
One of the differences between the mathematical equation and its ver-
bal transmediation, apart from the very concise narrative (consisting of 
virtually only a minimal core story) being expanded to a somewhat more 
elaborate narrative, is that events in the form of occurrences are changed 
into actions. Events represented by equations, if the latter are not embed-
ded in other forms of communication, are normally occurrences rather 
than actions. Some events in equations have a larger impact (adding four 
rather than one is a more significant change of states), which means that 
they in a way can be hierarchized. In another way, however, all events are 
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equally vital, as ignoring even the tiniest of them will invalidate any 
equation.
Mathematical narration in equations, involving represented events that 
are temporally interrelated in a meaningful way, is very much supported by 
conventions that facilitate narration. One such principal qualifying con-
vention is, of course, the rule of sequential decoding. Like Western written 
verbal language, one must decode equations (roughly) from left to right 
and from top to bottom, in order to get the events in the right order (the 
represented events must be understood to follow the order of decoding 
the mathematical signs). There are many other conventions that I will not 
go into great detail with here. For instance, the use of parentheses deter-
mines how events are to be separated from each other and ordered. A 
section of an equation such as 3y + 7 is totally different from 3(y + 7). 
3y + 7 means that first the variable y is tripled, and then seven is added to 
the product. On the other hand, 3(y + 7) means that seven is added to the 
variable y, and then this sum is tripled. Because of the parenthesis conven-
tion, the two sections represent different events that are ordered in differ-
ent ways and are therefore parts of different narratives. It can be concluded 
that represented events in equations are not only interrelated in general 
but temporally interrelated in specific ways.
Clearly, just as paintings or pieces of instrumental music, not all equa-
tions are best understood as narratives. A formula such as e = mc2 is hardly 
a narrative. An equation such as 3x + 22 + 6 − 4 = 3 × 4 + 3, on the other 
hand, represents several interrelated events that change the developing 
numeral state: numbers are multiplied, squared, added, and subtracted. 
These calculations cannot easily be performed without collateral experi-
ence of numeral changes in one’s life environment and, especially in the 
case of more complicated equations, mathematical training increasing 
one’s ability to keep track of a multitude of intricately interrelated events. 
The assumption in every equation, including those that cannot be seen as 
narratives, is that they hold total internal coherence. Only when the bal-
ance between the two expressions is perfect, meaning that they represent 
exactly the same numeral state, can the equation be considered correctly 
formed or solved. Solving an equation involves strong mental indexicality: 
semiosis based on contiguity or real connections. This means that there 
are simply no options regarding how to connect the signs of the media 
product to what we think of as the mathematical reality. Signs such as 22 
are symbols, of course, but also indices to the extent that they put us in 
direct relation with general principles (in this case, a perceived actual exis-
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tence of the quality of twoness and the operation of multiplying a number 
with itself).
I also think that it is fruitful to make a distinction between narratives 
and stories in equations, at least to a certain extent. We have already stated 
that it is essential to decode the mathematical symbols in a specific order 
and that this order largely determines the order of represented events in 
the narrative. However, an important incentive for construing stories out 
of more extensive narratives is, we have also noted, to understand how the 
temporally interrelated events in the narrative would unfold if they would 
appear in directly perceived real life instead of being represented, and 
evoking such an incentive for equations seems almost nonsensical (unless, 
of course, they are embedded in other forms of communication represent-
ing more concrete aspects of the experienced world). This means that, 
normally, it would probably make little sense to think in terms of temporal 
differences (regarding order, duration, and frequency) between narrative 
and story in mathematical equations.
However, this does not eliminate the usefulness of the distinction 
between a complete narrative and a scaffolding core story, at least in equa-
tions that can be simplified. Isolating variables and simplifying equations 
are established ways of solving them step by step. For instance, 
3x  +  22  +  6  −  4  =  3  ×  4  +  3 can initially be simplified so that 
3x + 4 + 6 − 4 = 12 + 3 remains. Simplifying it even further may lead to 
3x + 10 − 4 = 15. Perhaps this stage of the simplification could be consid-
ered the core story of the complete narrative. Further simplification leads 
to 3x + 6 = 15, then 3x = 9, and finally x = 3, which is the solution—the 
final state after the events have passed by, so to speak.
However, I doubt the usefulness of the concepts of embedded virtual 
narrators and narratees for equations. The virtual spheres of mathematical 
equations are strictly regulated and can hardly allow for alternative per-
spectives. Furthermore, the focalization of the actual or overarching vir-
tual narrator must be very strong to fulfill the firm requirements of 
equations. The expected truthfulness of the qualified medium of mathe-
matical equations, as its internal coherence, is based on mental contiguity 
leading to indexical junctions: the logics of mathematics is not only valid 
within the virtual spheres of equations but also reflects conditions in the 
perceived actual sphere, including what we understand to be physical laws. 
Thus, the indexical objects in the perceived actual sphere may be both 
mental and material. As equations can be applied to both general phenom-
ena and particular circumstances, the indexical objects in the perceived 
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actual sphere may additionally be universal as well as particular, and wholes 
as well as details.
guided tours
The last qualified media type to be investigated is guided tours, which, to 
the best of my knowledge, have not yet been researched in terms of narra-
tion. This is a form of communication that may rely on a wealth of modes; 
hence, it exemplifies multimodal narration at its extreme. As a guided tour 
goes on, all forms of media products can be incorporated in a composite 
media product that integrates an increased amount of more or less dissimi-
lar media types—together forming an amalgamated media type with its 
own character. Virtually all modes of the material, spatiotemporal, senso-
rial, and semiotic modalities may be included in guided tours, which 
entails that narration, and communication in general, can be realized 
through many different resources interacting in a multitude of complex 
ways that can only be hinted at here. In order to make the presentation 
somewhat more focused, I will mainly discuss one of many variations of 
guided tours: guided city tours.
All guided tours are temporal; they are not only perceived in time, 
which is the case for all media products, but, like music, they are unfolded 
in time. This is a convenient media trait for narration as it makes it possible 
to represent events in a certain order that cannot be escaped. However, 
guided tours can include parts that are static rather than temporal, 
although introduced in a temporal flow. As a guided city tour goes on, 
sculptures, reliefs, paintings, and other forms of visual, static, and two- 
dimensional images are likely to appear. Also, various forms of inscrip-
tions, signposts, and other static, visual, and verbal media products that 
must be sequentially decoded in order to make full meaning can be 
expected to be integrated. It is clear that these static incorporated media 
products may represent events that contribute to an overall narrative.
I would argue that guided tours are generally expected to be narrative. 
In other words: narration is one of the qualifying traits of guided tours. 
Most people who embark on a guided tour do not simply want to learn 
about a row of isolated states and events but also about their meaningful 
temporal interrelations. Spatial movement is another qualifying trait of 
guided tours. The participants in a guided city tour expect to be involved 
not only in a temporally evolving media product but also in a three- 
dimensional, spatially evolving media product; they expect to walk or be 
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driven around in the city—otherwise, it is simply not a tour. Furthermore, 
a tour cannot be considered a guided tour if it does not include a guide. 
Thus, a classic guided tour includes one or several corporeally present 
persons acting as guides, meaning that they are the actual narrators being 
present together with the participants, the actual narratees. Variations of 
guided tours, such as those involving audio guides (pre-recorded voices) 
instead of living persons, are not considered here.
As guided tours are composite media products potentially incorporat-
ing virtually all kinds of media products, they can represent practically all 
kinds of states and events, whether these events are actions or occurrences. 
These many forms of events may clearly be more or less strongly interre-
lated. It may be presumed that the actual narratees of guided city tours 
normally form a hierarchy of essential historical events, with certain major 
events at the top forming a scaffolding story: when the city was founded, 
when it became a capital, when it was invaded, when the most famous 
buildings were erected, when major parts of it were destroyed in a fire, and 
so on, and how these events are interrelated.
Given the open structure of guided tours, which normally include a 
broad variety of media products, probably often representing a multitude 
of also only vaguely interrelated events, actual narratees are likely to con-
strue partly rather different hierarchies of events. Naturally, all forms of 
background knowledge of history, culture, geography, and so forth—and 
of earlier narratives including events related to these areas—facilitate the 
creation of relevant interconnections among the many directly represented 
events, as well as events that are not directly represented by the guided 
tour. Because most people expect guided tours to be narrative (they are 
often conventionally understood to constitute narratives), they are prob-
ably narrativized to a high degree in accordance with cognitive schemes 
related to historical, cultural, and political development.
However, diverging background knowledge among actual narratees 
may contribute to the formation of both differing stories and dissimilar 
hierarchies of events. Another factor that may add to a disintegration of 
stories construed by different perceivers is the complexity of representa-
tions in guided tours, meaning that there are no definite borders between 
a guided tour and everything surrounding it; almost any observation of 
the actual narratees may be incorporated into what they perceive to be the 
guided tour. In order to make sense of the sometimes scattered or even 
conflicting mass of represented events, either clearly within or in the bor-
der zone of the guided tour, the perceivers are likely to construe an over-
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arching virtual narrator that, to some extent, reconciles uncertainties and 
conflicts and pushes the many represented states and events toward inter-
nal coherence.
Probably much more often than not, guided tours harbor temporal dif-
ferences between narrative and story (Genette 1980 [1972]: 33–160). It 
is difficult to arrange a guided city tour in such a way that the temporal 
order of the represented events in the complete narrative correspond pre-
cisely to the temporal order in the story. Moving through a city involves 
encountering quarters, buildings, squares, and monuments related to his-
torical events that do not follow the path of the tour. Thus, the guide 
must, at least to some extent, jump back and forth among the historical 
events and still explain their interrelations so that a scaffolding story can 
be captured. Using spoken language, this is easily achieved though phras-
ings such as ‘this happened long before …’ or ‘this would lead to the 
events that I described earlier …’. Differences in duration are also unavoid-
able. As a guided city tour only lasts for a few hours and the history of a 
city can be counted in decades, centuries, or even millennia, the duration 
of the narrative, directed by the actual duration of the media product, is 
very much shorter than the duration of the story—the duration of states 
and events as we assume they have appeared in real life. Differences in 
frequency are also ordinary elements in guided city tours. For instance, the 
most central events in the story, such as a collective action like a revolution 
or a natural occurrence like an earthquake, are likely to be represented 
several times in the narrative even though they occur only once in the 
story; this is modeled on our assumptions of real life events. In an abun-
dantly multimodal media type such as guided tours, these repeated repre-
sentations of the same events can be realized in a multitude of ways: 
through speech and gestures, sculptures, monuments, inscriptions, leaf-
lets, engravings, paintings, ruins, or walls with cracks caused by the earth-
quake or bullet holes from the revolution.
It may not be self-evident how to understand the status of narrators in 
relation to the many media products that are integrated in a guided tour. 
However, it is clear that a guide is an actual narrator being present at the 
tour, using her own body and its extensions as media products while talk-
ing, gesticulating, and pointing, and also drawing objects in the surround-
ing into the realm of communication so that they act as media products. 
This presence enables two-way communication between the actual narra-
tors and the actual narratees—the tour participants. There may also be 
communication among the actual narratees that adds to the guided tour. 
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All this gives the participants the potential double role of actual commu-
nicators, possibly narrators, and actual narratees (in other words: they can 
interact with the guided tour). On top of this, the participants of a guided 
tour encounter various media products produced by other, often absent, 
actual narrators. Thus, one can say that a guided tour involves not only the 
actual narrators constituted by the present guides (and possibly the par-
ticipants) but also a variety of mainly absent, living or dead actual 
narrators.
However, one could also argue that although the many media products 
in a guided tour are certainly directly perceived by the actual narratees, 
they are actually embedded in the overall narrative produced by the guides. 
Disregarding those many media products that are unavoidably haphaz-
ardly perceived by the participants, beyond the control of the guide, the 
media products that the guide actually incorporates in the tour (in a 
planned or improvised way) are not only perceived by the participants but 
in effect represented by the guide when somehow communicatively draw-
ing the participants’ attention to them. There is no conflict between 
something being simultaneously perceived and represented: the guide 
might say ‘there you can see the castle’ and at the same time point to it 
while the perceiver simultaneously actually looks at the castle, representing 
a certain event in political history. This means that while the architects, 
builders, and those who ordered the building of the castle are the initial 
actual communicators of, say, political power or cultural belonging, both 
these actual communicators and the media product—the castle—become 
embedded in the guided tour when represented by the guide. I believe 
that this view is feasible. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that whereas 
there are only a few present actual narrators of guided tours (the guides 
and possibly some participants), there are a multitude of embedded virtual 
narrators of embedded represented media products. In the end, it is the 
focalization of the actual narrators—what they know and what they choose 
to highlight about the city—that primarily determines how the narrative is 
formed.
Finally, it should be noted that the qualified medium of guided tours 
tangibly illuminates the relevance of truthfulness for narration. As many of 
the locations of the represented events in guided city tours are not only 
represented but also actually perceived during the tour, the door is open 
for media products to have direct and strong interactional contiguity with 
the represented states and events in the narrative. There is an important 
difference between someone saying that a certain city has a castle bearing 
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material witness to both an earthquake and a revolution, and someone 
saying that the castle in front of you has traces of these dramatic events. 
Directly perceiving a building with cracks and holes, which could have 
resulted from an earthquake and battles, may add a vital indexical dimen-
sion: the participants of the guided tour directly perceive material objects 
that are drawn into the communication and thus acquire the function of 
media products; media products that are really connected to the perceived 
actual sphere.
Therefore, in contrast to the previously discussed qualified media types, 
guided city tours provide opportunities for not only mental but also mate-
rial contiguity between representamens of the media product and objects 
in the perceived actual sphere. While in the case of cracks and bullet holes 
the perceived contiguity is mechanical, also electromagnetic, chemical, 
organic, and other forms of material contiguity may be involved in achiev-
ing external truthfulness in guided tours. Grossly simplifying the issue of 
indexical object in guided tours, it can be surmised that participants of city 
tours expect them to be truthful to both material and mental objects, to 
both details and wholes, to objects that are manifested previously and cur-
rently rather than subsequently (to history rather than future), and to 
particulars rather than universals (to one specific city rather than all cities). 
Additionally, it is generally both accepted and perhaps even expected that 
guided city tours are truthful to other virtual spheres; that is, to earlier 
communication regarding the city in question, including accepted history 
writing but also legends, fanciful tales, and other submedia types that are 
less directly anchored in the perceived actual sphere.
rounding off
I will stop here before my account of transmedial narration becomes too 
repetitive. More and lengthier examples of qualified media types would no 
doubt highlight additional media-specific intricacies, but I doubt that the 
essential transmedial principles would be further clarified. However, the 
conceptual tools that I have offered in this treatise for understanding and 
analyzing narration should be useful for disentangling the narrative poten-
tial of any form of communication. They should also, hopefully, be helpful 
for perceiving both media similarities and media differences that facilitate 
or obstruct transmediation of narratives among different forms of basic 
and qualified media types.
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